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THE WEST VIRGINIA CONSUMER CREDIT
AND PROTECTION ACT*
VINCENT PAUL CARDI**
This article discusses the 1974 West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act, hereinafter referred to as WVCCPA.1 A sum-
mary of the Act is undertaken early in the article, detailing for the
reader what the Act does. Beyond this summary there is no section
by section restatement of the WVCCPA in the article nor is every
section or group of sections discussed.2 The purpose of the article
is to discuss why the WVCCPA was passed and what it attempts
to do, and in some areas, to discuss how well the Act accomplishes
its purpose.
To place the WVCCPA in its evolutionary context, the article
first provides a brief look at traditional common law problems in
this area and at early statutes providing consumer protection. The
second part of the article details the legislative history of the
WVCCPA and contains a statement of its broad purposes and a
detailed summary of its contents. A substantial portion of the
article analyzes how successfully the Act controls finance charges
and how it regulates those engaged in extending small loans for
consumer purposes. Finally, a few of the many provisions in the
WVCCPA that protect consumer debtors from abusive or unfair
* This article was co-authored in whole by Thomas Bowen Bennet, B.S.
(1970), M.A. (Econ. 1973), West Virginia University; presently a second year stu-
dent at West Virginia University College of Law.
**A.B. (1963), J.D. (1967), Ohio State University; LL.M. (1971), Harvard Uni-
versity's member of the faculty at the West Virginia University College of Law since
1967.
The authors wish to thank students in the College of Law Sales class for their
help in researching and pointing out various problems in the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act. In particular the authors wish to thank Lyn
Dotson and Nate Bowles.
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-1-1 to -8-102 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
2 The Act contains one hundred and three sections, and fills seventy pages in
the West Virginia Code without annotations. Because of the intricacy of many of
its provisions, it is expected that the reader will have the Code before him when
reading about the more complex sections. The Act can be found in the pocket
supplement of volume fourteen of the West Virginia Code, even though that volume
contains chapters forty-seven through fifty of the Code and the Act is in chapter
46A. The index to the West Virginia Code contains an index to the "Consumer
Credit and Protection Act" found in the pocket supplement in volume nineteen of
the West Virginia Code. The index is an invaluable aid in finding provisions in this
complex act.
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credit practices are examined in detail, such as several of the provi-
sions giving all purchasers of consumer goods, including those who
pay cash, protection from and remedies for deceptive selling tac-
tics or defective goods.
The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act is
intended to: (1) increase the availability of consumer credit by
raising allowable finance charges (interest rates) and move toward
equalization of rates available to consumers whether they borrow
the money from a lender or buy the goods on credit from a seller;
(2) regulate the rate of finance charges allowed for consumer credit
transactions by prescribing rates and rules for computation; (3)
regulate those businesses which make small consumer loans and
which were formerly regulated by the small loan act; (4) protect
consumers who purchase goods or services on credit or through
consumer loans from deceptive selling techniques, unconscionable
contract terms, and undesirable debt recovery and collection prac-
tices; and (5) protect consumers who purchase goods or services for
cash or credit from, and to give them remedies for, defective or
shoddy goods and services and unfair and deceptive selling prac-
tices.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. Common Law
An eighteen year old girl and her mother signed a contract
with a computer programming school for a year's training at $2400
tuition. The contract contained a clause, in fine print, that allowed
the school to keep six hundred dollars, plus seven dollars for every
class hour attended including one hundred absences in case the
student withdrew from the program. In the school's office the girl
and her mother executed a promissory note for $2400 to the lender
(a separately incorporated finance agency), received a check for
$2400, and endorsed and handed the check back to the school.
When the girl later became pregnant and dropped out of school,
the lender sued for the amount owed on the note.
The court found that the damage clause in the school's con-
tract was unconscionable and if the school had been the plaintiff,
the contract would not have been enforeable. The plaintiff, how-
ever, was a separate corporation and the loan contract was techni-
cally separate from the computer contract. But what other reason
was there to allow the lender to collect on the loan, when in fact
the lender was collecting on the contract? None that the court
[Vol. 77
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could see. Noting that the lender made loans only to the students
of the school, the court held that the lender and the school were
so interwined, that the lender should be responsible for the con-
tract performance of the seller. The court held that the defense of
unconscionability to the damage clause which was good against the
seller, was also good against the lender.3
On the surface this case appeared to involve an ordinary ac-
tion on a promissory note brought by a lender against the maker
to recover the unpaid balance. In such an action the law is clear.
If the lender proves that he made and delivered the agreed upon
loan and that the time for payment is past, the lender has an
enforceable claim for the amount due. It makes no difference that
the seller, whose services were purchased with the loan proceeds,
breached his contract; the transactions are separate occurrences
between separate legal entitles. That is the law of contracts.
Yet, here the court made a further law of contracts. The court
held that where the lender is related to the seller and knows that
the money will be used to purchase services under a defective
contract, the lender does not have a right to complete payment.
This new rule is an addition to the common law of contracts and
becomes part of that body of law which protects consumers.
The development of the common law of consumer protection
is more a reaction to particularly onerous factual situations than
it is a logical development of jurisprudence. For this reason it is
often hard to state principles of consumer protection law in other
than broad general terms. In the famous case of Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,' the court considered the operation
of a cross-collateral agreement. The buyer purchased merchandise
valued at $1800 over a period of several years. The contract re-
tained a security interest in the goods purchased and provided that
each payment would be applied pro-rata to the outstanding bal-
ance of all the goods purchased, so that no item would be fully paid
until all items were paid in full. So even though the consumer had
paid the store over $1400 and had reduced her obligation to $164
before her final purchase of a $515 stereo, under the contract her
default would lead to repossession of everything she had pur-
chased. The court of appeals held that to enforce such a contract
clause would be an unconscionable abuse of a consumer and re-
3Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 67 Misc. 2d 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971).
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See 79 HARV. L. REv. 1299 (1966).
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manded the case to the trial court. The court also noted that the
buyer was a welfare mother who lived on a $218 per month govern-
ment stipend and that the seller knew this when he sold her the
$515 stereo. Did the court in this case decide that cross-collateral
provisions were unenforceable? Or did it decide that a seller cannot
knowingly sell a $515 stereo to a welfare buyer who receives only
$218 a month and expect to enforce the contract? It is not clear
from the opinion, and we must conclude that it probably decided
some combination of the above . The resulting legal principle is
simply that courts will look with disfavor upon cross-collateral
agreements and upon sales to consumers whom the seller knows
might not be able to pay and that, in certain circumstances, courts
may find such practices unconscionable.
Similarly, some courts have shown that they will refuse to
enforce contracts in which the price of the consumer goods greatly
exceeds their value. These courts, however, offer no set formula to
use in determining when the price is so disproportionately high to
be unconscionable. One case held that a price of $842 plus finance
charges for a freezer worth $250 was unconscionable.' Other courts
have found unconscionable contracts to sell goods worth three
hundred dollars for nine hundred dollars,7 goods worth three
hundred dollars for eight hundred dollars,' goods worth $348 for
nine hundred dollars,' and goods worth faf less than the selling
I Before the case could be reheard, the seller replaced the repossessed furniture
and agreed to give the buyer a not insubstantial further cash settlement. Had the
case gone to trial on remand, an adverse decision would have been advice to many
other purchasers. During the previous decade the seller had seldom filed less than
one hundred writs of replevin per year in the general sessions court. See Dostert,
Appellate Restatement of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work, 54 A.B.A.J.
1183 (1968). Pierre E. Dostert was the buyer's attorney in Williams.
I Milford Finance Corp. v. Lucas, CCH Poverty L. Rep. 12,962 (Mass. App.
1970). For a discussion of price versus value of the goods as grounds to avoid a
contract under the UCC, see Note Unconscionable Sales Prices, 20 MINE L. Rv.
159 (1968). Although many courts cite section 2-302 of-the UCC as their authority
in refusing to enforce contracts which they find unconscionable, that code section
was not intended to create new substantive rules defining which practices were
unconscionable and which were not. It was intended to give courts statutory sup.
port for refusing to enforce contract terms which they were already refusing to
enforce and to enable them to do so by a simple reference to the statute instead of
by a complex manipulation of rules of law and equity.
I Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 198 N.Y.S.2d 264, (Sup. Ct.
1966).
' Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968).
' Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966).
[Vol. 77
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price of $1700.10 Not only do the ratios of value to price vary in
these cases, but most cases involved other facts that helped per-
suade the court to overturn the contract. One buyer could not read
the English language contract," another thought he was buying a
food plan instead of a freezer,'" another was known by the seller to
be of limited financial resources,'3 and another was not shown a
true statement of the finance charges.'4 Thus, it can be concluded
from these cases that some courts will look with disfavor upon
major consumer purchases where the contract price greatly ex-
ceeds the true value of the goods, especially where there are other
reasons to find the contract inequitable.
Nevertheless, while many decisions that protect consumers
are made on a case-by-case basis and give only general indications
of judges' opinions of unfair and unenforceable contract practices,
the courts have, in a few areas, laid down concrete rules. A number
of courts have abolished privity as a requirement in products lia-
bility cases.'5 Many have held disclaimers invalid unless conspicu-
ously located in the contract.'6 Some have held confession of judge-
ment clauses invalid." The clarity, scope, and force of a court's
decision must vary with the problem it is approaching. If the prob-
lem is a common one and if there is clear agreement on its fairness
or unfairness, a clear rule with certain application may follow. Yet
,0 American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964). But see People v. Marks, 12 Mich. App. 690, 163 N.W.2d 506 (1968) (an
unstated price of $612 was charged for $25 worth of work done by the seller in
seventy-five minutes to a 73 year old buyer in a house to house sale; held not a sale
under false pretenses).
" Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966).
2 Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968).
,2 Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
" American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964).
,1 See Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Hammon v. Digliani, 148 Conn.
710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244,
147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
26 See Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 IlM. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674
(1963); Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971); Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968); Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co.,
352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J.
358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960). See also, Note, Disclaimers of Warranties in Consumer
Sales, 77 HARv. L. REv. 318 (1963).
11 Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26,28; 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Dist.
Ct. 1966).
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some practices are acceptable or only questionable when standing
alone and only become unacceptable in the eyes of the law when
they are combined with other questionable facts or practices.
These must necessarily be handled on a case-by-case basis until
the certain combination becomes so common that it becomes rec-
ognizable as a particular abusive practice. Then the courts or the
legislature can draft and adopt a certain rule abolishing all such
practices. So, although courts will at times make large decisions
clearly affecting common consumer practices, most judicial control
over consumer transactions will involve the primary judicial func-
tion of deciding a single dispute between two parties. In this way
the judiciary plays a large role in seeking out and defining those
commercial practices that victimize consumers and sets the stage
for future concrete protection.
B. Statutory Protection
1. The Uniform Commercial Code and Other State Legislation
A spanish-speaking couple signed a contract requiring them to
pay nine hundred dollars plus a $245 credit charge for a refrigerator
that cost the seller $348. In making the sale, the seller told the
buyers that they would probably not have to pay anything for the
refrigerator, however, because he would credit them with a twenty-
five dollar commission on every unit subsequently sold to the buy-
ers' friends and neighbors as a result of seeing their refrigerator.
In an action to collect on the debt, the court looked at the $1145
total price for the refrigerator, the buyer's inability to understand
the written contract, and the promise of twenty-five dollar com-
missions, and found it shocking to the conscience. The court looked
to section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in
New York and stated:
It is normally stated that parties are free to make whatever
contracts they please so long as there is no fraud or illegality
... . However, it is the apparent intent of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to modify this rule by giving the courts power to
police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find
to be unconscionable. 7
The court seemed persuaded that the UCC did more than just
codify the common law practice of refusing to enforce unconsciona-
ble contracts but that the UCC urged courts to step in and inter-
fere with unconscionable practices.
[Vol. 77
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The UCC'I contains a number of provisions that protect con-
sumers: it prescribes what actions will create an express war-
ranty; 9 prevents disclaimers of express warranties once made;2
provides that the sale itself will create a warranty that the goods
are merchantable2" and that the circumstances of the sale might
warrant that the goods are fit for an intended purpose;2 requires
that disclaimers be conspicuous in order to be effective; 23 and
makes the seller extend to the family and guests of the buyer any
warranty he gives to the buyer. 24 Protection for consumers is given
by other sections of the UCC, including remedies given a customer
against a bank for wrongful dishonor of his or her check."
Numerous state laws protect consumers against a variety of
unfair practices, including statutes: abolishing referral sales;26
abolishing cognovit notes;" providing cooling off periods in home
solicitation sales;28 regulating deceptive trade practices;29 prohibit-
ing disclaimers of implied warranties; 0 prohibiting pyramid selling
schemes; 3' and modifying the holder in due course protection.22
These statutes are often independent and aimed at a particu-
lar abuse or comprise small codes aimed at an area of unfair prac-
tices, such as debt collection. They generally do not involve the
legislature in a wholesale investigation of consumer problems and
seller and creditor abuses. The two recently drafted uniform codes
considered below take a different approach and try to deal with
many, if not all, of the problems related to consumer purchasing
and financing.
Is Drafted jointly by the National Conference Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute, the UCC has been enacted in all the states
except Louisiana in the last two decades.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-313 (1966).
* Id. § 46-2-316.
21 Id. § 46-2-314.
- Id. § 46-2-315.
- Id. § 46-2-316.
21 Id. § 46-2-318.
- Id. § 46-4-402.
2' IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.24(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 130(b) (1975).
28 ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 44-5001 to -5008 (Cum. Supp. 1971). See Comment,
Arizona's Home Solicitation and Referral Sales Act: An Evaluation and Sugges-
tions for Reform. 12 ARiz. L. Rav. 803 (1970).
21 MAss. ANN. LAws ch.93A, § 2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-316A (Cum. Supp. 1973).
2' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-15-1 to -6 (1974 Cum. Supp.).
HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 476-18 (1968).
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2. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Con-
sumer Act
In 1957 the Council of State Governments asked the National
Conference on Uniform State Laws to draft a model retail install-
ment sales act. Some in the credit industry thought that the effort
should be extended to cover all types of extensions of consumer
credit. Consumer interests felt that the effort should be expanded
even further to cover all types of credit abuses in consumer trans-
actions. A special committee began work on all of these areas and
presented the first draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(hereinafter referred to as the UCCC) to the National Conference
of Uniform State Laws in 1966.11
After two years of redrafting, the Revised Tentative Final
Draft was approved by the National Conference in 1968. Within
three years the UCCC was adopted by Oklahoma (1969), Utah
(1969), Colorado (1971), Idaho (1971), Indiana (1971), and Wyo-
ming (1971). The state of Kansas adopted the UCCC in 1973.
While many favored the UCCC as a balance between lending inter-
ests and consumer interests,u others felt either that it did not
represent the creditor's interests or that it did not adequately pro-
tect consumers."
The belief that the UCCC did not concern itself enough with
the problems of the poor, early spawned a second uniform con-
sumer code. Approximately fifty-five consumer experts from all
over the country attended a conference in Washington on June 20,
1969, which was co-sponsored by the National Consumer Law Cen-
ter" and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and
1 See Comment, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the
National Consumer Act 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 889, (1971).
31 See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1 (1969); Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 24 Bus. LAW. 209
(1968); Copenhaver, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(1968).
1 See U.C.C.C. a Tool for Creditors, 28 Mo. B.J. 324, (1972); Littlefield, The
Plight of the Consumer in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 48 DENVER L.J. 1
(1971).
n The National Consumer Law Center was established at Boston College Law
School in June of 1969 under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO). The Center is designed to aid the poor in the United States through study
and reform of legal doctrine which work to their detriment. The Center also assists
over 2000 legal services attorneys across the country with consumer law problems.
12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 889, 893n.38 (1971).
[Vol. 77
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agreed that the UCCC was inadequate and required substantial
revision. The National Consumer Law Center was asked to under-
take the task of revision with the aid of those experts willing to
participate in the drafting." The result of their efforts was the
National Consumer Act-" (NCA) published in 1970.
Both of the uniform codes are attempts at legal reform and
both are currently being promoted in state legislatures for adop-
tion. There has been a good deal of commentary comparing the two
acts. 9 As indicated by the nature of its drafters, the NCA includes
more provisions intended to protect the consumer than its model,
the UCCC, and it abolishes, instead of just regulating, some abu-
sive credit practices. The UCCC is more balanced or regressive
than the NCA, depending upon one's viewpoint. That the UCCC
is more acceptable is evidenced by its adoption in seven states;
while the NCA has not been adopted as a whole in any state. A
basic assumption of the UCCC is that a high interest rate ceiling
will benefit creditors and consumers alike by leaving the availabil-
ity of credit and the interest rate to the fluctuations of the market.
The drafters of the NCA were more optimistic about the present
supply of credit and less sanguine about the effects on consumers
of raising the rate ceiling. While the merits of the two codes can
best be judged by comparing their corresponding provisions" and
by reading the authoritative commentaries, it is clear that their
existence is changing the nature of the legal response to consumer
problems.
3. Federal Consumer Statutes
The federal government has taken the lead in creating laws
that recognize and protect the interests of the retail consumer.
From the early statutes making it a crime to defraud a buyer
through the mails" and regulating passenger rates on interstate
1 Prefatory Note to the First Final Draft of the National Consumer Act (1970).
5Id.
See Kass, Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act:
Some Objective Comparisons, 8 S. DiEGo L. Rav. 82 (1971); Comment, Consumer
Protection Under the UCCC and the NCA-A Comparison and Recommendations,
12 ARiz. L. Rav. 572 (1970); Note, Limitations on Sales Agreements Under the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, 56 IowA L. Rav.
171 (1970); Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Con-
sumer Act, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 889 (1971).
11 See the table providing cross references between the UCCC and the NCA
found in the Appendix located at the end of this article.
"1 Act of March 1, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1131.
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carriers,4" Congress moved on to direct intervention in protecting
the quality of consumer goods by passing the Food and Drug Act
in 190611 and the Agricultural Meat Inspection Act in 1907."
Probably the most important legislation was the Federal
Trade Commission Act,45 which was enacted in 1914. This Act
established the Federal Trade Commission and prohibits unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce. The Federal Trade Commission is empowered to
prevent unfair methods of competition, to prevent deceptive ad-
vertisement of food, drugs, and therapeutic devices, and to prevent
other deceptive practices. Through delegation by later statutes,
the Commission has the duty to regulate packaging and labeling
of certain consumer commodities, to achieve true credit cost dis-
closure to consumers, and to protect consumers from inaccurate or
obsolete credit reports.
Also in 1914, the Unfair Advertising Act" made it unlawful to
disseminate any false advertisement which is likely to induce the
purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.
Recently, Congress has enacted a spate of laws which contain
sections protecting the consumer and a number of broad acts di-
rected specifically at consumer protection. The Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act47 of 1966 was intended to enable consumers to obtain
accurate information regarding the quantity and contents of goods
and to facilitate value comparisons through the regulation of pack-
ages and their labels.
The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act48 of 1968 re-
quires a seller of land divided into fifty lots or more, offered as a
common plan, to file with the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development a statement containing certain facts about the prop-
erty and to give similar information to buyers.
,2 Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1971) (originally enacted as
Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
43 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1971) (originally enacted as Act of
June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
11 Agricultural Meat Inspection Act, Act of March 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat.
1259.
" Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1971) (originally en-
acted as Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717).
45 15 U.S.C. § 52-58 (1971) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311,
§ 12, as added Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 4, 52 Stat. 114.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1971).
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1971).
[Vol. 77
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The Consumer Product Safety Act49 attempts to protect con-
sumers from unreasonable risk of injury resulting from consumer
products by developing uniform safety standards and promoting
research in the prevention of product related injuries. This law
should assist some consumers in evaluating the comparative safety
of consumer products.
Finally the Consumer Credit Protection Act" was enacted to
protect the credit buyer in all phases of his credit life. The act is
divided into three parts. The first part, commonly known as the
Truth in Lending Act, is intended to assure a meaningful disclo-
sure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various terms available to him and to avoid the
uninformed use of credit. The second part of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act places some restrictions on garnishments. The third
part, known as the Fair Credit Reporting Act,5' is designed to
protect the individual from inaccurate information contained in
credit reporting agency files; this Act gives the individual a right
to see the information on file and the right to challenge its accuracy
and its misuse.
II. THE WEST VuIGINIA CONSUMER CREDrr AND PROTECTION ACT
A. Background
Along with other state legislative bodies, the West Virginia
Legislature began to take some minor action in the consumer area
in the late 1960's. In 1969 and 1970 several small bills were intro-
duced to remedy specific consumer problems, including a bill to
abolish holders in due course in consumer transactions. In 1971, a
draft of the UCCC was introduced but did not pass; even so in that
year pyramid selling schemes were outlawed.2 Whether the ban-
ning of pyramid sales practices was part of a consumer protection
movement or a part of the nationwide reaction to Glenn Turner's
"Dare to Be Great" endeavors is not clear.
In 1972, banks and other lending institutions began to notice
that usury prosecutions were increasing across the country. Dis-
turbed by this and bothered by the unfairness of laws that allowed
high finance charges for installment purchases and revolving
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. I1, 1974).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (1971).
51 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1971).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-15-2, -3 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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charges of consumer goods but required low finance charges for
small cash loans used to pay for these same consumer goods, these
lending institutions turned to the UCCC. The lending institutions
saw in the UCCC the protection and simplicity of one uniform
financing law and the opportunity to raise finance charges for con-
sumer loans which would concomittantly result in expansion of the
credit market for consumers. These banking interestsO sought con-
sumer support for the UCCC and a draft of this uniform code was
introduced. The bill was killed in the House Judiciary Committee
after much work by one of its subcomittees 4
In 1973, consumer interests" wanted a new bill and they
drafted a short concise statute" containing a variety of consumer
protection provisions. This bill and the UCCC draft" in substan-
tially its 1972 form were both introduced. After a great deal of
committee work, both bills were combined and modified, and the
resulting consumer credit and protection bill was passed by both
houses of the Legislature. A clerical oversight, however, had left
some of the intended provisions out of the bill as passed and the
committee persuaded the Governor to veto the bill. 8
I3 These interests were represented largely by the West Virginia Bankers Asso-
ciation. This association is controlled by the large banks who handled lender credit
cards (Bankamericard, Master Charge, etc.) charging 18% when the legal interest
rate was 8%. The small banks were not particularly concerned, and on occasion
even lobbied against the UCCC and in particular against the restrictions on the
rights of holders in due course, assignees, and interlocking lenders. This difference,
and the emerging dispute over branch banking, has led to the formation of the West
Virginia Industrial Banking Association.
H.B. 283, 60th W. Va. Legis. Reg. Sess. (1972).
Many people worked hard to enact strong consumer protection legislation.
Chief among these was an attorney, William Field, Esq., then a Republican dele-
gate from Kanawha County. It appears that his knowledge of consumer problems
and consumer legislation, his ability to explain the proposals to other legislators,
and his ceaseless efforts over a three year period were largely responsible for the
inclusion in the Act of much of the consumer protection provisions. The legislative
skill of Cleo Jones, then a Republican delegate from Kanawha county, was also very
important in the passage of the Act.
H.B. 1066, S.B. 338, 61st W. Va. Legis. Reg. Sees. (1973) (called the Field-
Palumbo Bill). The bill was modeled after the recommendations of President
Nixon's special commission on consumer finance contained in NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES (1972).
5 H.B. 1065, S.B. 347, 61st W. Va. Legis. Reg. Sess. (1973).
The Governor then put a request for this legislation in his call for a special
session of the Legislature. It was passed by both houses as H.B. 208 and S.B. 51
but then inexplicitly vetoed by the Governor.
[Vol. 77
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In 1974, there was-an agreement between the sponsors of the
bill in both houses that it would be passed in its 1973 form. Never-
theless, when it emerged from legislative services, banking ori-
ented changes had been made in the bill. Rule of 78 rebating had
replaced pro-rata rebating in the provision providing rebates for
prepayment." Furthermore, allowance of some assignment of some
earnings had replaced a prohibition of all assignment of earnings."
As a result, the bill went back to committee, and further changes
were made. The sections dealing with holders in due course, as-
signees, and interlocking lenders formerly contained nominal limi-
tations or the absolute prohibition of the holders defenses; the new
versions went on to seemingly grant, in other language, what they
had just taken away.' In other action, consumer interests success-
fully amended the bill to include sections prohibiting disclaimers
and abolishing horizontal privity, two extremely important provi-
sions not in the 1973 version. The legislature passed the bill on
March 5, 1974, and it went into effect on September 1, 1974.2
B. Purposes and Scope
The WVCCPA has a number of purposes. It sets ceilings on
the rate of finance charges (interest rate) and then further regu-
lates the rate of finance charges for certain kinds of credit. To this
end the Act defines different kinds of finance charges such as credit
card fees, insurance fees, delinquency charges, and deferral
charges and specifies where in the rate determining formula these
charges shall be placed for computational purposes. To achieve all
of this, the WVCCPA contains a code, a systematic comprehen-
sive, inter-related set of laws, that constitutes article three of the
Act.
The Act authorizes, licenses, and regulates those lenders
called "supervised lenders," persons or companies who engage in
the business of making some loans with a principle of up to $1200
to natural persons for a personal (non-business) or agricultural
purpose63 with a finance charge exceeding eight percent as deter-
" W. VA. CODE Am. § 46A-3-111 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
eO Id. §§ 46A-2-116, -130.
" Id. §§ 46A-2-101(7), -102(7), -103(6).
W2 . VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-8-101 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Generally, this means a loan to a farmer for producing, transporting, or
manufacturing farm products. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-102(3) (Cum. Supp.
1974).
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mined by an actuarial method and who are not a bank or other
"supervised financial organization"6 organized or chartered under
other federal or West Virginia laws. 5 The Act does this by a statu-
tory scheme set out in article four of the Act.
The WVCCPA regulates a variety of credit extension prac-
tices, credit agreement terms, credit payment processes, and debt
collection practices in consumer transactions. It does this in a
number of largely independent statutory sections gathered chiefly
in article two of the Act.
The Act regulates commercial trade practices and methods of
competition in a few statutory sections in article six and by admin-
istrative regulation through articles six and seven.
It provides some rights, remedies, and other protection to both
consumers who buy on credit or who purchase on a cash basis. It
does this in generally independent statutory sections in articles six,
five, and seven."
The WVCCPA protects consumers and regulates credit prac-
tices and commercial trade practices by setting up a regulatory
agency under the Attorney General. It does this by a comprehen-
sive scheme set out in article seven of the Act.
In assembling the WVCCPA, the Legislature borrowed heavily
from the UCCC, especially in the sections relating to finance
charges, supervised lenders, and consumer credit protection. It
also borrowed heavily from the NCA, especially in the sections
relating to general consumer (cash or credit purchases) protec-
tion."7 Many sections were continued from the existing West Vir-
ginia law68 and sections were borrowed elsewhere or created by
drafters and sponsors of the bill.
61 Id. § 46A-1-102 (43).
65 Id. §§ 46A-1-102(44), (45), (14).
61 An easily overlooked provision declares: "This chapter also prescribes in
articles six ... and seven . . . protective measures for consumers in transactions
not necessarily involving consumer credit." Id. § 46A-1-103(3). "Consumer," for
purposes of article six, was defined by a 1975 amendment to the Act as a natural
person to whom a sale is made in a consumer transaction, and a "consumer transac-
tion" as a sale to a natural person or persons for a personal, family, household, or
agricultural purpose. H.B. 1421, § 102(b), 62d W. Va. Legis. Reg. Sess. (1975).
87 A comparison of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act with
the UCCC and the NCA appears in the table of parallel citations in the Appendix
to this article.
Many of the supervised lender regulations come from the prior small loan
act. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-7A-1 to -26 (1966).
[Vol. 77
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Some general rules and peculiarities of the WVCCPA should
be noted. Generally, the Act only applies to loans for, or credit
sales of, goods, services, or interests in land, made to natural per-
sons for primarily personal or agricultural purposes, where the debt
is less than $25,000 and is payable in installments or is subject to
a finance charge. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule.
Many sections apply to cash sales. Many sections apply to leases.
Some sections apparently apply to transactions for non-personal
(business) purposes."9 Some sections do not apply to loans or credit
sales for agricultural purposes. Some sections do not apply to
credit transactions made pursuant to lender credit cards."
Finally, excluded from coverage of the Act are extensions of
credit to governmental agencies, most sales of insurance, some
transactions regulated by governmental public utility or common
carrier tariffs, licensed pawnbrokers, and secondary mortgage
lenders licensed under article seventeen, chapter thirty-one of the
West Virginia Code.7'
C. Summary of WVCCPA Provisions
Although the content of the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act will not be detailed in this article, it is summa-
rized here in order to show the reader just what consumer and
consumer credit problems are treated in the Act.
1. REGULATION OF LENDING INSTITUTIONS AND
PRACTICES
a. LENDING INSTITUTIONS
REGULATION OF The Act regulates the lending opera-
LENDING OPERA- tions of supervised lenders (formally
TIONS small loan companies) making con-
sumer loans under $1200,2 and sets
forth licensing and renewal procedures
€' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-104, -102(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974) prohibit unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce.
o Id. § 46A-1-102(21).
Id. § 46A-1-105.
72 Id. 88 46A-4-101 to -113 set forth the procedure for obtaining a license to
make supervised loans. The restriction on multiple loan agreements (4-108) is dis-
cussed at footnote 148.
15
Cardi: The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
NOTIFICATION
for these lenders. Use of multiple loan
agreements by supervised lenders to
obtain higher finance charges is prohib-
ited. The Act proscribes the taking of
assignments of earnings or interests in
land as security and restricts the taking
of a security interest in household furni-
ture. Renegotiation by a supervised
lender of loans discharged in bank-
ruptcy is also restricted by the
WVCCPA.3 The Act also restricts the
conduct of business other than making
small loans by supervised lenders.7
Every person engaged in making con-
sumer credit sales or loans or who takes
assignments and collects payments of
such sales or loans, except sellers ex-
tending credit only by seller credit card,
is required under the WVCCPA to file
notice of the same with the State Tax
Department.75
b. REGULATION OF CREDIT TERMS AND PRACTICES
FINANCE CHARGES The WVCCPA also attempts to regulate
finance charge rates on consumer loans
and consumer credit purchases made by
sellers and lenders other than super-
vised lenders. The Act regulates rebates
upon prepayment, refinancing, and
consolidation of consumer debts, and
other charges in the form of delin-
quency, deferral, permissible addi-
tional, insurance, or advances to per-
form covenants."
,1 A discussion of the restrictions on multiple loan agreements is found in note
147. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-4-109 (Cum. Supp. 1974) contains the restrictions on
security interests in land and household furniture, on assignment of earnings, and
on renegotiation of a loan discharged by bankruptcy.
-' Id. §§ 46A-4-110, -112.
75 Id. § 46A-7-115.
11 Id. §§ 46A-3-101 to -103 regulate seller finance charges; id. §§ 46A-3-104,
-106 and id. § 46A-4-107 regulate lender finance charges. See text accompanying
[Vol. 77
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RECEIPTS AND A creditor of a consumer credit sale or
ACCOUNT INFOR- loan is required by the WVCCPA to
MATION deliver periodic statements to the con-
sumer showing payments received and
to deliver other information when re-
quested by the consumer.77
ASSIGNMENTS A debtor is permitted to pay the origi-
OF DEBT nal creditor of a consumer sale or con-
sumer loan until he receives sufficient
notice of an assignment reasonably
identifying the rights assigned and in-
structing the debtor to pay the as-
signee. 8
BALLOON PAYMENTS In any consumer credit sale or loan
which contains a scheduled payment
that is twice as large as the smallest of
the earlier scheduled payments, a form
notice must be given under the Act
warning the consumer of this extra
large, or balloon, payment. If the initial
obligation was less than fifteen hundred
dollars, the WVCCPA gives the con-
sumer a right to refinance any balloon
payment that is at least twice as large
as the average of the earlier scheduled
payments."
DEFAULT The WVCCPA gives a debtor a five day
grace period after a payment is due and
then a further ten day opportunity to
cure a default in payment after a writ-
ten notice of default is sent by the credi-
tor, for the first three defaults on any
notes 160-400 for discussion of these provisions. The sections on rebate (id. § 46A-
3-111), refinancing (id. § 46A-3-107), delinquency (id. §§ 46A-3-112,113) and defer-
ral charges (id. § 46A-3-114), are discussed in the text accompanying note 281.
Permissible additional charges (id. § 46A-3-109), insurance charges (id.), and
charges to perform consumer covenants (id. § 46A-3-115) are detailed in the text
accompanying notes 165-300.
'7 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-114 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
-' Id. § 46A-2-113.
79 Id. § 46A-2-105.
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EXTORTIONATE
EXTENSION OF
CREDIT
obligation,10 and limits default charges
to reasonable expenses.8"
Extortionate extensions of credit are
uncollectible through civil process
under the Act. The WVCCPA also spec-
ifies facts which make a prima facie de-
termination of extortionate extension of
credit.2
c. REGULATION OF BARGAINING PROCESS AND
CONTRACT TERMS
UNFAIR METHODS
OF COMPETITION
AND DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES
Unfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts are made unlaw-
ful8 3 by the WVCCPA, so as to
complement similar federal statutes. 4
The Act gives the Attorney General the
power to interpret and to define what
constitutes unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts. 5 Fur-
thermore, specific actions which will
constitute such unfair or deceptive acts
are enumerated by the Act, including
actions that: mislead consumers as to
the identity, sponsorship, affiliation,
origin, or approval of the seller; 8 mis-
lead consumers as to the ingredients,
uses, newness, standards, or model of
the goods sold; 7 falsely disparage an-
other's business;" advertise goods with
the intent not to sell them as advertised
or to supply enough;" give false reasons
80 Id. § 46A-2-106. This provision also modifies, in some situations, the collec-
tion rights of secured parties as set out by id. §§ 46-9-502, 503, and the acceleration
allowed by id. § 46-1-208.
91 Id. § 46A-2-115.
Id. § 46A-2-120.
Id. § 46A-6-104.
- Id. § 46A-6-101.
Id. § 46A-6-103.
Id. § 46A-6-102(e)(1) to (5).
Id. § 46A-6-102(e)(5), (6).
Id. § 46A-6-102(e)(8).
Id. § 46A-6-102(e)(9), (10).
[Vol. 77
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NOTICE TO
GUARANTORS
APPROVAL OF
FORMS AND PRO-
CEDURES
LEASES
REFERRAL SALES
for price reductions; 0 make any false or
misleading act or omission or advertise-
ment intended to cause reliance there-
upon, whether or not anyone is in fact
misled.' The media is exempted from
such liability under the Act in most
transactions.2
The WVCCPA prescribes a certain
form of a separate notice that must be
given to cosigners, comakers, sureties,
endorsers, and guarantors before they
can be liable on a consumer credit sale
or consumer loan.' 3
Creditors and sellers may submit, in
writing, forms and procedures to the
attorney general or commissioner of
banking for approval; if such approval
is obtained in writing the use thereof is
exempted from any penalty provision of
the Act. 4
The Act requires that certain informa-
tion be given the lessee in consumer
leases 5 and limits the lessee's liability
for keeping the leased goods past the
contract period."
Referral sales are prohibited by the
WVCCPA. Thus, a seller or lessor is
prevented from inducing a buyer or les-
see to purchase or lease upon a promise
by the sellor or lessor to give a discount
or to pay value if the buyer or lessee aids
in sales or leases by the same sellor or
lessor to other persons, if such discount
or value is dependent upon the occur-
P Id. § 46A-6-102(e)(13), (14).
"Id.
', Id. § 46A-6-105.
3 Id. § 46A-2-104.
" Id. § 46A-7-102(2).
93 Id. § 46A-2-111.
" Id. § 46A-2-112.
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HOME SOLICITA-
TION SALES
MAGAZINE AND
CORRESPONDENCE
COURSES
PROPERTY SUBJECT
TO SECURITY
INTERESTS
COGNOVIT
JUDGEMENTS
ance of the sale or lease to the other
person."
As regulation of home solicitation sales,
the Act provides the buyer a three day
"cooling off" period within which to
cancel, in writing, most home sales;"
the Act requires the seller to give the
buyer written notice of the buyer's right
to cancel," and, in most cases, requires
the seller'0 and the buyer"' to return
any consideration received prior to can-
cellation.
The WVCCPA gives a buyer the right
to cancel multiple magazine subscrip-
tions or correspondence courses; the
buyer's notice of cancellation operates
to terminate any further financial obli-
gations upon the contract or subscrip-
tion.'02
The kinds of property that may be sub-
jected to a contractual security inter-
est in a consumer credit sale are pre-
scribed by the WVCCPA.10 The Act al-
lows cross-collateral security interests
in some situations' and prescribes the
order in which payments are applied to
release the security interests upon debts
arising out of two or more consumer
credit sales.0 5
Authorizations to confess judgement
on a claim arising out of a consumer
credit sale or a consumer loan are void
under the WVCCPA. 10
- Id. § 46A-2-110.
98 Id. § 46A-2-132.
"Id. § 46A-2-133.
"' Id. § 46A-2-134.
101 Id. § 46A-2-135.
"' Id. § 46A-2-138.
"o Id. § 46A-2-107.
" Id. § 46A-2-108.
' Id. § 46A-2-109.
"' Id. § 46A-2-117.
[Vol. 77
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UNCONSCIONABLE
CONTRACTS
The Act confirms a court's power to
refuse to enforce any contract or con-
tract term that the court finds as a mat-
ter of law to be unconscionable.' 7
d. REGULATION OF COLLECTION PRACTICES
ASSIGNMENT OF The WVCCPA prohibits a person from
EARNINGS assigning, for payment of debts arising
from a credit sale or consumer loan, any
portion of his wages that is more than
twenty-five percent of those earnings
left after legally required deductions are
withheld. An employee under the Act
has the right, at will, to revoke any as-
signment of earnings or any agreement
with his employer to have wages de-
ducted.10
GARNISHMENT
RESTRICTION ON
DEFICIENCY
JUDGEMENTS
Garnishment is prohibited by the
WVCCPA before a judgement is ob-
tained on the debt, and the amount of
a debtor's wages that can be subject to
garnishment is limited to the lesser of
twenty percent of the debtor's take-
home pay or the amount by which the
debtor's take-home pay exceeds thirty
times the federal minimum hourly
wage."9 In addition, the Act prohibits
employers from discharging or taking
other forms of reprisal against employ-
ees because their wages are being gar-
nished."'0
The WVCCPA limits the remedies of
sellers of consumer goods or services
and of interlocking lenders when the
balance due is one thousand dollars or
less. Under such conditions the seller or
lender must choose between levying on
' Id. § 46A-2-121.
' Id. § 46A-2-116.
' Id. §§ 46A-2-118, -130.
,,0 Id. § 46A-2-131.
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EXEMPTIONS FROM
EXECUTION
DEBT COLLECTION
[Vol. 77
the collateral securing the debt or suing
for the balance owed; the seller or
lender may not do both."'
Within specified value amounts cloth-
ing, furniture, children's toys, insurance
policies, and other personal property
are exempted by the Act from judicial
execution resulting from consumer
credit transactions except from execu-
tion to recover the purchase money due
on such personal property."2
The WVCCPA: regulates debt collec-
tion practices of those engaging, di-
rectly or indirectly, in the collection of
debts;"' prohibits the unlicensed prac-
tice of law by debt collectors;"' and pro-
hibits use of threats or coercion,"' op-
pression or abuse,"' unreasonable pub-
lication of a consumer's indebtedness," 7
deceptive representations,"' uncons-
cionable means, "' or violations of postal
laws,'2 1 in debt collection or attempted
collection.
2. REMEDIES, DEFENSES AND PENALTIES
a. CONSUMER REMEDIES AND DEFENSES
CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE ACT
A consumer may recover actual dam-
ages and a civil penalty in the amount
of one hundred dollars to one thousand
dollars from a creditor who violates the
I' Id. § 46A-2-119.
112 Id. § 46A-2-136.
113 Id. § 46A-2-122.
"I Id. § 46A-2-123.
,,5 Id. § 46A-2-124.
1,8 Id. § 46A-2-125.
1" Id. § 46A-2-126.
its Id. § 46A-2-127.
'i Id. § 46A-2-128.
120 Id. § 46A-2-129.
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CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICE
Act's provisibns, relating to excess
charges, disclosure in consumer leases,
statements of accounts, default charges,
assignment of earnings, cognovit judge-
ments, illegal, fraudulent or uncons-
cionable conduct, prohibited debt
collection practices, restrictions on se-
curity in interests in land, and on
household furniture, and renegotiation
by a supervised lender of a loan dis-
charged in bankruptcy. The total obli-
gation of a consumer in a supervised
loan made by a creditor not licensed
under the WVCCPA,1 2' is rendered void
unless (except for unlicensed loans) the
creditor corrects the error within fifteen
days of discovery and prior to receipt of
written notice of such error;'1 but no
penalty is imposed under such circum-
stances if the creditor establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that a
violation is unintentional. '
Any consumer who suffers an ascer-
tainable loss of money or property as a
result of another person's use of an un-
fair method of competition or unfair or
deceptive act, may recover under the
Act his actual damages or $200, which-
ever is greater, or equitable relief. More-
over, the Act provides that if the inju-
rious act has been enjoined by the
Attorney General as an unfair or decep-
tive method of competition or trade
practice, such injunction is prima facie
evidence that the act is in fact unfair or
deceptive.124
12 Id. § 46A-5-101.
,2 Id. § 46A-5-101(7).
I2 Id. § 46A-5-101(8).
12 Id. § 46A-6-106.
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CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR UNLAWFUL
DISCHARGE
ASSISTANCE FROM
THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
REMEDIES
PRESERVED
LONG ARM PRO-
VISION
DISCLAIMERS
A consumer may within ninety days
recover from an employer the value of
up to six weeks wages which the con-
sumer can prove were lost as a result of
discharge caused by attempted garnish-
ment in addition to reinstatement in
the job.'
A consumer injured by an excess
charge may request assistance of the
Attorney General in redressing his in-
jury, ' and the Attorney General may
sue to recover for the consumer the ex-
cess charge, and in some cases, an addi-
tional penalty.' 2
The WVCCPA preserves all other
remedies available to a consumer; the
regulatory powers given to the Attorney
General do not affect the consumer's
exercise of such other available reme-
dies. '
A long arm statute, reaching any non-
resident holding an instrument, con-
tract, or other writing arising from a
consumer credit sale or lease subject to
this article, is included in the Act for
the purpose of service of notice and pro-
cess in any action against such person
arising from such consumer transac-
tion.'
The Act prohibits any merchant from
excluding or modifying any express or
implied warranties with respect to
goods that have become or are intended
to become the subject of a consumer
transaction and voids any attempt at
disclaimer.'30
,25 Id. § 46A-5-101(6).
126 Id. § 46A-7-102(I)(2).
22 Id. § 46A-7-111.
'' Id. § 46A-7-113.
"2 Id. § 46A-2-137.
' Id. § 46A-6-107.
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PRIVITY
ASSIGNEES,
HOLDERS IN DUE
COURSE, AND
INTERLOCKING
LENDERS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The requirement of privity is abolished
by the Act in actions for breach of war-
ranty or negligence between the con-
sumer and a defendant arising out of a
consumer transaction.' 3'
Holders in due course of negotiable
credit transactions,'3 2 assignees of non-
negotiable instruments and other con-
tracts,'3 and lenders of money who have
an "interlocking" relationship with the
seller,l4 are by the Act subject to claims
and defenses that the obligor-buyer has
against the seller, where the obligation
arose out of a consumer sale or lease.'
The WVCCPA precludes a creditor
from collecting a sales or loan finance
charge arising from a consumer credit
sale or loan consummated in another
state in excess of the amount of charge
permitted by the Act in an action
brought in a West Virginia court.' 6
b. CREDITOR AND SELLER DEFENSES
APPROVED ACTS
OR OMISSIONS
Except for the refund of excess charge,
any act or omission done in conformity
with a rule of the Attorney General or
the commissioner of banking' r is ex-
empted from liability under the
WVCCPA. Moreover, any practice per-
mitted by the Act is not unconscionable
for purposes of an action brought under
the Act.'3
I d. § 46A-6-108;
132 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-101 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
' Id. § 46A-2-102.
134 Id. § 46A-2-103.
' See text accompanying notes 461-509 infra.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-104 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
'3 Id. § 46A-7-102(2).
' Id. § 46A-7-109(4).
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APPROVED FORMS
OR PROCEDURES
EXCUSE FROM
PENALTY
ACTION BY A
CONSUMER AND
THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
Sellers and creditors are exempted from
penalties under the Act resulting from
the use of forms and procedures submit-
ted in writing to and approved in writ-
ing by the Attorney General or commis-
sioner of banking.'39
A creditor is excused from imposition
of a penalty in a suit by a consumer
(except for unfair trade practices) if the
creditor notifies the debtor of the credi-
tor's violation and corrects the error
within fifteen days of its discovery and
before action has commenced on the
violation or before the creditor has re-
ceived written notice of the error.'40 A
creditor is also excused from paying a
penalty in a suit by a consumer or the
Attorney General if the creditor estab-
lishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the violation was uninten-
tional or the result of a bona fide non-
negligent error."'
The WVCCPA provides that a con-
sumer action to recover an excess
charge shall stay a similar action by the
Attorney General and that a dismissal
with prejudice or a final judgement
against the consumer shall result in dis-
missal of the Attorney General's ac-
tion.'
c. ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL PENALTIES
CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION DIVISION
AND ATTORNEY
GENERAL
The Act creates a division of consumer
protection under the authority of the
Attorney General"' and authorizes the
Attorney General to counsel people as
'' Id. § 46A-7-102(2).
, Id. § 46A-5-101(7).
Id. § 46A-5-101(8); id § 46A-7-111(1).
14 Id. § 46A-7-111(1).
I3 Id. § 46A-7-101.
[Vol. 77
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss3/3
CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION
ACTION TO
INVESTIGATE
VIOLATIONS
OF THE ACT
ACTION TO
ENFORCE
COMPLIANCE
WITH THE ACT
to their rights and duties under the Act,
to conduct research and educate con-
sumers, to promulgate regulations to
effectuate the purposes of the Act,'44 to
define unfair methods of competition
and unfair and deceptive acts,"-' and to
make a yearly report on consumer credit
and protection problems to the Gover-
nor and the Legislature."'
The Attorney General is authorized,
and upon request of the commissioner
of banking is required, to investigate
violations of the Act when he has proba-
ble cause to believe that there has been
a violation. To that end the Attorney
General may subpoena witnesses, ad-
minister oaths, and do all that is neces-
sary, subject to the Administrative
Procedures Act," 7 to determine whether
a violation exists,"' provided the names
of those investigated are kept secret.
The WVCCPA authorizes the Attorney
General to take action against sellers or
creditors for practices in violation of the
Act,"' to negotiate written assurances of
compliance, ' to issue cease and desist
orders subject to appeal and judicial
review for violations other than uncons-
cionable agreements or conduct, 5 ' to
obtain injunctions to enforce such cease
and desist orders to stop other viola-
tions of the Act, and to obtain tempo-
rary injunctions pending the outcome of
the actions already brought to enjoin
such violations."52
'" Id. § 46A-7-102.
Id. § 46A-6-103.
," Id. § 46A-7-102(f)(3).
"7 Id. § 46A-7-105.
"' Id. § 46A-7-104.
"' Id. § 46A-7-102(1)(a), -103(1).
150 Id. § 46A-7-107.
,"I Id. § 46A-7-106.
152 Id. § 46A-7-110.
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ACTION TO ENJOIN
UNCONSCIONABLE
CONTRACTS OR
CONDUCT
ACTION TO LEVY
A CIVIL PENALTY
ACTION TO
RECOVER EXCESS
CHARGES AND
PENALTIES FOR
THE CONSUMER
The Attorney General is authorized to
sue to enjoin a creditor from uncon-
scionable conduct in inducing credit
sales or loans, from making or enforcing
unconscionable contract terms, and
from unconscionable debt collection
practices, if such conduct, term, or
practice is unconscionable, is likely to
injure consumers, and if the reason the
creditor has caused or is likely to cause
injury is primarily because the transac-
tion is a credit transaction.'
The Act directs a court in the de-
termination of unconscionability to
consider belief by the creditor that
debtor probably would not pay"' or re-
ceive benefit from the goods or services,
gross disparity between the price and
the value of the goods or services,
charges for insurance, and the seller's
knowledge that he was taking advan-
tage of the debtor's ignorance.'
The Attorney General is authorized to
sue to recover up to five thousand dol-
lars in civil penalty from any person
who has engaged in repeated, willful
violations of the Act within the previous
four years.'
The WVCCPA authorizes the Attorney
General to sue a creditor to force a re-
fund to the consumer of excess charges.
If the excess charge was deliberate or
reckless (not unintentional or the result
of a bona fide error), or if the creditor
does not make the refund within a
reasonable time, the Attorney General
' Id. § 46A-7-109.
154 That a buyer should not have to pay a seller who extends the buyer credit
even though the seller knows the buyer will probably not pay is an interesting, but
not a new idea. See The Improvident Extension of Credit as an Unconscionable
Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REv. 225 (1974).
'" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-109 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Is6 Id. § 46A-7-111(2).
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DIVISION OF
AUTHORITY
WITH OTHER
AGENCIES
CONSUMER AFFAIRS
ADVISORY COUNCIL
may force a payment to the creditor
of the refund and in addition may im-
pose a penalty of not more than the
greater of the whole finance charge or
ten times the excess charge. An action
brought by the consumer challenging
the same violation shall stay the Attor-
ney General's action, however, and
dismissal or judgement against the
consumer will dismiss the Attorney
General's action.15 7
The Act places the Attorney General
in a secondary position with respect to
other agencies in examining and inves-
tigating banks and other supervised
financial organizations and requires the
Attorney General to inform such agen-
cies of incidents of non-compliance with
the Act. Nevertheless, the Attorney
General has full authority to investigate
and prosecute to enforce any consumer
protection provision of the Act."8
The WVCCPA creates a consumer
affairs advisory council of nine mem-
bers appointed by the Governor, four of
whom shall represent consumer financ-
ing and retailing business. The council
shall meet with the Attorney General
and advise him on problems in con-
sumer transactions. '59
d. CRIMINAL PENALTIES
FINES AND
IMPRISONMENT
A penalty of up to five thousand dol-
lars and/or one year imprisonment may
be imposed under the Act: upon a su-
pervised lender who willfully makes an
excess charge; upon a person who makes
a supervised loan without a license; and
1Id. § 46A-7-111(1).
1Id. § 46A-7-103.
-~ Id. § 46A-7-116.
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upon a person who engages in consumer
credit sales or loans or who takes assign-
ments thereof and tries to collect the
assigned sales or loans without register-
ing the same with the State Tax De-
partment. In addition, the Act imposes
a penalty of up to one thousand dollars
and/or one year imprisonment upon any
person who commits debt collection
practices specifically proscribed by the
Act. 6'
D. Banking and Supervised Lender Financing Provisions
1. Finance Charge Rate Regulation
The discussion which follows considers some of the economic
factors involved in setting rates of finance charges. Thereafter, the
method of setting rates of finance charges used by the drafters of
the WVCCPA is studied from the viewpoint of the effectiveness of
the method adopted to achieve the desired regulation of rates.
Rather than adopting the method of disclosure plus maximum rate
specification of the UCCC and the NCA, the drafters of the
WVCCPA chose to stipulate, by classification, various rates that
may be charged. But by so presenting the rates, the WVCCPA
allows the clever creditor to avoid rate maximums in the confusion
caused by the inclusion of the old special interest lender rates in
the new rate provisions because of inaccurate paraphrasing and
merging of the lender and seller rate provisions of the model acts.
In one instance, a literal interpretation of the Act permits an un-
limited interest rate.
It is useful to first examine the objectives of the WVCCPA
provisions regulating the rates of creditor imposed finance charges.
Since no rate disclosure requirements are contained in the Act,'
disclosure of the true rate of finance charge to the debtor could not
have been an objective of the Act's drafters. The avowed purpose
of the WVCCPA is to prescribe maximum finance charges upon
I- Id. § 46A-5-103.
M" There are two disclosure provisions in the Act affecting areas other than
rates of finance charges: a provision requiring disclosure of advances to perform
covenants of a consumer, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-115 (Cum. Supp. 1974), and
a provision requiring disclosure of additional insurance charges. Id. § 46A-3-
109(2)(d).
[Vol. 77
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most credit extended through consumer sales and consumer
loans. 6' Nevertheless, because maximum rates of finance charges
may be prescribed in two forms, the form chosen not only reflects
the purpose intended, but also determines, in large part, the likeli-
hood of its success in the accomplishment of that purpose. One
form of maximum charge merely sets a general ceiling rate; the
debtor may be charged any rate below this ceiling rate. In essence,
credit rates may freely fluctuate below the maximum level., 3 The
other method interferes with the market mechanism by attempt-
ing to regulate rates. Normally, this form of regulation specifies
rates according to (1) the type of individual granting credit,
whether seller or lender; (2) the form of credit transaction, whether
by loan, charge, revolving charge, or other credit method; (3) the
type of goods purchased, whether real estate, cars, or goods; and
(4) any combination of these classifications. The ultimate result of
this second form of rate regulation is interference with the market
rate of interest set by the supply and demand for money."'
The WVCCPA follows the latter, or a regulation philosophy.
Consumer credit rates are regulated according to the type of credit
transaction, the identity of the creditor, and the form of goods
purchased."' When the economic realities are considered, however,
the ability of any legislative body to control interest rates is, at
best, only a temporary phenomenon, and the choice of this method
may hinder accomplishment of the Act's intended purpose.
Moreover, over and beyond problems inherent in the method se-
lected, West Virginia may have more difficulty in regulating rates
because of drafting errors and inconsistencies in the Act's provi-
sions.
102 Id. § 46A-1-103. The reader should note the exclusion of lessors and others
specifically excluded elsewhere in the Act particularly id. § 46A-1-105.
NI This method of controlling finance charge rates is followed by both the
UCCC and the NCA. The difference in their approaches is at the level the maxi-
mum rate should be set. The NCA advocates a lower ceiling rate. Compare UCCC
§ 2-201, Comment 1, 1 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 5061 (1971), with NCA § 2-
301, Comment 2.
164 Such an attempt to interfere is unrealistic, for example, when the market
rate of interest would be greater than the maximum allowable by statute and the
creditors funds are mobile. In such a situation creditors would invest in other areas,
and consumer credit might disappear.
IS? W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-101, -103 to -106, § 46A-4-107 (Cum. Supp.
1974) are regulation by the identity of the creditor; id. §§ 46A-3-101, -103, -104(2),
-105, -106 and id. § 46A-4-107 are regulation by credit forms; id. 46A-3-101(6), -102
are regulation by the type of goods purchased or sold.
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a. Regulations Philosophy Economically Unsound
In a simplified market economy, the supply of and the de-
mand for goods and services determines their prices. Money may
be considered a good and as such its price, the market rate of
interest, is determined by the interaction of the supply and de-
mand for money. One of the components of the supply of money
is the amount of consumer credit supplied. Likewise, an element
of the demand for money is the ability to purchase consumer
goods, services, and real estate through any form of credit. Thus,
the market rate of interest is partially set by the amount of con-
sumer credit offered by creditors and required by debtors.100
In a similar fashion, an investor places his money in invest-
ments that yield the greatest return-assuming equal risk factors.
A creditor as an investor will continue his particular business ven-
ture-credit granting-while the comparable rate of return from
alternate investment ventures is equal to or less than the rate
obtainable in his business. When the rate of return on the credi-
tor's loans (finance charges) falls below that of other equally risky
or riskless investments, the creditor will shift his money to alterna-
tive investment areas to continue to maximize his rate of return.
Since the price of consumer credit, which is the rate of interest
or of finance charge, is partially a function of the supply and de-
mand for consumer credit and for money, any governmental at-
tempt to regulate consumer credit rates of interest or finance
charges interferes with the natural market mechanism.'0 7
As long as the market rate is below the statutory rate, the
maximum rate of consumer credit charges is irrelevant because the
creditor must extend credit on the market's terms or lose business
to competitors. When the market rate is at or above the statutory
rate, consumer credit can dry up. In such an instance any rational
creditor will attempt to devise methods to avoid the statutory rate
ceiling. Throughout history this has occurred through the use of
points, discounting, the time-price doctrine, and mutliple loan
agreements. Alternatively, the creditor may shift his funds from
forms of credit with lower statutory rates to those with higher
rates: from simple loans to revolving loan accounts. Finally, the
creditor may transfer his money into a different form of investment
"I In actuality, the supply and demand of money is a function of the supply
and demand for credit and vice versa.
I" See note 165 supra.
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such as government securities. 8' Thus, when the market rate is
greater than the statutory rate, regulation of rates of finance
charges is ineffective and may temporarily eliminate the supply of
credit to consumers.'69 Moreover, if the market rate attains or sur-
passes the statutory rate forcing the supply of credit to diminish,
and if the demand for credit continues at the same or higher levels,
the market rate for consumer credit may increase further.' In
other words, under proper conditions a statutory ceiling may ag-
grevate the difference between the market and statutory rates.
The theoretical economic considerations have been over sim-
plified; however, one who disbelieves the phenomenon of consumer
credit shifting should consider the Hunt Report'71 and compare the
percentage change in commercial bank holdings of government
securities with the change in consumer loans during a period when
the market rate of interest exceeds the statutory rate or rates.
The WVCCPA would protect consumers to a greater degree
through the use of a single rate ceiling below which interest rates
may freely fluctuate, rather than by regulating rates imposed in
different manners, varying with the form of credit, creditor classifi-
cation, and goods classification. Adoption of this procedure would
M This discussion assumes the mobility of money. In the short run, a seller
may be forced to grant credit below the market rate (at the statutory maximum)
to sell goods. Nevertheless, for a longer time period, even a seller cannot grant credit
below the market rate because he must obtain money to finance his own purchases
or to finance his credit granting - unless he is his own banker. Alternatively, a
seller may subsidize his credit customers through increasing the price of all the
goods he sells.
' The shifting of consumer credit money to purchases of government securi-
ties by creditors often occurs when the market rate is below the statutory rate. This
occurs partly because of the difference in the risk factor of default and/or loss
present between an investment in government securities and a consumer loan.
Since the risk of loss from a governmental security is generally less than that of a
consumer loan or finance charge, the differential in the risk factor will be a major
determinant of how far below the statutory rate consumer credit will begin to be
transferred into government securities. The same rationale applies to other alter-
nate investments.
"I The market rate for consumer credit may increase even if the demand for
consumer credit falls. For this to happen, however, the change in demand for
consumer credit must, at a minimum, be less than the change in the supply of
consumer credit. This assumes that the other factors retain their certibus paribus
feature.
"I SENATE Comi. ON BsANING & URBAN ANAAs, 93D CONG., lT SESS., REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANcL STRucruRs AND REGULA1ON (Comm.
Print 1973).
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eliminate the unnecessary jumble of regulatory sections for rates
of interest and finance charges. In addition, it would alleviate cred-
itors' attempts to evade and to avoid the statutory rates and would
lessen the chance that some forms of consumer credit will dry up.'
b. Coverage of Finance Rate Provisions
Only finance charges on consumer credit sales or consumer
loans granted by a seller or lender are regulated by the
WVCCPA.'7 3 The extension of credit by a seller may be by either
a general grant or a revolving charge account.174 A loan of money
may be by a revolving loan account from a supervised financial
organization, by any other consumer loan from a lender other than
a supervised lender, or by any loan from a supervised lender.'
Particular attention should be given to what constitutes a
consumer credit sale or a consumer loan. The WVCCPA excludes
from such classification and from the Act's coverage: (1) transac-
tions by a seller or lender not regularly extending credit; (2) pur-
chases on credit by an organization;' (3) purchases over $25,000,
and (4) debts not repayable in installments and/or without finance
charge." ' Additionally, sales on lender credit cards such as Banka-
mericard or Mastercharge are specifically excluded from classifica-
tion as consumer credit sales; they are not excluded, however, from
the consumer loan category.' Also excluded from the Act's cover-
age are loans guaranteed or insured by the United States govern-
ment or an agency thereof.
I" The forms of credit with the lower rates necessarily dry up first. If the risk
of loss factor is considered, the forms of credit with higher rates may dry up when
the market rate is still below the statutory rate.
'" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-103 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
17 Id. § 46A-3-101, -103.
'73 Id. § 46A-3-104, -106; id. § 46A-4-107; id. § 46A-1-102(43) defines a super-
vised financial organization so as to include commercial banks, industrial loan
companies, building and loan associations, and credit unions. Specifically excluded
from the definition are insurance companies and supervised lenders (small loan
companies). A supervised lender is defined as a person authorized to make or to
take assignments of supervised loans. Id. § 46A-1-102(44). This definition of a
supervised lender specifically makes the assignee of one making a supervised loan
a supervised lender.
176 Organization is defined as "... a corporation, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership, cooperative or association." Id.
§ 46A-1-102(26).
177 Id. 99 46A-1-102(12)(a), 
-102(14)(a)-(d).
178 Id. § 46A-1-102(12)(6).
[Vol. 77
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Since there are individual sections regulating credit sales of
real estate and non-revolving loan accounts by supervised financial
organizations or "other lender(s)," neither transaction shall be
considered a consumer credit sale or loan for purposes of the dis-
cussion that follows.1 7 9
The purchase by the debtor may take one of four credit forms:
from the seller as a revolving charge account; from the seller as a
general grant of credit; from a supervised financial organization as
a revolving loan account; or from a supervised lender in any form.
To determine the maximum rate of charge permissible under
the WVCCPA, one must first determine into which of several
classes the transaction falls. The extension of credit is made either
by a seller in a credit sale or by a lender through a loan.18 If by
loan, the class of lender must be determined. A lender is either a
supervised lender or a supervised financial organization under the
Act.
Next, whether credit is extended by the lender or the seller,
the form of credit transaction must be determined. It may be a
revolving charge (loan), a supervised lender loan, a commercial
bank grant of credit, or other form. 8 ' For each of these differen-
tiations, a potentially different rate of finance charge exists.
M Id. § 46A-3-102 applies to consumer credit sales of real estate in which the
seller retains title or creates by agreement a purchase money lien. These sales are
specifically excluded from the remaining seller credit transactions. No similar re-
striction on the rates in consumer loans for real estate purchases is found in the
WvWCCPA. Section 46A-3-105 and section 46A-3-104 of the WVCCPA are the other
sections excluded from this discussion.
"I The relevant provisions are id. §§ 46A-3-101, -103, -106 & id. § 46A-4-107.
Is' Id. § 46A-3-101(6) sets three rates of finance charge that only a seller of
vehicles must follow. These rates are based on the age of the motor vehicle. In
setting the rates by age, subsection (a) prescribes a rate applicable to motor vehicles
purchased ". . . when such sale is made less than one year after the year of the
model year designation of such motor vehicle or such motor vehicle is purchased
new . . . ." Assume that a 1976 motor vehicle is sold September 1, 1975, and
immediately resold. Does this one year period end December 31, 1976? Literally
translated, this one year does not end until December 31, 1977. More simply, for a
1976 vehicle initially sold and resold on September 1, 1975, the "one year period"
is greater than two years. In contrast, for a car purchased new, the one year period
may run from the date of sale in 1975. Also consider a 1976 car purchased new on
December 31, 1976 or in 1977. Is the time period one year from the date of purchase
or from the model year designation, December 31, 1977? Does subsection (a) pur-
port to give the seller a choice of time periods: either one year after the year of the
model year designation or one year after such motor vehicle is purchased new. For
our resold vehicle, this permits two potential time periods, December 31, 1977 or
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The differing rates arise from the WVCCPA's adoption of a
hybrid of the rate provision of the UCCC, the NCA, and more.
Rather than following either the NCA approach of using one sec-
tion to set finance rates for all creditors, or the UCCC system of
three rate prescriptions, a single, but different rate prescription
each for sellers, for lenders, and for supervised lenders, the West
Virginia Act has many different rate prescriptions for each of the
creditor classifications: sellers, supervised lenders, and supervised
financial institutions.11 The different rates are prescribed within
the creditor classification by incorporation by reference of the
many West Virginia special interest lender group rates in effect
prior to adoption of the WVCCPA.1 Moreover, the WVCCPA
specifies separate rates for consumer credit sales of real estate, 84
September 2, 1976. If a second resale takes place between September 2, 1976 and
December 31, 1977, this is greater than one year after the vehicle was purchased
new but still within the one year rule based on model year designation. If the seller
is given the choice of which time period to choose, September 2, 1976, or December
31, 1977, he would pick September 2, 1976, because he avoids the 12% maximum
rate set by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-101(6)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974) and is not
constrained by the next time period rate which is for vehicles greater than one year
but less than two years after the year of the model year designation. In effect, if
the vehicle seller is granted this choice, his rate of finance charge is unregulated
by this section of the Act from September 2, 1976, until December 31, 1977. This
could not have been the intention of the drafters. Finally, what acceptable eco-
nomic rationale justifies differentiating only seller credit rates on the basis of years
from the model year designation? None!
"I NCA § 2.201; UCCC §§ 2.201, 3.201, 3.508. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A.3-
101, -103, -104, -106 (Cum. Supp. 1974); id § 46A-4-107.
10 The rates for sellers are set in W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-101, -103 (Cum.
Supp. 1974). Id. §§ 46A-4-107, -111 establish the finance rate limits for supervised
lenders. The rates for supervised financial institutions are found in id § 46A-3-
104(1). The maximum finance charge rate that may be charged by supervised
financial institutions is by reference specified according to the lender, as follows:
banks, as defined by id § 31A-1-2, may impose no greater rate than that authorized
by either, id.; industrial loan companies are governed by the rate maximums speci-
fied in id § 31-7-11(a)(5), (6); building and loan associations must use the rates
fixed by id § 31-6-17 or id 47-6-5; credit unions must not exceed the rates given in
id § 31-10-16 or id § 47-6-5; any remaining lender, other than a supervised lender,
may set rates as specified by id § 47-6-5(a). As part of the WVCCPA, both id § 31A-
4-30 and id § 47-6-5, -Sa have been amended. Id. § 47-6-5 (Cum Supp. 1974) simply
restates the old provision allowing a 6% interest rate as the legal rate when not
contracted; if by contract a rate of 8% is allowed. Id. § 47-6-5(a), as amended,
(Cum. Supp. 1974) provides for loans repayable in installments a choice of either
6% add on interest or 6% discount up to a 15% maximum, based on the actuarial
method. It also specifies that the Rule of 78's be used for rebates. With the excep-
tion of the minimum charge and certain other credit information costs, id. § 31A-
4-30 is identical to id. § 47-6-5, -5(a).
I" Id. §§ 46A-3-102, -105.
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for sellers of motor vehicles and for creditor advances to perform
consumer covenants.18 5 As a result of this incorporation and indi-
vidual rate specification, a minimum of fifteen different sections
are used by the WVCCPA to set permissible finance charges. Al-
though adoption of either the NCA or the UCCC approach would
have simplified the determination of permissible finance charges,
facilitated consumer disclosure, and made rate avoidance more
difficult, neither approach was adopted by the drafters. Prolifera-
tion, rather than simplification, of rate sections is the unfortunate
result.
Another result of rate section proliferation is that a clever
creditor may more easily avoid these by finding a loophold in one
of the many provisions. An example, is a seller who bifurcates his
business subject to the rate limitations for sellers. Suppose the
seller does not directly grant the consumer his credit, but he owns
or controls the lender. In such a situation should the lender be
deemed the seller? The West Virginia Act deems a creditor to be
a seller if the creditor is an assignee of the seller's right to pay-
ment.8 ' One would assume that the lender above would be an
assignee of the seller's right to payment (and therefor a seller)
since for purposes of the buyer's defenses such a lender is consid-
ered under the Act an assignee of the seller.' 7 But this is not the
case. For purposes of determining finance rate maximums, the
WVCCPA does not regard the lender as a seller even if controlled
or owned by the seller. Thus, a seller may avoid a seller rate ceiling
by breaking off his credit granting from his sales. '88
I' Id. §§ 46A-3-1016, -115. For advances to perform covenants of a consumer,
see discussion in text following note 227 supra.
21 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-102(40) (Cum. Supp. 1974)
"8 Id. § 46A-2-103(1)(a)(ii).
'' The WVCCPA clearly encompasses a creditor who is both a seller and a
lender in its provisions for consolidation. Id. §46A-3-108(2), (3). In Carper v. Kana-
wha Banking and Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d 897, 911 (W. Va. 1974), the West Virginia
court considered these factors in examining the closeness of the lender-seller rela-
tionship under the time-price doctrine: "(a) sellers agreement with the buyer to
finance the balance or arrange a loan; (b) additional profit to a seller through dealer
reserves; (c) splitting of profit between the seller and lender from insurance prem-
iums or other charges required of the buyer-borrower; and (d) papers signed by the
buyer-borrower in blank." In light of the applicability of the WVCCPA to creditors
who separate their business from their selling operations and of the ability of a
supervised financial institution to charge seller rates of finance charges as an as-
signee of a consumer credit sale contract under W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-104(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1974), whether the factors mentioned in Carper may be used to deem
a lender to be a seller (or vice versa) is not certain.
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The National Consumer Act avoids this problem because it
sets a single rate for all creditors. ' In the above situation, the
seller would be deemed a creditor if he arranged or procured the
consumer credit.' 0 But since the UCCC defines seller in the same
fashion as the WVCCPA, 1" the same avoidance scheme is avail-
able to a UCCC lender. This bifurcation may have advantages not
only through different rate ceilings but also through application of
the rates to different balance levels for seller or lender credit., 2
The methods to avoid rate regulation under the WVCCPA are
limited only by the ingenuity of the creditor. The better approach
would have been to adopt the NCA disclosure provision in connec-
tion with a single section setting the ceiling rate for all creditors,
all forms of credit, and all types of goods. From a consumer's and
a lender's view, such an approach would be simple to understand
and easy to comply with. More importantly, the courts would not
be as frequently involved in litigation caused by a creditor's at-
tempts to avoid the various rate limits.
c. Difficulties in "Maximum Finance Charge"
The greatest potential for rate limit avoidance under the
WVCCPA lies in those sections which permit the creditor to im-
pose upon all accounts within a range of balances the same finance
charge. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the Act intended to present
only one method of determining the maximum finance charge per-
missible for ranges of balances. This is not the case. Those sections
regulating finance charges for seller, general grants of credit, seller
revolving charge accounts, supervised financial organization re-
volving loan accounts, and supervised lenders allow the use of
ISO NCA § 2.301 & comment 1.
190 NCA § 1.301 & comment 1.
191 UCCC § 2.107, 1 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 5047 (1975).
192 General consumer credit from a seller may not exceed a rate of eighteen
percent on unpaid balances of the amount financed up to $1500 and of twelve
percent on balances greater than $1500. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-101(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1974). For seller revolving charge or supervised financial organization's re-
volving loan accounts, the rate maximum is one and one-half percent per month
on the balance to $750 and one percent per month over $750. Id. §§ 46A-3-103(3),
-106(3). Supervised lenders may charge a maximum of thirty-six percent on un-
paid balances of $200 or less, twenty-four percent on unpaid balances from $201 to
$600, and eighteen percent on unpaid balances from $601. Id. § 46A-4-107(2). In
contrast, consumer loans by supervised financial organizations or other lenders not
in the form of a revolving loan account are regulated only by flat rates for all ranges
of balances. Id. § 46A-3-104(1).
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ranges.' 3 To simplify discussion, the range method established for
use by sellers under general grants of credit and for supervised
lenders will be referred to as Method A."4 Method B will indicate
the procedure to be followed to compute charges for ranges set for
revolving charge accounts and non-supervised lender revolving
loan accounts."'
Under both methods A and B, the use of ranges allows a credi-
tor to charge a rate of finance charge that is higher than the rate
authorized by the respective sections. Using method A, the credi-
tor may charge the same finance charge on the highest and lowest
account balance in a range if:
(a) that dollar finance charge expressed as a percentage of the
median balance is at or below the maximum rate permitted by
the respective section, and
(b) that dollar finance charge expressed as a percentage of the
lowest balance in the range is no greater than the dollar charge
expressed as a percentage of the median balance ((a) above)
plus 8% of the percentage calculated on the median. (.08 times
(a) above)"'
Example 1: Assume 18% per year is the maximum rate permit-
ted, the median of the range is $100, and a one month year. The
creditor may charge $18.00 per year on the median balance of
$100. Under the 8% rule, the creditor may charge a maximum
rate on the lowest balance in the range equal to 18% + .08 (18%)
= 19.44%. To find the lower limit of the range set .1944 x =
$18.00. Then the lowest balance is $92.59. The upper limit is
$107.41. Both the upper and lower limits are $7.41 from the
median of the range. In this example, the creditor may charge
$18.00 on all balances between $92.59 with an effective rate of
19.44% and $107.41 with an effective rate of 16.75%.
Using method B, the eight percent rule constraining the lower
limit on the range of balances is susceptible of an interpretation
that permits a greater variation in the lower limit of the range and
in the actual rate of finance charges. Under Method B, the creditor
may use ranges if he:
(a) makes the same charge on all balances within the specified
range, and
"I Id. §§ 46A-3-101(4), -103(2)(c), -106(2)(c); id. § 46A-4-107(5), (6).
"'1 Id. 46A-3-101(4); id. § 46A-4-407(5), (6).
19" Id. 46A-3-101(4)(a), (b); id. §§ 4-107(5)(a), (b).
1"6 Id.
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(b) if the percentage when applied to the median amount
within the range does not produce a charge exceeding the charge
resulting from applying that percentage to the lowest amount
within the range by more than 8% of the charge on the median
amount. ," 7
An astute creditor would read these provisions literally. To use the
range method, the creditor must charge the same finance charge
on all balances within a range. So far, there is no difficulty. The
second portion poses the problem. It can be read to permit the use
of ranges if the same percentage when applied to both the median
and lowest amount in a range does not produce a charge on the
lowest amount greater than the charge on the median amount plus
eight percent times the charge on the median amount.
Example 2: Assume as in example one that the median is $100
and the maximum rate allowed is eighteen percent. Using the
range determined in example 1, the test for Method B is
whether 18% of $92.59 is greater than 18% of $100 plus (.08)
times ($18.00). This is a mathematical impossibility! Thus, the
creditor may charge 18% on the highest balance in the range
and charge this charge for all balances in the range. In our
example, 18% of 107.41 is $19.33. The actual rate on the lowest
balance for a finance charge of $19.33 is 20.88%.
Example two has assumed that the range is still limited by the
eight percent rule; but, under Method B, the eight percent rule
does not limit the lower balance in a range. In reality, there is no
limit to the potential size of the range other than by those "...
classifications and differentiations he (the creditor) may reason-
ably establish . . .- ,"
Obviously, such a result is not contemplated by a regulative
statute. The net effect of the statute, however, under a literal
interpretation of Method B is to deregulate interest rates and to
allow the market to determine the effective rate of finance
charges.' 9 The deregulation under Method B is caused by impre-
cise wording. In Method A, "rate" means rate of finance charge
expressed as a percentage of a balance1 0  Thus, one would expect
"9 Id. (emphasis added).
Id. Simple computations demonstrate that the greater the width of
balances, the higher the effective rate of interest.
"' Absent the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z, the only constraint on
the rate of finance charges that a creditor may charge is the market rate determined
by the supply and demand factors.
2' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-101(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974); id. § 46A-4-107(5).
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"charge" to mean actual dollar charge-not a rate of finance
charge. But even assuming that "charge" is used synonymously
with "rate" of finance charge, and "rate" is substituted for
"charge" in Method B, the eight percent rule still does not limit
the lowest balance in the range. A creditor can still avoid any rate
limitation because "percentage" is not defined in Method B. Does
"percentage" mean the percentage on the highest, the median, or
the lowest amount in the range? The clever creditor would choose
the maximum rate per year on the highest balance to set the fi-
nance charge for the entire range. In this manner, eighteen percent
per year (one and one-half percent per month) can never produce
a rate on the lowest amount in the range that is equal to-let alone
greater than-the charge on the median balance. Clearly, the sec-
tions using Method B need to be re-written; it is not sufficient to
reinterpret charge to mean rate of sales (loan) finance charge. In
addition, the percentage applied to the median balance must be
defined as: the dollar finance charge divided by the median bal-
ance. These changes will eliminate the literal application of
Method B demonstrated above.
An objection to the literal interpretation of Method B re-
mains: these range provisions are intended to be controlled by the
maximum rates set in the respective sections. Such an interpreta-
tion eliminates the range difficulty with Method B; however, it
overlooks the objective of ranges of balances to permit a single
charge on balances within the range. To accomplish this goal by
applying the maximum rate to the median amount will always
allow some balances to be charged an amount greater than the
maximum rate."1 Thus, the range method must have been in-
tended to be an expressed exception to the statutory rates. But
even as an exception to the maximum rates, the WVCCPA range
sections are not properly limited. The UCCC, the National Con-
sumer Act, the Truth-in-Lending Act, and Regulation Z,10 all of
which preceded the WVCCPA and had similar range of balance
sections, limited the operation of the maximum rate exception for
211 There is an assumption of a continuous number of actual accounts over the
entire range. Under this assumption, a creditor obtains a higher rate of finance
charge on balances below the median at the cost of a lower rate on balances above
the median. This assumption of continuity is not necessarily realistic-especially
for small creditors with limited credit facilities.
I" See UCCC § 2.201(3), 3.201(5), 2.207, UCC Consumer Credit Guide 5061,
5181, 5067 (1975); NCA § 2.201(5), (7)(c); 15 U.S.C. § 1606(b) (1970); 12 C.F.R. §
226.5(C)(2)(iv) (1974).
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ranges so that the rate of finance charge on the median could not
exceed the maximum rate allowed and effectively constrain the
lower limit by the eight percent rule."03 But the only limits, under
the WVCCPA, on the maximum rate of finance charge for creditors
permitted to use Method B are the market rate, in addition to the
limites imposed by Regulation Z for creditors covered by the
FCCPA.'1
Even the suggested corrections of Method B will not suffice to
remedy the problems in range regulation under the WVCCPA.
Both Methods A and B pose further difficulties. To effectively
regulate finance charge rates, the range of balances method as-
sumes that the ranges will be based on a continuous cardinal scale
of numbers rather than on a creditor's non-continuous (discrete)
113 Id. The reader should note that the 8% rule under Method A and the
intended 8% rule under Method B are not identical to the 8% rule computed by
FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 226.5(c)(2)(iv) (1974). Regulation Z permits a somewhat
larger effective rate on the lowest balance because it allows the 8% variance to be
8% of the rate on the lowest balance's rate. In contrast, Method A requires the 8%
variance to be calculated on the median rate. Thus, reliance on the Regulation Z
provision will violate the WVCCPA maximum rate provision. Eg.: WVCCPA maxi-
mum rate on lowest balance equals 18% + .08 (18%) = 19.44%. Regulation Z allows
.08 + .18 = 19.56%.
I" Almost all creditors covered by the WVCCPA are covered by the Truth-in-
Lending Act and Regulation Z. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(f), 1602(b) (1970) and F.R.B.
Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1(a) (1), 226.2(k) (1974). The federal provisions encompass
credit on which a finance charge is or may be imposed or which by agreement is
payable in at least four installments. Before the consumer credit comes within the
WVCCPA either the debt must be payable in installments or a finance charge must
be imposed. W. VA. ConE ANN. § 46A-1-102(12)(a)(iv), -102(14)(c) (Cum. Supp.
1974). Id. § 46A-1-102(27)(c) defines "payable in installments" to include poten-
tially a financial arrangement not covered by Regulation Z and the Truth-in-
Lending Act: a consumer loan of two or three installments on which no finance
charge is or may be made.
The absence of disclosure requirements under the WVCCPA permits a creditor
to comply with the FCCPA and Regulation Z disclosure requirements in spite of
the fact that the method of computing rates of finance charges under the state
procedure is different from that under the federal procedure. There are two areas
in which the differences between state and federal computational methods will
produce a variance in the resulting rate of charge. First, the state procedure may
allow a greater rate and dollar finance charge. This is the case when the Method B
range of balances is used. In this situation, the creditor must use the federal proce-
dure to avoid violation of the FCCPA. Second, a variance may result when the
federal method shows a higher rate of finance charge than the state method would
compute. In such a case, a creditor can possibly avoid violation of both the FCCPA
and the WVCCPA. See text accompanying note 177 supra.
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range of actual accounts.' 5 The WVCCPA does not indicate
whether or not the continuous cardinal scale should be used in
connection with its provisions. Nevertheless, assuming the drafters
of the WVCCPA intended for creditors to use the cardinal scale,
the median balance would be the exact mid-point of the range;
whereas if a creditor uses his actual balances, the median is varia-
ble.
Example 3: Ranges based on a continuous cardinal scale:
Range Median
$100-109 $105
$110-119 $115
Median based on actual account balances. Assume Ex. 1. range
of $92.59 to $107.41.
Balances in the Range Median
$ 92.59 $93.20 is the median
$ 93.00 not $100 as in Ex. 1.
$ 93.00
$ 93.20
$ 93.50
$ 93.50
$107.41
Using the actual account balance distribution, the median may
be above, below, or equal to the median obtained under a con-
tinuous cardinal scale.
If a creditor sets the median based on his actual distribution
of accounts, the creditor can alter the ranges from those computed
by the cardinal scale. The astute creditor will examine his ranges
set by the cardinal scale and determine which ones have a median
based on the actual amount balance distribution below the median
of the cardinal scale range.
Example 4: In example 1, which assumed a continuous cardinal
scale, the median of the range $92.59 to $107.41 was found to
be $100. In example 3, the median of the same range based on
actual account balances was found to be $93.20. Using method
"I Only the UCCC clearly indicates the use of a continuous cardinal scale of
numbers. UCCC § 2.201, comment 3, CCH Consumer Credit Guide 5061 (1971).
Cardinal numbers are simply the numbers with which we count, 1, 2, 3, 4, in
contrast with ordinal numbers which rank, such as first, second, etc.
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A which controls the lower limit of the range by the eight per-
cent rule and assuming a one month year with an eighteen
percent maximum rate of finance charge, the potential lower
limit of the range shifts to $86.30.
(1) .18 ($93.20) = $16.78
(2) .1944 (x) = $16.78
x = $86.30
$93.20 is the median based on actual accounts and $86.30 is the
lower limit.
Through successive approximations, a range can be set using the
balance method that will charge a higher finance charge on lower
balances than the continuous cardinal median method."'8
The use of actual account balances allows a lender an even
greater range of return than either the average daily balance or
beginning balance methods because neither of the range methods,
A or B, requires that ranges be used for all accounts of the creditor.
Thus, a creditor may determine which ranges produce a greater
rate of return using account balance ranges than if he used the two
alternate methods of computing finance charges, the maximum
rate on the average daily balance or the beginning balance.'" Thus,
for ranges that produce a greater return than the alternative meth-
ods, a creditor should compute the finance charge by the range
method. And for ranges that have a lower return than the average
daily balance or beginning balance, the creditor would not be wise
to use the range method to determine finance charges."'8 The same
10 The shifting of the lower limit also shifts the median of the range for both
the account balance and for the cardinal scale approaches. In contrasting the cardi-
nal and account balance method the important factor is that balances which would
have been in a lower range with a lower median are now shifted into the bottom of
a higher range with a higher median under the account balance method.
Consider: Cardinal Ranges Median
$92.59 to $107.41 $100
$77.76 to $ 92.58 $85.17
Account Balances - $86.30 is the new potential lower limit for the account balance
range from example 4. Thus, balances from $86.30 to $92.58 under the cardinal scale
with median of $85.17 now shift to a higher range under the account balance
method with a median at the least greater than $86.00. The result is a higher
finance charge for balances between $86.30 and $92.58 under the account balance
method.
Although W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-101 (Cum. Supp. 1974) deals with
precomputed sales credit, the finance charge for this credit may still be based on
average daily balances or beginning balances.
11 Anytime range Method A is used, a rate of finance charge greater than the
maximum rate is imposed on balances below the median, and a lower rate is
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profit maximizing theory applies to creditors who compute ranges
using the continuous cardinal scale method subject to the eight
percent rule."0 9
As previously mentioned, the UCCC requires that the range
of balances be computed on a continuous cardinal scale of numbers
and that the median be the exact mid-point of a range. 10 Although
the National Consumer Act relies on Regulation Z and the Truth-
in-Lending Act to control the dollar gap of the range, no indication
is given as to which median the NCA follows."' Since neither the
Truth-in-Lending Act nor Regulation Z specify which median
should be used, the NCA due to its consumer orientation, un-
doubtedly uses the same median as the UCCC, which employs the
more consumer oriented cardinal scale.
2 12
So far, a creditor can manipulate his use of the three computa-
tional methods to compute the amount of a debtor's unpaid
account balance so as to determine finance charges.2 12 In this man-
ner, the creditor can raise the effective rate of charges on some of
his debtor's accounts above the maximum rate and maximize his
return through the use of ranges for only some of his debtor's bal-
ance.
Example 5: Assume four ranges of balances: a to b, c to d, e to
f, g to h. Also, assume that ranges a to b and e to f generate a
greater total dollar finance charge by the range method than by
the others. The creditor would determine a debtor's finance
imposed on balances above the median. Otherwise the creditor uses the average
daily balance or beginning balance method to calculate a debtor's finance charge.
2' The profit maximizing theory is also applicable to the continuous cardinal
scale ranges. To maximize profits, the increase in finance charges below the median
may be considered an area under a graph. Similarly, the decrease in finance charges
above the median may be represented by an area under a graph. When the area
below the median is greater than the area above the median plus a variable Z
representing the cost of determining balance distributions, the creditor maximizes
profits through the use of the range of balances method. The difference between
the two, however, is the distribution of actual balances about the median.
2M0 UCCC § 2.201, comment 3, CCH Consumer Credit Guide 5061 (1971).
2" NCA § 2.201, comment 6.
212 The use of standardized tables mentioned in F.R.B. Reg. Z 12 C.F.R. § 226.5
(c)(2)(i-iv) (1971) indicates that the NCA must have used the same continuous
cardinal scale as is used under the UCCC. Otherwise, a standardized chart or table
could not be prepared for ranges.
213 The three methods of computation are: average daily balance, beginning
balance, and the range method, which employs either of the former account balance
methods to compute the median and the ranges.
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charge by the range method if a balance falls in ranges a to b
and e to f. For the remaining ranges, the creditor would use the
average daily balance method or the beginning balance method.
Such a procedure is not disallowed by the WVCCPA.
The choice illustrated in example five is of greater benefit to
a creditor who may use Method A under sections 46A-3-101 and
46A-4-107 of the WVCCPA. These sections not only do not require
that ranges be used for all accounts; they also do not require that
the creditor place all accounts into a range."' Under Method A, the
creditor may choose which accounts to exclude from a range. As a
result, the ranges may be designed by the creditor to maximize his
return from the ranges. To maximize his return, the creditor would
create ranges for all balances from zero to infinity and determine
the median for each range. All accounts that fall between the lower
balance of a range and its median would be charged according to
the continuous cardinal range method. All accounts above the
median of a range would be excluded from the range and finance
charges would be computed on the average daily or beginning
balance method."'
Yet another device to raise the effective rate of finance charges
may exist under the West Virginia Act through the use of ranges.
Each section that authorizes the use of ranges sets maximum rates
on a step basis. For example: nineteen percent on balances to
$1500 and twelve percent on balances over $1500. May the creditor
assign the portion above and/or below the $1500 to different
ranges? May one part (say above $1500) be assigned to a range and
the rest (below $1500) not be assigned to a range? If such a proce-
dure is allowed, the effective rate of finance charge may exceed the
maximum rate.21
8
24 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-101(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974) and id. § 46A.4-107(5)
provide that "[the creditor] may make the same sales [loan] finance charge on
all amounts financed [on all principal amounts] within a specified range." Con-
versely, id. §§ 46A-3-103(2)(c), -106(2)(c) require that the creditor make"... the
same charge on all balances within the specified range ......
25' The range in Example 1, computed by the continuous cardinal method, was
$92.59 to $107.41 with $100 as the median. Under Method A, only accounts between
$92.59 and $100 would be placed into the range. The accounts above $100 would
be charged on the alternative methods. The reason for choosing accounts to be
placed within ranges is to take advantage of an effective rate above the maximum
rate on balances below the range median and to avoid the lower rate on balances
above the median.
2"I This is particularly relevant since a creditor does not have to use ranges for
all balances. If $1560 falls in a range that does not maximize a creditor's return, he
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Example 6: On a $1680 balance calculated by the average daily
balance method, assign $1500 to one range of balances and
$1,501 to $1680 to another range. Alternately, compute the fi-
nance charge on $1500 by the average daily balance method and
the credit charge on $1501 to $1680 by the range method or vice
versa.
For revolving charge and revolving loan accounts, three meth-
ods of computing account balances are expressly provided by the
WVCCPA.1 1 Although the beginning balances method is one
choice, it should never be used by a profit maximizing creditor,
because such method always gives a debtor a lower unpaid balance
than the average daily balance method. The use of average daily
balances generates larger unpaid balances and larger finance
charges for a creditor." '
Example 7: Consider an account with a balance at the begin-
ning of a month of $100 under the following transactions:
(a) First of month purchases of $30 and thirtieth of month
payments of $20, (b) First of month payments of $20 and thir-
tieth of month purchases of $30, (c) Fifteenth of month pur-
chase of $30 and thirtieth of month payment of $20, (d) Fif-
teenth of month payment of $20 and thirtieth purchases of $30,
(e) Payment of $100 on first day and purchases of $30 on thir-
tieth day. For application of the finance charge rates for this
month, the account balances for transactions (a) to (e) using
average daily balance or beginning balance are:
Av. Daily Bal. Beginning Balance
(a) 129.33 80
(b) 81.00 80
(c) 115.33 80
(d) 90.33 80
(e) 0.67 0
will not use the range method for computing the finance charge on this balance. If
the range from $1490 to $1520 maximizes the creditor's return, the allocation of
$1500 of the $1560 to the range of $1490 to $1520 with median $1505 will increase
the creditors return because of the maximization criteria. In light of F.R.B. Reg.
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.501(b) (1974), this procedure is not altogether illegal.
27 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-103(2)(a-c), -106(2)(a-c) (Cum. Supp. 1974); id.
§ 46A-4-107(6) (a) (i-iii). These sections provide for the use of average daily balances,
beginning balaces, or the median of a range with balances computed by the average
daily or beginning balance procedure. NCA § 2.201(7)(a).
"I8 If the cost of computing the average daily balance or the appropriate ranges
exceeds the increase in finance charges gained by these account balance methods,
the creditor should use the beginning balance method.
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Had the WVCCPA used the unpaid balance on the last day of the
billing cycle, a slightly more difficult choice would be presented to
the creditor. From the balance on the last day, all payments, cred-
its, and refunds to which the consumer would be entitled during
the current billing cycle would be deducted to compute the unpaid
balance on the last day of the billing cycle." '1 For example, under
the transactions in example seven, the unpaid balances on the last
day are:
Last Day Balance
(a) 90
(b) 90
(c) 90
(d) 90
(e) 20
The last day balance produces a greater balance than the average
daily balance for transactions (b) and (e) and an almost identical
balance for transaction (d). To the profit maximizing creditor, the
beginning balance is an irrelevant choice. In contrast, the last day
balance would be chosen by a creditor in place of the average daily
balance method because it sometimes generates a greater account
balance."2 Although the beginning balance method is the preferred
method of computing balances for the debtor, the creditor suppos-
edly has the choice of which procedure to use. In reality, the profit
maximization criteria controls the choice of which account balance
method to use. The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
Act should have balanced the competing interests of creditor and
debtor and stipulated one method for balance computation."' This
would further disclosure of true rates of finance charges. Rate dis-
closure to a debtor would be facilitated because he would know
which balance method must be followed to determine his finance
219 NCA § 2.201(7) (a).
22 Again, the creditor would follow the profit maximization computations to
determine when to use the last day balance or the average daily balance.
2' For open end credit, the National Consumer Act uses only the last day
balance method and ranges using the last day balance method. NCA § 2.201(7).
Although the last day balance method was used for purposes of example, no
preference is expressed by the writers for the last day balance method. Instead of a
choice of three method, a single method is advocated to simplify disclosure for
consumers. The account balance computational procedure should weight the posi-
tions of both debtor and creditor. That is, since the last day or beginning balance
methods usually create smaller account balances than the average daily balance,
the Legislature could alter the finance charge rate maximums to account for the
lower dollar finance charge return to the creditor.
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charge. In light of the absence of rate disclosure requirements
under the WVCCPA, the allowance of only one method of account
balance computation becomes more important to the debtor.
2. Rate Avoidance and Potential Violation of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act
Some provisions of the WVCCPA permit a creditor to include
charges, that under the FCCPA must be included in the finance
charge, in the total amount financed. This section of the article
analyzes two such provisions of the Act: a provision allowing credi-
tors to impose additional charges, 22 including a charge for insur-
ance and a provision authorizing charges for amounts advanced to
perform consumer covenants .2  Such allowance of charges in the
amount financed under the West Virginia Act creates potential for
violation, by a creditor, of the first portion of the FCCPA, the
Truth-in-Lending Act. Since a clever creditor can obtain two dif-
ferent rates of finance charges while complying with both the
FCCPA disclosure provisions and the West Virginia finance charge
rate computation procedure, the violation is only potential because
of the lack of a disclosure requirement in the West Virginia Act.
Reliance on this anomoly by a creditor is dangerous, however,
because a subsequent refinancing, consolidation, or prepayment
can trigger a violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act. 4
To prevent avoidance of finance rate maximums, the
WVCCPA specifies those charges that must be included in the
finance charge and those that may be added to the amount fi-
nanced, or the principal obligation.m The effectiveness of these
provisions to prevent avoidance of the finance rate maximums
depends on the ability of a creditor to shift items from the finance
charge to the amount financed or principal.22 The potential for
22 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
= Id. § 46A-3-115.
2'1 Before reading this portion of the text, the reader should study closely W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-109, -115 (Cum. Supp. 1974); FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§
226.80), 226.6(Rev. ed. 1974); 15 U.S.C. § 1601, 1605, (1970).
22 The items allowed in the amount financed or principal are set forth in W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-102(4), (33) (Cum. Supp. 1974). Amounts that must be
included in the finance charge are enumerated in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-
102(23), (39) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
221 A creditor can avoid the finance rate maximums by shifting items from the
finance charge into the amount financed. Consider a one year, $100 grant of credit
repayable in one installment with a finance charge of $18.00 or a rate of 18%. The
total amount of repayment is $118. If an added charge of $10 for required insurance
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such shifting in either an initial extension of credit or a refinancing
or a consolidation is through the application of the provisions
authorizing additional charges, including charges for insurance
and advances to perform covenants of a consumer. 7
The WVCCPA authorizes a creditor to charge the debtor for
certain advances made by the creditor for performance of cove-
nants of the debtor. If the covenants made by the debtor are con-
tained in the financing agreement and the creditor "pursuant to
the agreement pays for performance of such duties . . ." such
advances made may be added to the amount of the debt.2 The
covenants for performance of which advances may be applied to
the amount of the debt, are limited under the WVCCPA, to those
"pertaining to insuring or preserving collateral or payment of
taxes, fees or assessments..."I"
What is meant by the term debt is not clear in the WVCCPA,
and this creates an initial problem for creditors attempting to take
advantage of this provision. Does "debt" mean the amount fi-
nanced, the principal, or the finance charge? Although "debt" is
undefined in the Act, the term is used in definitions of consumer
credit sale and consumer loan to mean the total amount owed by
the consumer.2s However, since the "debt" may as easily refer
to protect the creditor from the consumer's default is added onto the amount
financed; then the amount financed becomes $110, and the maximum finance
charge becomes $19.80. But since this form of required insurance, unlike optional
insurance, must be included within the finance charge under W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
46A-1-102(23)(a), (39)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974), the amount financed remains $100
and the $10 cost of the insurance premium comes out of the $18 maximum finance
charge.
I Both additional charges and insurance premiums may be added to the
unpaid balance or the amount financed. Id. § 46A-3-109. In addition, the creditor
may add to the total amount of the debt certain advances made pursuant to the
financing agreement for performance of covenants of a consumer. Id. § 46A-3-
115(1).
= Id. § 46A-3-113(1).
m Id.
Id. § 46A-1-102(12)(a)(iv), (14)(c). Although these sections appear to use
"debt" synonymously with "amount financed" or "principal", "debt" clearly must
have a different meaning. The definitions of consumer loan and consumer credit
sale both include that "either the debt is payable in installments or a sales finance
charge [must be] made . . ." Id. § 46A-1-102(12)(a)(iv); id. § 46A-1-102 (14)(c).
This suggests that "debt" means the value of the goods or services purchased plus
a finance or interest charge; in other words, the total amount owed by the consumer.
In contrast, neither "principal" nor "amount financed" by definition include a
finance charge or interest. Id. § 46A-1-102(4) & (33). See also National Consumer
Act § 1.301(9), comment 1.
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either to the amount financed (principal) plus a finance or interest
charge or to only the amount financed (principal), the term is
meaningless for purposes of allocating advances made for cove-
nants between the finance charge or the amount financed.
The equivalent provision of the UCCC is similarly ambigu-
ous.21 Although the National Consumer Act definition of amount
financed is unambiguous, a similar ambiguity is found in the NCA
term "unpaid balance"; since "balance" may or may not include
both the sales price of the good (service) purchased and a finance
charge . 2
Nevertheless, an analysis of the structure of all of the above
provisions suggests that "debt" means the amount financed or
principal, or the unpaid balances of these amounts. Moreover,
since a finance charge may be made on advances for performance
of consumer covenants, the drafters must have intended such addi-
tional charges to become part of the amount financed.
A second problem of interpretation is presented to the creditor
attempting to take advantage of the WVCCPA charge shifting
provisions. The WVCCPA permits advances by the creditor for
"payment of taxes, fees or assessments" to be added to the amount
financed. May all taxes, fees, and assessments covenanted by the
consumer be included in the amount financed? The question is
open and unanswered since the West Virginia Act does not specify
the extent to which covenants taxes, fees, or assessments may be
included, and the UCCC, the NCA, and Regulation Z do not in-
clude such charges in their equivalent sections.2
Although the WVCCPA clearly authorizes the addition of the
advances specified above to the unpaid amount financed or unpaid
balance as to revolving loan and revolving charge accounts,24
whether the same charges may be shifted in any other extension
of credit is subject to interpretation. The provision in the
WVCCPA governing charges in other credit extensions provides:
A sales finance charge or a loan may be made for sums ad-
vanced pursuant to subsection (1) at a rate not exceeding the
rate stated to the consumer pursuant to the provisions of the
UCCC §§ 2.208, 3.208 1 CCH CoNsuMR CREDrr GUIDE, 5068,5188 (1975).
2 National Consumer Act § 2.208.
3 UCCC §§ 2.208, 3.208 1 CCH CONSUMR CREDrr GUIDE 5068, 5188 (1975);
National Consumer Act § 2.208; FRB Reg Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(j) (Rev. ed. 1974).
2'' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-115(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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"Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act" with respect to the
sale or loan, refinancing or consolidation.
Unlike the FCCPA and Regulation Z, which require disclosure but
do not state specific rates,no the WVCCPA does not require disclo-
sure and attempts to specify rates of finance charges. However,
instead of making advances subject to the rate sections of the
WVCCPA for sales, loans, refinancing, or consolidation, the West
Virginia drafters have made advances subject to rates of finance
charges which were quoted to the consumer with respect to the
initial transactions and which were formulated according to the
computational methods of the FCCPA in the Truth-in-Lending
Act.2l The distinction between the rates applied is a crucial one;
the incorporation of the Truth-in-Lending rates in this provision
creates both a potential loophole in finance rate maximums and
an inconsistency with the disclosure provisions of the Truth-in-
Lending Act.
The section of Regulation Z that provides for increases in an
existing extension of credit requires that only the unearned portion
of the finance charge which is not credited to the existing obliga-
tion be added to the new finance charge and proscribes the inclu-
sion of that portion in the new amount financed; it does not specify
an applicable rate for advances. Thus, comparison of other provi-
sions of Regulation Z with the WVCCPA is necessary to determine
if the rate of advances, arrived at by the Truth-in-Lending Act
computational method for rate disclosure, will, for purposes of
disclosure under the FCCPA, be the same rate as that determined
under the West Virginia Act.m
To the extent that "insuring or preserving collateral" in
WVCCPA section 3-115(1) are synonymous with the FCCPA terms
"perfecting, protecting or preserving the security" for the creditor's
undertaking of the consumer's obligation in Regulation Z, the in-
crease in the amount financed caused by advances for covenants
= Id.
238 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1681 (1971); FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226 etseq. (Rev.
ed. 1974).
2 This is consonant with the wording of the UCCC, which of the model acts
contains provisions most closely resembling those of the West Virginia section on
advances for consumer covenants. UCCC § 2.208, comment, 1 CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 1 5068 (1975).
2 FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.80) (Rev. ed. 1974).
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is identical under both Acts.O But should "insuring the collateral"
or "taxes, fees and assessments" not be synonymous with the
terms "perfecting, protecting or preserving the security" under the
FCCPA, the unpaid amount financed may be different..24 Even if
such a difference exists, however, some items may be includable
in the amount financed under other provisions of Regulation Z. For
example, since under Regulation Z insurance to protect collateral
required by the creditor may be added to the finance charge, it
follows that it may instead be added to the existing obligation. 24'
Such addition will produce no difference in the new unpaid
amount financed and consequently no violation under either Act.
Even so, for items that must be included in the finance charge
under the FCCPA separate procedures can be carried out to com-
ply with both state and federal law. If assessments under section
46A-3-115(1) of the WVCCPA includes such items as a charge for
preparation of required disclosures under the Truth-in-Lending
Act, such charges must be made part of the finance charge under
the FCCPA.242 Because the West Virginia Act would permit these
charges to be placed into the unpaid amount financed, the rate of
finance charge under the FCCPA provisions may be greater than
"I Regulation Z does not treat such increases in an existing obligation as a new
transaction for purposes of its disclosure requirements. Id. Moreover, Regulation Z
requires that unearned finance charges be placed into the finance charge only if the
transaction is a the new transaction. Thus, since an increase in the amount financed
due to advances for covenants is not a new transaction, the creditor may add the
advance for consumer covenants onto the unpaid amount financed.
2,1 If an advance for consumer covenants authorized by W. VA. CODE ANN. §
46A-3-115(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974) is not also considered an increase in the con-
sumer's obligation to reimburse the creditor for undertaking the consumer's obliga-
tion in perfecting, protecting or preserving the security, as defined under the Truth-
in-Lending Act, the whole transaction is considered a new transaction under Regu-
lation Z, FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(j) (Rev. ed. 1974), and may not be added
to the amount financed. If such an advance is considered a new transaction a
further determination must be made to see if the insurance of the collateral, fees,
taxes, or assessments must be included in the finance charge under the Truth-in-
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (1971). If they must be included in the finance
charge, the rate of finance charge under the West Virginia Act will vary from that
stated under the Truth-in-Lending disclosure.
241 FRB Letter No. 195 (Dec. 1, 1969). In addition, optional insurance under
F.R.B. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.814(a) (Rev. ed. 1974) may be purchased subsequent
to a consumer credit transaction and the insurance alone may be treated as a new
transaction. FRB Letter No. 755 (Jan. 24, 1974). In this instance, the optional
insurance would not have to be included in the finance charge.
1 FRB Letter No. 693 (April 13, 1973); CCH CONSUMER CREDrT GUIDE 30,
963 (1974).
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the West Virginia rate. Consequently, a higher rate could be
charged on the advances than on the amount financed in the origi-
nal transaction. This is not the intent of the drafters of the
WVCCPA.
Example 8: Consider a $100 unpaid amount financed and a $2
assessment that may be added to the unpaid balance under the
WVCCPA provisions for advances but which must be placed in
the finance charge under the Truth-in-Lending Act. Also as-
sume a one year, one installment credit grant at a rate of 18%.
W. Va. Computations
$100
+2 assessment
$102 = Total amount financed
X.18
$18.36 = Finance charge
±102.00
$120.36 = Total Amount Repayable
Truth in Lending Computation
$100
X.18
$18.00 = Finance Charge
Alternate A: The $2.00 assessment must be included in the
$18.00 finance charge. Therefore $100 + 18 = Total amount
repayable.
Alternate B: The $2.00 assessment may be added onto the
$18.00 finance charge for a total finance charge of $20.00.
Therefore: $100 + 20 $120 = Total amount repayable.
In example eight, compliance with the FCCPA under Alter-
nate A shows a lower dollar finance charge than the WVCCPA
computation would allow. Under Alternate B, the creditor could
add the two dollar assessment onto the other finance charge and
obtain a greater dollar finance charge and rate of finance charge
under the FCCPA than under the West Virginia Act.
But even if the rate of finance charge computed under the
FCCPA is greater or less than that computed under the West Vir-
ginia Act, does it follow that there is a violation of the Truth-in-
Lending Act? Because disclosure of the cost of credit is the objec-
tive of the Truth-in-Lending Act, it is possible to avoid violation
[Vol. 77
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of both the WVCCPA and the Truth-in-Lending Act. In example
eight, the rate of finance charge was within the rate allowed by the
WVCCPA in the hypothetical West Virginia computation. Under
Alternate A, although the rate of finance charge under the Truth-
in-Lending Act is identical to the West Virginia rate, the actual
dollar finance charge is different under the Truth-in-Lending Act
figures since it is based on different amounts financed due to the
variance in computing these amounts. Consequently, the dollar
finance charge allowed by West Virginia Act, as a percentage of the
amount financed under the FCCPA, is greater than the rate com-
puted under the West Virginia Act. Under Alternate B, the con-
verse is true.
In each alternative, no violation of the West Virginia provi-
sions occurs because when calculated according to the State
procedure, the rate maximum is not exceeded. Yet no violation of
the Truth-in-Lending Act has occurred in either alternative be-
cause there has been an accurate disclosure of the rate used accord-
ingly to federal computations. A violation of the Truth-in-Lending
Act would arise, however, if an inconsistent State disclosure were
made . 3 But since the West Virginia Act does not require disclo-
sure and therefore none is made, no inconsistency in disclosure can
occur. "
To the extent that the Truth-in-Lending Act's purpose is "to
assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms avail-
23 FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6, 226.604 (Rev. ed. 1974) identify state
disclosures that are inconsistent with FCCPA disclosures and describe how an
inconsistent state provision may be disclosed to avoid a violation. Although addi-
tional information required for state disclosure purposes may be supplied, it may
not" . . . be stated, utilized, or placed so as to mislead or confuse the consumer
or contradict, obscure, or detract attention from the information required by this
part to be disclosed." Id. § 226.6 (c). Thus, some inconsistent state disclosures may
not be given to a consumer. In instances where inconsistent state disclosure is not
allowed, 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1970) exempts the creditor from compliance with the
state requirement only to the extent of the inconsistency.
... W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-115(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides for disclo-
sure, but the section can be complied with without creating an inconsistency. For
items that both state and federal acts permit to be included in the amount fi-
nanced, disclosure similar to that prescribed in FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.814
(b) (Rev. ed. 1974) would meet the state requirements. With respect to advances
that West Virginia allows in the amount financed but which the FCCPA requires
in the finance charge, disclosure pursuant to Example 8 would satisfy both state
and federal requirements.
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able to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit,"245 no violation
of the Truth-in-Lending Act will result provided the actual disclo-
sure complies with its provisionsY0s Under Alternate A, the maxi-
mum finance charge which is allowed by the FCCPA is eighteen
dollars because the charge of $18.36 under the West Virginia com-
putation would be understated by the FCCPA disclosure and the
necessary federal disclosure would not be made. Under Alternate
B, the creditor can follow the FCCPA disclosure provision and not
violate the Truth-in-Lending Act despite an effective rate of fi-
nance charge under its provision greater than the State rate maxi-
mum . 7 Thus, under Alternate B there is no violation of either the
West Virginia Act or the FCCPA despite two different percentage
rates.28
If a credit transaction is never prepaid, refinanced, or consoli-
dated, the creditor can comply with the WVCCPA and with the
215 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
24, Burgess v. Charlottesville Savings and Loan Assn., 477 F.2d 40, 44-45 (4th
Cir. 1973).
2 FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(h) (Rev. ed. 1974) indicates that an over-
statement of the finance charge or of a percentage may violate Regulation Z and
the FCCPA. But this provision is inapplicable to the transaction in example 8
because it requires an overstatement of the disclosure required by the Regulation
Z and the FCCPA-the example 8 transaction overstated the state rate and finance
charge, not the Regulation Z rate or finance charge.
28 Despite the annulment of inconsistent state provisions by 15 U.S.C. §
1601(a) (1970), that provision is not necessarily applicable to a non-disclosure stat-
ute. In 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1971), a further expression of intent is found:
This subchapter does not otherwise annul, alter or affect in any manner
the meaning, scope or applicability of the law of any State, including, but
not limited to, laws relating to the types, amounts or rates of charges, or
any element or elements of charges, permissible under such laws in
connection with the extension or use of credit. ...
In essence, the lack of disclosure requirement in the WVCCPA avoids the applica-
tion of the FCCPA provisions on inconsistent state provisions. Even under alternate
B, the Truth-in-Lending Act places a lower limit on the total debt than is placed
by the West Virginia Act - $120 versus $120.36. To avoid the difficulty of Alternate
A, the creditor would have to charge no greater than $120. Thus, under both alter-
natives, A and B, the total debt repayable is the same despite the variance in the
rate of finance charges under the state and federal acts. At this point in the transac-
tion, use of the West Virginia computational procedure will not result in violation
of the Truth-in-Lending Act for failure to disclose properly; a later rebate because
of a consolidation, refinancing, or prepayment, however, will cause such a violation,
unless the creditor follows the FCCPA and Regulation Z provisions for the entire
transaction. In effect, it is a potential future event that can trigger the violation
due to different allocation, originally, of items between the finance charge and the
amount financed. For most consumers, the chance of discovering this violation is,
at best, slight.
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FCCPA and any inconsistency in results thereby will not result in
violation of either. Unlike a theoretical example, however, debts
are often refinanced, consolidated, or prepaid."9 Thus, under the
rebate provisions of the West Virginia Act and the Truth-in-
Lending Act, the amount of unearned finance charges rebated will
vary because of the differences between the two Acts' allocation of
the covenant advances.
Example 9: From example 8, Alternate B, the total FCCPA
finance charges used in the rebate formula (Rule of 78) is
$20.00. For the West Virginia computation, it is $18.00.
This difference in the amount of the finance charges may consti-
tute a violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act if the allocation of
advances for consumer covenants specified by the WVCCPA is
used by the creditor. To avoid this potential violation, a creditor
will have to follow the provisions of the FCCPA for the entire
transaction and not those of the WVCCPA.5 °
In summary, the provision for advances to perform covenants
of a consumer was drafted with the intent to permit a creditor to
pay for certain obligations a consumer agrees to but fails to per-
form. The creditor appears to be allowed to add these advances
onto the unpaid amount financed and to charge the same finance
rate that was charged on the original transaction (or the current
revolving loan or charge rate).2' This goal is not attainable, how-
ever, because of a potentially different rate and amount of finance
charge calculated by the FCCPA disclosure provisions than is per-
missable under the West Virginia Act. In addition, there is a dan-
ger of a violation of the FCCPA in a subsequent refinancing, con-
solidation, or prepayment of the initial transaction. Thus, the dis-
crete creditor cannot rely on the provisions of section 46A-3-115 of
the WVCCPA. 12
"I This potential violation may also arise on prepayment of a deferred portion
of the original transaction. For a delinquency charge that is the same as a deferral
charge under W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-112(1) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1974) the same rationale
applies.
' This assumes that the creditor does not continue to make both state and
federal computations separately as he did on the initial financing.
2"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-115 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
2 2 An interesting question is raised with reference to state and federal usury
laws under the example given for advances for consumer covenants. If the creditor
is a national bank under 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1970) and subject to the usury provisions
of 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970) on the initial financing including advances (as in example
9, alternate A or B), the Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures will show a higher rate
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Lastly, if fees and assessments are given the same definition
as official fees in section 46A-1-102(25) of the WVCCPA, the ad-
vances for consumer covenants could be added to the unpaid
amount financed under both the FCCPA and the West Virginia
Act.23 Taxes receive similar treatment.24 This interpretation will
avoid the problems posed by a variance between State and federal
computations of the amounts financed and finance charges.
When the definitions of "sales finance charge" and "loan fi-
nance charge" are considered in connection with the amount fi-
nanced, a similar potential to shift items from the finance charge
to the amount financed exists.25 Since additional charges are ex-
cluded from both the sales and loan finance charge by the
WVCCPA and are included in the amount financed, an examina-
tion of the additional charges is necessary to see if they could
encompass charges that should go into the finance charge under
the Truth-in-Lending Act.211 Thus, the inquiry focuses on potential
shifting of finance charge items into the amount financed and/or
potential violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act.
of finance charge than the West Virginia Act. As demonstrated, it is possible not
to violate either act until a later refinancing, prepayment, or consolidation. The
same is true for national bank violations of 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970). Prior to any
refinancing, prepayment, or consolidation no violation of the usury law occurs
because whether a rate of interest is usurious under 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970) is decided
according to the law of the state in which the loan is made. Evans v. National Bank
of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108 (1919); Schumacher v. Lawrence, 108 F.2d 576 (6th Cir.
1940). In determining whether transactions by national banks under a revolving
loan plan were usurious, the court in Aker v. President Nat'l. Bank, 373 F. Supp.
56, 69-70 (E.D. Pa. 1974), followed on the computational methods permitted by the
relevant Pennsylvania statute.
2 The items enumerated in official fees under the West Virginia Act are spe-
cifically excluded from the finance charge in 15 U.S.C. § 1605(d)(1-2), (e) (3)
(1970).
21' 15 U.S.C. § 1605(d)(3) (1970).
255 The definition of sales finance charge appears in W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 46A-
1-102(39) (Cum. Supp. 1974); the definition of loan finance charge is found in id. §
46A-1-102(23); the definition of amount financed is found in id. § 46A-1-102(4).
Both definitions of finance charge exclude additional charges.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1974) allows the following
additional charges to be added to the amount financed: official fees and taxes;
certain charges for insurance; annual charges for the privilege of using a lender or
similar credit card; charges for other benefits; and reasonable closing costs for a
debt secured by an interest in land. The charges for other benefits, including insur-
ance, must meet four criteria: charges must be reasonable in relation to the bene-
fits; cannot be'for credit; must be of value to the consumer, and must be excluded
as permissible additional charges from the sales or loan finance charge by rule
adopted by the commissioner.
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Of the additional charges includable in the amount financed
under the WVCCPA, only official fees and taxes are clearly treated
identically by the FCCPA.27 Also, annual charges for the privilege
of using a lender credit card are placed into the amount financed
by both the State and federal acts.2s
The three remaining additional charges includable in the
amount financed under the WVCCPA if so included would produce
a shifting potential and would constitute a possible violation of the
Truth-in-Lending Act. The FCCPA excludes from inclusion within
the finance charge specified charges made in connection with a
debt secured by an interest in real property.259 The West Virginia
Act excludes from computation of finance charges "reasonable
closing costs with respect to a debt secured by an interest in
land. '260 Determination of "reasonable closing costs" leaves too
much leeway for a creditor's imagination and may permit some
costs that the FCCPA requires to be included in the finance charge
to be shifted under the WVCCPA to the amount financed. If such
shifting occurs, a violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act, identical
to the one for advances for covenants, would probably result.",
Similarly, "charges for other benefits" under section 46A-3-
109(1)(d) of the WVCCPA is too amorphous. Here too, the credi-
tor's ingenuity is the only limit to prevent him from shifting items
out of the finance charge and into the amount financed. The lan-
guage of this provision in the West Virginia Act facilitates the
shifting process because the statute also includes a benefit unilat-
erally conferred on the consumer by the creditor.262 Also, neither
21 15 U.S.C. § 1605(d)(1-3) (1970).
2" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974); FRB Reg. Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.407 (Rev. ed. 1974). Regulation Z requires that these charges be
imposed as a qualification for membership and for issuance of the credit card. West
Virginia requires that the charges be imposed "for the privilege of using," which is
not necessarily a qualification for membership. However, the payable in advance
requirement of W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974) indicates
the payment is a condition of qualification for membership; UCCC § 3.302(1)(c)
uses identical wording. 1 CCH CONSUMER CPEDrr GUIDE 5202 (1975).
211 The items listed in 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(1)-(6) (1970) are: fees or premiums
for title examination, title insurance or similar purposes; fees for preparation of a
deed, a settlement statement, or other documents; escrows for future payments of
taxes and insurance; notary fees; appraisal fees; and, credit report changes.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(1)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
2' See text accompanying notes 248-252.
... W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1974) specifies "charges
for other benefits, . . . , conferred on the consumer. . ." (Emphasis added). An
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Regulation Z nor the FCCPA excludes these items from the finance
charge."' Again, some charges placed in the finance charge under
the FCCPA may be shifted into the amount financed under the
West Virginia Act, and a violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act
may occur if disclosure is not according to the federal act's provi-
sions.2"4
The last category of permissible additional charges is insur-
ance as described in subsection two of the additional charge provi-
sion."' Subsection two allows the creditor to charge the consumer
the cost of: reasonable life, accident and health insurance to be
taken by the creditor on the consumer, reasonable insurance on
property offered as security, and vendor's or creditor's single inter-
est insurance in which the insurer has no subrogation right.5 ' Al-
though the West Virginia Act specifically disallows the imposition
of a requirement that life, accident, or health insurance be pur-
chased by the consumer or that it be purchased from the creditor,
a particular agent, broker, or insurance company as a condition
precedent to the granting of credit, as to other forms of insurance
a requirement may be imposed that it be purchased and/or pur-
chased from a particular source."' Conceivably, the cost of acquir-
identical provision exists in UCCC §§ 2.202(1)(c), 3.202(1)(d) 1 CCH CONSUMER
CREDrr GumE 5062, 5182 (1975).
-3 FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (Rev. ed. 1974); 15 U.S.C. 1605(d)(4) (1970).
If West Virginia had a disclosure statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(1)(d)
(Cum. Supp. 1974) would violate the FCCPA. Consider the National Consumer
Act, § 2.202, comment 3.
2" See text accompanying notes 248-252. The "permissible additional charge
for other benefits conferred on the consumer" criteria of being excluded as a permis-
sible additional charge from the sales or loan finance charge by rule adopted by the
commissioner is meaningless. Additional charges are already excluded by the defi-
nitions of sales and loan finance charges. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-102(23)(a)(ii),
id. § 46A-1-102 (39)(b).
215 Id. 46A-3-109(1)(b).
21 Id. 46A-3-109(2). In addition, id. 46A-3-109(2)(c) allows a creditor to add the
premium to the principal or amount financed (cash price) or deduct the premium
from proceeds of a loan. If the premium is deducted from the proceeds of a loan in
advance, the time factor will increase the variance between the West Virginia rate
and the federally disclosed rate.
211 Although the required purchase of life, health, or accident insurance from
the creditor or a designated agent, broker, or insurance company is disallowed
under W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(2)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974), any liability or
penalty for enforcing such a requirement arises not from the violation of id. § 46A-
3-109(2)(e) but from imposition of an excess finance charge. The excess charge
results from the improper inclusion of required insurance in the amount financed
rather than in the finance charge. Absent close scrutiny of the West Virginia statute
by a consumer, this overcharge will not be noticed.
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ing such required insurance can be placed in the amount financed
by force of the provisions in the WVCCPA for additional charges. 68
The definitions of "sale" and "loan finance charge" present a
conflict when read in connection with the provisions for additional
charges. The finance charge provisions indicate that "all charges
payable directly or indirectly by the buyer (debtor) and imposed
directly or indirectly by the seller (lender). . . as incident to the
extension of credit. . ." are to be included in the finance charge." 9
These provisions are identical to those of the UCCC and of the
FCCPA.7 0 The interpretation given by the Federal Reserve Board
to those provisions is that the finance charge shall be "the sum of
all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the consumer, and
imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or
as a condition of the extension of credit . . . ." unless otherwise
excluded.Y Assuming the FRB interpretation would be applicable
to or persuasive with respect to the WVCCPA, it appears that a
finance charge must include any required charges that are an inci-
dent to the extension of credit under the WVCCPA. 2 Thus, re-
quired insurance should be placed into the finance charge-not
into the amount financed.
On the other hand, not all required insurance is disallowed as
an additional charge in the amount financed under the West Vir-
ginia Act. Both the sales and loan finance charge definitions ex-
clude additional charges. 213 It is possible under the construction of
these two conflicting provisions that some required insurance may
be added to the amount financed, rather than to the finance
charge. Such shifting, as discussed previously, increases the effec-
tive rate of finance charges above the maximum rates set by article
three of the WVCCPA. But it should also be remembered that any
such shifting bears the potential for subsequent violation of the
Truth-in-Lending Act.2 4
.8 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974) allows charges for
insurance to be added to the amount financed through the inclusion of additional
charges in the definition of amount financed, and, therefore, a potential shifting.
Id.§ 46A-1-102(39)(a), (23)(a)(i).
n0 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.109(1), comment 1; 3.109(1), comment 1 1 CCH CONSUMER
CREDrr GUIDE 5049, 5169 (1975); 15 U.S.C. 1605(a) (1970).
"I FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (Rev. ed. 1974).
" This interpretation is in accord with the legislative intent expressed in W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-101(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
-3 Id. §§ 46A-1-102(39)(b), 23(a)(ii).
2' See text accompanying notes 248-252.
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To require the addition of non-optional insurance premiums
to the finance charge is theoretically justified. These charges occur
because the transaction was for credit and not for cash. Moreover,
when coupled with the past and present abuses connected with
credit related insurance,. such as rebates of consumer premiums
from insurance companies to the creditor, such mandatory inclu-
sion of non-optional insurance premiums in the finance charge is
necessary to prevent maximum finance charge rate avoidance."'
The alternative means to prevent such avoidance is strict regula-
tion of credit related insurance purchases.
Of the types of insurance permitted to be added as additional
charges under the West Virginia Act, only property insurance
seems to have been modeled after the Truth-in-Lending Act, and
without substantial change.26 Both permit the premiums to be
added onto the amount financed if the creditor furnishes
a clear and specific statement in writing to the debtor, setting
forth the cost of the insurance if obtained from or through the
creditor, and stating that the debtor may choose the person
through whom the insurance is to be obtained.m
Even if property insurance is required by the creditor, the disclo-
sure required by the provision above of the West Virginia Act will
satisfy the federal disclosure requirements. Therefore, the prem-
iums may be included in the amount financed without violation
of either the WVCCPA or the FCCPA. 5
Although the WVCCPA specifies that life, accident, and
health insurance may not be required by the creditor as a condition
precedent to the extension of credit, it is possible for a creditor, as
discussed above, to include the cost of such insurance within the
amount financed through the provisions allowing additional
charges. But a creditor doing so risks violation of the Truth-in-
Lending Act. Anytime these forms of insurance are written in
connection with a consumer credit transaction, the FCCPA re-
quires the premiums to be included in the finance charge, unless
21 A discussion of the affect of tie-in sales of insurance on rates of finance
charges is given by Copenhaver, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 71 W. VA.
L. REv. 1, 14-18 (1968).
2" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-109(1)(b), -(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1974); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1605(c) (1970).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-109(2)(d) (Cure. Supp. 1974). The Truth-in-
Lending Act contains only minor wording differences. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (1970).
21 Id.; FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.403 (Rev. ed. 1974).
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the consumer is informed in writing that the insurance is voluntary
and the consumer indicates in writing a specific desire for such
insurance.29 This form of disclosure is mandated whether or not
the insurance is required. But neither written notification of the
optionality nor a statement of the debtor's affirmative consent is
required under the additional charge provisions of the WVCCPA.
Consequently, some optional life, health, or accident insurance
premiums that may be included in the amount financed under the
West Virginia Act must, without disclosure, be placed in the fi-
nance charge under the Truth-in-Lending Act. Again, this differ-
ent placement under the State and federal Acts will not necessarily
cause a violation of either the WVCCPA or the FCCPA on the
initial financing of a credit transaction. However, should a subse-
quent refinancing, prepayment, or consolidation occur, a violation
of the Truth-in-Lending Act would arise for a creditor who relied
on the State allocation of life, accident, or health insurance prem-
iums to the amount financed for State finance rate purposes and
who placed them in the finance charge for federal disclosure pur-
poses.2 0
In summary, because of inconsistencies in the definitions of
sales and loan finance charges and of the amount financed, the
provisions for additional charges and advances to perform cove-
nants of a consumer may allow avoidance of the finance rate maxi-
mums. But a creditor who relies on these West Virginia sections
may violate the Truth-in-Lending Act-if not at the initial financ-
ing, then when a rebate occurs.
3. Possible Abuses and Violations Under the Rebate, Refinanc-
ing, Prepayment, and Consolidation Provisions.
The inclusion of accumulated unpaid delinquency and defer-
ral charges in the amount financed on a prepayment, in any man-
v1 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(1-2) (1971); FRB Reg. Z 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (5)(ii)
(Rev. ed. 1974).
m For vendor's single interest insurance written in connection with a credit
transaction, Regulation Z excludes the premiums from the finance charge if the
insurer waives all right of subrogation and complies with the disclosures in 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(6). FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.404 (Rev. ed. 1974). West Vir-
ginia allows vendor's single interest insurance to be placed in the amount financed
only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and disclosures similar to the federal
provisions are made by the creditor to the debtor. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-
109(2),-(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1974). Essentially, both statutes allow this item to be
included in the amount financed under identical requirements.
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ner, of a debt under the WVCCPA may cause a West Virginia
creditor to violate the FCCPA. In addition, the attempt by the
WVCCPA to give certain creditors preferences on consolidation of
debts, through sloppy drafting or planned exception, has created
inconsistent subsections under the consolidation provisions of the
WVCCPA. By combination of the provisions from the UCCC, the
NCA, and the formerly applicable sections of West Virginia Code,
the article explains how the drafters' failure to consider the overall
legislative scheme of the various acts has created difficulties in the
application of the WVCCPA through the absence of necessary defi-
nitions of terms. In particular, the absence of definitions for "credi-
tor," "consumer credit transaction," and "arising out of a con-
sumer credit sale," results in conflicting interpretations as to
which creditors may consolidate and what credit transactions may
be consolidated. Finally, there will be interpretive problems that
arise from the Act's specification of different finance charge rates
for various types of creditors in at least seven different sections, in
combination with the requirement that all creditors follow the
same provisions for refinancing, prepayment, consolidation, and
rebates."'
Since many consumer credit transactions are subsequently
prepaid, refinanced, or consolidated, the applicable provisions of
the WVCCPA must be scrutinized to determine if rate avoidance
or Truth-in-Lending Act violations may thereby occur. To properly
analyze these types of transactions, the section on rebates must be
read in conjunction with those dealing with refinancing and consol-
idation. 12
Any precomputed consumer credit sale or consumer loan that
is prepaid in full by cash, refinancing, consolidation, or other
method is subject to the "Rule of 78" for rebate of a part of the
finance charge on the prepaid obligation. If rebate of a portion
21' Prior to reading the discussion that follows, the reader should study W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-107, -108, -111 to -114 (Cum. Supp. 1974); 15 U.S.C. § 1605
(1970); FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.4(c), 226.80) (Rev. ed. 1974).
282 The refinancing provision applicable to consumer credit sales and consumer
loans is W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-107 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The provision for
consolidation of sales or loan finance charges, is id. § 46A-3-108. The section on
rebates and application of payments is id. § 46A-3-111.
Id. § 46A-3-111(1), (2). The Rule of 78 is also known as the sum of the digits
method. It is used to separate the earned finance charge from the unearned portion.
By such separation, the consumer pays only the portion of the earned finance
charge that corresponds with the balance due at the time of prepayment. To obtain
the denominator, simply add the total number of months for which the obligation
[Vol. 77
64
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss3/3
CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION
of the finance charge on any existing obligation was not required,
a refinancing of that obligation would include some unearned fi-
nance charges in the amount financed or principal of the subse-
quent transaction. Under the WVCCPA, the amount financed or
principal of the subsequent refinancing transaction of a non-
precomputed debt is the unpaid balance, plus accrued charges on
the date of financing, plus deferred payments for additional
charges, and plus accumulated unpaid delinquency or deferral
charges." For a precomputed transaction, the amount financed or
principal upon subsequent refinancing is the amount due at the
time of prepayment, less the rebate available under the Act, less
any minimum finance charge, and plus deferred payments of addi-
tional charges and accumulated unpaid deferral or delinquency
charges."8 5 Refinancing may proceed under the WVCCPA not only
under the provisions for refinancing but also under the provisions
for consolidation of a precomputed debt. 6 Once the amount refi-
nanced or the refinanced principal has been determined, a finance
charge rate is determined by the provisions on sales or loan finance
was originally financed. For a two year loan, this is the sum of the numbers one to
twenty four, or 233. The numerator is the reverse order summation of the number
of months remaining on the loan after prepayment does or will occur. If a loan is
prepaid in full after ten months, fourteen months remain. Thus, the numerator
would be the sum of 14 + 13 + 12 +... + 2 + 1 or 105. To find the rebate, multiply
105/233 times the original amount of the finance charge for the entire life of the
credit transaction. Beneficial Discount Co. v. Johnson, 211 S.E.2d 571, 573 n.1 (Va.
1975).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-107(1) to (3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
" Id. Regulation Z requires for disclosure purposes that any unearned portion
of a finance charge, not deducted from the existing debt, be added to the new
finance charge, as opposed to the amount financed. FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.8(j) (Rev. ed. 1974). The purpose of this procedure is to prevent an increase in
the total finance charge as a result of including unearned finance charges in the
amount financed or the principal.
If the creditor elects to keep the unearned charge in the amount financed, he
may under Regulation Z charge a finance charge on these unearned items. A pen-
alty exists for this election: the unearned finance charge included in the amount
financed must be subtracted from the finance charge computed on the refinanced
obligation. The result is a reduction of the effective rate of finance charge on the
refinanced obligation.
The absence of disclosure requirements in the WVCCPA makes necessary the
Act's requirement that rebates of unearned finance charges be excluded from the
amount financed or principal of the refinanced transaction. Without such a rule, a
creditor could place these unearned charges into the amount financed to comply
with state finance rate maximums and as well into the finance charge to meet the
FCCPA disclosure provisions.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-108(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
65
Cardi: The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
charges.27 Thus, on refinancing an obligation may have the same
or a different rate of finance charge as was applied to the prior
debt.
Under a refinancing of either a precomputed or non-
precomputed debt, certain sections of the WVCCPA pose difficul-
ties of interpretation. The Act provides that the amount refi-
nanced, or principal of the refinanced obligation, may be financed
"at a rate not exceeding that permitted by the provisions on sales
finance charge for consumer credit sales or loan finance charge for
consumer loans, as the case may be."' 5 As already indicated, this
wording possibly permits a higher rate of finance charge on the
refinancing than was imposed on the original obligation. This ap-
proach is substantially similar to the UCCC. 9
Unlike the WVCCPA and the UCCC, the National Consumer
Act provisions on refinancing do not include accumulated unpaid
delinquency or deferral charges in the new amount financed or
principal. 20 Aside from the consumer arguments against including
unpaid "earned" delinquency or deferral charges in the new
amount financed such inclusion potentially endangers the credi-
tor.2 9 1 Despite the fact that charges for late payment, delinquency,
Id. § 46A-3-107.
2 Id.
-9 UCCC §§ 2.205, 3.205, 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5065, 5185 (1975).
The National Consumer Act does not permit the creditor to charge a higher rate
on the refinanced obligation. The maximum rate allowed on the refinanced obliga-
tion under the NCA is the rate disclosed on the original obligation before refinanc-
ing. NCA § 2.206, comment. Although the UCCC does not expressly include delin-
quency or deferral charges in the amount financed, two undefined terms "unpaid
balance" and "accrued charges" found in § 2.205 and § 3.205 of the UCCC could
include these charges. In addition, UCCC §§ 2.210(7), 3.210(7), 1 CCH CONSUMER
CREDrr GUIDE 5070, 5190 (1975), specifically allow the collection or retention of
delinquency charges on rebate upon prepayment. Consequently, a creditor can
place delinquency and earned deferral charges into the amount financed on a refi-
nancing. This is subject to the anticipation criteria of FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.4(c) (Rev. ed. 1974). See text accompanying note 289.
- UCCC §§ 2.205, 3.205; 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE T 5065, 5185 (1971).
NCA § 2.206.
"' The consumer oriented argument rests in the creditor advantages of refi-
nancing. Under a refinancing, the creditor obtains a greater dollar finance charge
even if the rate is not changed. Generally, a creditor will increase the maturity
period of the obligation and obtain a higher dollar finance charge partially due to
the time factor. To the extent that permissible additional charges are incurred on
refinancing by the consumer, the dollar finance charge increases further. Conse-
quently, it is advantageous for a creditor to refinance even at the rate of the original
transaction. Moreover, the creditor may, under the WVCCPA, be able to raise the
[Vol. 77
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default or other such occurrences are not considered finance
charges under the FCCPA if imposed as a result of unanticipated
failures of a consumer to pay his obligation on time, deferral or
delinquency charges as defined in the WVCCPA may be consid-
ered finance charges under the FCCPA,292 and as such cause viola-
tion by the creditor of the Federal Act. Although any earned defer-
ral and any delinquency charge may be included in the amount
financed on a refinancing under the WVCCPA, the Truth-in-
Lending Act permits inclusion of such charges only if they are
unanticipated.23 But since an anticipated deferral or delinquency
charge is considered a finance charge under the FCCPA, on refi-
nancing, only the earned portion may be added onto the amount
financed or principal. 294 Although a creditor could follow the
rate of finance charge on refinancing if the rate on the original transaction was not
at the prescribed maximums.
These greater finance charges on refinancing represent the cost of extending
repayment of the debt. One reason for refinancing a credit transaction is to avoid
deferral and delinquency charges because of the debtor's inability to pay some or
all of his installments. Since deferral and delinquency charges result from failure
to pay these installments when due, a creditor who refinances a debt with deferral
and/or delinquency charges is charging more than once for the same consumer
benefit-an extension of time for repayment of all or part of the existing debt in
place of default. The addition of deferral or delinquency charges to the amount
financed or principal on refinancing allows those charges to increase the cost of
refinancing further. Under this approach to refinancing, the consumer is charged
three times for an extension of the maturity date: once for any deferral or delin-
quency charge on the original obligation; again for the refinancing; and, third by
application of the finance rate to the deferral or delinquency sum included in the
amount financed or principal.
The writers believe the purpose of refinancing is to provide an extension of the
payment period for the entire debt at a cost of increased finance charges; and that
deferral and delinquency charges represent the cost of extending the payment pe-
riod for part of the existing obligation. On this basis deferral and delinquency
charges should be viewed as a finance charge for a separate credit transaction equal
to the portion of the original transaction that is deferred or delinquent. Thus, it is
inconsistent to permit a creditor who refinances a credit transaction to charge a
finance charge on the portion of the earned finance charge of the prior obligation,
determined by the rebate allocation, and to charge a financecharge for the same
deferral of earned finance charges a second time via inclusion of deferral or delin-
quency charges in the amount financed or principal.
m FRB Reg. Z, 12 CFR § 226.4(c) (Rev. ed. 1974).
293 Id. A vendor's charge for late payment under a credit plan requiring full
payment of each billing within a stipulated period and not allowing installment
payments may be a finance charge. FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.401 (Rev. ed.
1974). In this instance only the earned portion of this charge could be added onto
the amount financed for a refinancing. Id. § 226.8G).
M 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (1971); FRB Reg Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(j) (Rev. ed. 1974).
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WVCCPA provision authorizing inclusion of an anticipated defer-
ral or delinquency charges in the amount financed for a refinancing
and still be in compliance with the FCCPA, because without a
duty to disclose under the WVCCPA the creditor has made no
inconsistent disclosure, nevertheless, on a later refinancing, pre-
payment, or consolidation, the creditor may be found in violation
of the Truth-in-Lending Act.295
When viewed from the consumer's perspective, the inclusion
of a deferral or delinquency charge in the new amount financed
represents a double charge for an extension of the repayment of the
debt."'8 The first charge is in the form of a deferral or delinquency
charge in place of defaulting part or all of the original transac-
tion.117 In effect, this is a charge for an extension of the repayment
period. The second charge in terms of interest on the new amount
financed is for an extension of the time for repayment of the entire
unpaid obligation, which includes earned finance charges deter-
mined by the rebate procedure. Although, such a double charge for
deferrals is not allowed for refinancing of an original transaction
that was precomputed, or for a consolidation that refinances a
precomputed obligation, 98 as to delinquency charges, no rebate of
unearned charges is granted by the WVCCPA on the refinancing
of the obligation, 99 and thus as to delinquency charges, the
WVCCPA permits an unjustified double charge.
Although no rebate of delinquency charges is required on refi-
nancing, the WVCCPA requires such rebate when the creditor
In many transactions, the full amount of a deferral or default charge is earned
because of their lump sum nature. As a result, many deferral or default charges that
are anticipated under Regulation Z may still become part of the amount financed
on a refinancing. The only form of anticipated late payment charges that may not
be considered earned under the FCCPA is a late payment that varies with the time
period of delinquency or deferral. Such a scheme is not, however, precluded under
the WVCCPA from inclusion as delinquency and deferral charges. On the contrary
the scheme seems clearly envisioned as to deferrals, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-
114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974), and as to delinquency charges, id. § 46A-3-112(1)(b).
21 See text accompanying notes 249-256 supra.
211 Double charge has been used to simplify the discussion. In reality, a triple
charge exists. See discussion in note 291 supra.
217 See text accompanying note 290 supra.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974) requires that on pre-
payment in full "during a deferral period, the portion of the deferral charge attrib.
utable to the unexpired full months in the deferral period shall be. . . rebated."
The consolidation provision permits the refinancing of a precomputed obligation
before its consolidation. Id. § 46A-3-108(1).
=1 Id. §§ 46A-3-112, -114.
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elects to convert certain defaulted precomputed credit transac-
tions into non-precomputed ones, 3°0 or when the creditor in effect
unilaterally refinances a delinquent obligation.3 11 Upon exercising
the conversion option the creditor must rebate any of the "delin-
quency or deferral charges made with respect to install-
ments. .. 302
Upon consideration of all of the above and in light of the
objectives and the consumer cost of refinancing, it is inconsistent
to require rebates of unearned deferral charges on a refinanced
3 Id. § 46A-3-113(4).
301 Id. § 46A-3-112(4).
1 Id. This provision indicates that both unearned delinquency and deferral
charges must be rebated if the creditor elects to convert a precomputed debt. The
wording of this section may be interpreted in at least two ways. Id. § 46A-3-112(4)
states:
If the creditor proceeds under this subsection, any delinquency or deferral
charges made with respect to installments due at or after the maturity
date of the delinquent installments shall be rebated, and no further delin-
quency or deferral charges shall be made.
Does this mean that all delinquency and deferral charges arising from the time that
the- installments that gave the creditor the conversion election were delinquent
must be rebated? If so, then all of the deferral and delinquency charges on the
delinquent installments from which the right to exercise the creditor conversion
option arose, as well as such charges on any subsequent installments, must be
rebated. No allowance is made under this interpretation for retention of any earned
deferral charge or a delinquency charge.
Another interpretation of section 46A-3-112(4) is that rebate must be made of
all delinquency or deferral charges on installments due on or after the date of the
delinquent installments that created the conversion option. Under this interpreta-
tion, the creditor may retain deferral or delinquency charges for only the first two
delinquent installments. The deferral charge under this second interpretation could
be greater or less than that permitted for prepayment of an obligation under id. §
46A-3-114(1). It could be greater if the conversion option is not exercised after
default on two consecutive deferral charges.
As to consumer sales it appears that the UCCC allows retention of all delin-
quency charges. UCCC §§ 2.210(7), 3.210(7); -1 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE I
5070, 5190 (1975). But as to consumer loans "any delinquency or deferral charges
made with respect to installments due at or after the date of the first delinquent
installment shall be rebated, and no further delinquency or deferral charges shall
be made." Id. § 3.203(4), 5183. Unfortunately, the West Virginia section is not
this clear.
The National Consumer Act does not allow delinquency charges to be retained
for any installment that is part of a refinancing or consolidation. This is true
whether the refinancing or consolidation occurs contemporaneously with the delin-
quency charge or at a later time. NCA § 2.204(3), comment 1. Due to the differing
treatment of delinquency charges by the UCCC and the National Consumer Act,
neither is helpful in interpreting the West Virginia provisions.
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transaction and not to allow rebates of delinquency charges. More-
over, this inconsistency is highlighted by the express requirement
of rebates of delinquency charges for unilateral refinancing of a
precomputed obligation by the creditor under the WVCCPA 30 3
For consolidation of consumer credit transactions, the same
difficulties posed by the refinancing provision exist: the consolida-
tion of a refinanced precomputed debt under the West Virginia Act
may include anticipated unpaid delinquency and deferral charges
in the amount financed or principal."' An added consolidation
problem may arise from the inconsistent treatment of deferral or
delinquency charges permitted by the creditors unilateral refi-
nancing of a debt."5
The remaining problems under the consolidation section of
the WVCCPA arise from the specified method of finance charge
rate determination." 6 The Act presents three different procedures
to determine which finance charge rate may be applied to the
amount financed or principal in a consolidation. First, if the con-
solidated debts arise solely from a consumer credit sale, the rate
is governed by the consumer credit sales finance charge section,
section 46A-3-101. Second, although not as clearly stated, the con-
sumer loan finance charge allowed by section 46A-3-104 governs
consolidations of consumer loans. °7 And third, a consumer loan
3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-112(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974). This is true only if a
deferred or delinquent debt is subsequently refinanced.
30 The section allowing consolidation of at least two consumer credit transac-
tions owed to the same creditor permits the parties to agree to combine these
obligations into a single schedule of payments. Id. § 46A-3-108(1). For consolidating
these debts, subsection one prescribes the determination of the amount financed
for precomputed and non-precomputed debts.
Id. § 46A-3-112(4). See discussion in note 302 supra.
30 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-108(2)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
307 Id. § (2); id. § 46A-3-104 is the only provision that logically governs consoli-
dation because the remaining rate section for consumer loans applies to revolving
loan accounts. To permit the use of the revolving loan account rates on consolida-
tion would contradict the express exclusion of the identical section as applied to
consumer credit sales. Id. § 46A-3-108(2). The terminology of the-provision specify-
ing the loan rate allowed on consolidation is probably not as precise as that applica-
ble to consumer credit sales because the provision also applies to supervised lenders
by cross reference in id. § 46A-4-107(3)(b). To require consolidated consumer loans
to be governed solely by the rates stipulated in id. § 46A-3-104 would impose lower
rates on the consolidated debt than on the original obligation owed to a supervised
lender. In such a situation, the supervised lender would probably not agree to
consolidation. The UCCC allows the supervised lender rate to apply in this case.
UCCC § 3.206(1)-(2), 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GumE 5186 (1975).
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may be consolidated with a consumer credit transaction arising
from a consumer credit sale. If the consolidated debt is composed
of a prior consumer loan and consumer credit sale, the creditor
may charge the rate of finance charge for consumer credit sales on
that portion of the consolidated amount financed that represents
the prior consumer credit sale. The portion attributable to a prior
consumer loan may be charged according to the rate provisions for
consumer loans. 08
The problems with the consolidation portions of the WVCCPA
arise from its attempt to give certain parties to consumer credit
transactions an optional method of debt consolidation.," Apart
from the problem of determining who are "parties" who may elect
this alternate method of consolidation, there is an oversight in the
wording. The Act states that "the parties may agree to the consoli-
dation resulting in a single schedule of payments either pursuant
to subsection (2) or by adding together the unpaid balances with
respect to the two sales."310 This provision refers to the method for
computing a schedule of payments in subsection two of the same
section; however, subsection two discusses only the computation
of the finance charge. Since a payment is composed of both a
finance charge and a sum by which the principal or amount fi-
nanced is reduced, the first phrase in the above quote is meaning-
less. With proper drafting the same provision should read ".
pursuant to subsections (1) and (2). . .311
Prior to considering who may elect the second method of con-
solidation under section 46A-3-108(3), an understanding of the
meaning of a seller, lender, creditor, and consumer credit transac-
tion is necessary. The WVCCPA defines a seller (lender) as "...
an assignee of the seller's (lender's) right to payment." 312 Thus, an
assignee of a seller is a seller and an assignee of a lender is a lender.
The Act does not define a creditor. In its normal usage, creditor
means anyone to whom money is due.313 Applying this normal
usage to the WVCCPA, a creditor is anyone to whom money is due
on a debt arising from a consumer credit sale, a consumer loan, a
M W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-108(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
= Id. § 46A-3-108(3).
310 Id.
I" Subsection one of id. § 46A-3-108 sets forth the procedure used to compute
the amount financed or principal of the consolidated debt; subsection two sets forth
the procedure for determination of the finance charge.
312 Id. § 46A-1-102(20), (40).
" WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 533 (1961).
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consumer lease, or a seller or lender credit card.3 14 Consumer credit
transaction is also not defined in the West Virginia Act. In fact,
only the National Consumer Act defines consumer credit transac-
tion .31 The NCA definition of consumer credit transaction includes
consumer credit sales, consumer leases, and consumer loans and
transactions pursuant to seller or lender credit cards. But since the
West Virginia Act specifically defines a consumer as "a natural
person who incurrs debt pursuant to a consumer credit sale or a
consumer loan," a consumer credit transaction under the
WVCCPA may only encompass a consumer credit sale or a con-
sumer loan.316 Under such a construction, consumer leases are ex-
cluded from consumer credit transactions under the WVCCPA.
Although such an interpretation is possible, it makes no sense to
exclude a consumer lease from the definition of a consumer credit
transaction. This is particularly true when one realizes that a con-
sumer lease may be identical to a consumer credit sale except that
the goods or services may not be totally purchased. In other words,
a consumer lease may be a credit sale for part or all of the value
of an equivalent consumer credit sale of the same good or service. 7
An alternate definition of consumer credit transaction under
the WVCCPA could be all consumer credit sales, consumer loans,
and consumer leases.3 11 Under this definition of consumer credit
transaction, the WVCCPA would apply also to lender and seller
credit card transactions. 31 Under either definition of consumer
credit transaction, a clever seller or lender could come within re-
quirements necessary to have the option of consolidation methods.
In order to have the option of consolidation methods presented in
section 46A-3-103(3) of the WVCCPA, there must be a consumer
"I Lender credit card is defined in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-102(21) (Cum.
Supp. 1974). Seller credit card is defined in id. § 46A-1-102(41).
3,1 NCA § 1.301(10).
3,1 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-102(11) (Cure. Supp. 1974).
3,1 This is particularly true when the consumer has an option of subsequently
purchasing the leased good or service. Also, to the extent that the leased price of a
good or service over its life normally exceeds the purchase price, a finance charge
is included in the lease payment.
311 This is the method used by the National Consumer Act to define consumer
credit transaction. NCA § 1.301(10), comment 1.
3,1 Although lender credit card is not within the definition of a consumer credit
sale or consumer lease, it is not specifically excluded under the consumer loan
definition. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-1-102(12)(b), (13)(b), (14) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
A seller credit card is included in the definition of a consumer credit sale. Id. § 46A-
1-102 (12)(a)(i).
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who "owes an unpaid balance to a creditor with respect to a con-
sumer credit transaction arising out of a consumer credit sale, and
becomes obligated on another consumer credit sale made by the
same seller,. . ." What is "a consumer credit transaction arising
out of a consumer credit sale"? Clearly, a consumer credit sale does
not include a lender credit card.32 Regardless of the exclusion of
lender credit cards from consumer credit sales, it is possible to
have a consumer credit transaction arising from a consumer credit
sale through the use of a lender credit card. This possibility de-
pends on the meaning of "arising out of a consumer credit sale. 3 2'
If the consumer obtains a cash advance through a lender credit
card to repay a consumer credit sale debt, a consumer loan has
been made that is within either proffered definition of a consumer
credit transaction. Then the use of the proceeds to repay a con-
sumer credit sale debt may meet the criteria of arising out of a
consumer credit sale. This construction relies on three factors: the
nonexclusion of lender credit cards from consumer loans, the lack
of any requirement that the consumer loan be for goods or serv-
ices,322 and a liberal interpretation of "arising out of a consumer
credit sale."
Should "arising out of a consumer credit sale" be construed
in the strictest sense to require some degree of privity of contract
between the seller who grants the credit and the consumer, only
those consumer loans granted by the seller would come within the
term "consumer credit transaction arising out of a consumer credit
sale." By definition, the assignee of a seller's right to payment is a
seller. 12 Thus, a creditor who is fortunate enough to be an assignee
of the seller's right to payment may obtain the consolidation op-
tion.3 24
I, Id. § 46A-1-102 (12)(b). Despite the fact that this provision precludes from
definition of a sale the use of a lender credit card when the seller allows the buyer
to purchase pursuant to a lender credit card, it does not necessarily exclude from
sale the case where the consumer borrows money through the lender credit card and
purchases the items from the seller with the proceeds. This transaction would come
within the definition of a consumer credit transaction but not within a consumer
credit sale because the seller did not grant the credit. Id. § 46A-1-102(12)(a)(i).
, Id. § 46A-3-108(3).
Id. § 46A-1-102(14)(b) requires that the debt be "incurred primarily for a
personal, family household or agricultural purpose."
= Id. § 46A-1-102(40).
m To obtain the option under id. § 46A-3-108(3) one more condition must be
met; the second consumer credit transaction must arise out of another consumer
credit sale made by the same seller.
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Once an interpretation of "arising out of a consumer credit
transaction" is made, a further restriction is met: the other con-
sumer credit transaction must also arise out of a consumer credit
sale from the same seller. For the initial seller of the goods or
services, this second criteria presents no problem. But since
"seller" is synonymous with the assignee of the seller's right to
payment, literal application of the definition of a seller permits the
consolidation of two consumer credit transactions arising out of a
consumer credit sale from two different sellers. If a creditor makes
sales of goods and services on credit and takes assignments from
sellers, as well, he could take an assignment of a consumer credit
sale and be a seller within section 46A-3-108(3). Then the creditor
could make a consumer credit sale to the consumer whose sale he
is now assignee of and be the seller in both transactions for pur-
poses of consolidation.
The mental gymnastics above, which one must perform to
interpret this consolidation section of the WVCCPA, are unneces-
sary and are the result of an apparent attempt to grant a benefit
to only one class of creditor. To the extent that this provision was
written for the benefit of one class of creditors, it has not necessar-
ily achieved its aim. As shown by literal application of the defini-
tion of a seller, the scope of section 46A-3-108(3) can include credi-
tors other than the actual seller. This expansion is due to the
absence of definitions for "creditor" and "consumer credit transac-
tion" which are necessary to interpret "consumer credit transac-
tion arising out of a consumer credit sale."
If section 46A-3-108(3) of the WVCCPA was not written for a
special class of creditors, it makes no sense unless considered in
light of the drafting techniques. Throughout article three of the
WVCCPA, the drafters have attempted to write the provisions for
refinancing, consolidation, prepayment and rebates for both con-
sumer credit sales and consumer loans in single sections. Such a
procedure is possible, as is the case under the NCA, when both
lenders and sellers are treated identically and are called creditors
for consumer credit purposes. 25 But unfortunately, the WVCCPA
m The National Consumer Act treats both lenders and sellers as the same
creditor for finance charge rate purposes and does not attempt to exclude certain
consumer credit transactions such as the lender credit card provisions in certain
sections of the WVCCPA. NCA § 2.201, comment 3. The UCCC treats sellers and
lenders differently, and uses separate articles to set forth finance charge rates,
refinancing, prepayment, consolidation, and rebates. UCCC §§ 2.101 et seq., 3.101
et seq., 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUmE J 5043 et seq., 5161 et seq. (1975).
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drafters did not adopt the National Consumer Act's use of identi-
cal treatment of sellers and lenders for finance charge purposes.
Moreover, they did not eliminate inconsistencies or interpretation
difficulties that are caused by piecemeal adoption and rewriting of
portions of two or more model acts. "'
4. Delinquency and Deferral Charges
The WVCCPA contains two sections governing the imposition
of delinquency charges on precomputed and non-precomputed
'" A further example of this problem is in the adoption of finance charge rates
applicable to finance the consolidation of a consumer loan and a consumer credit
sale. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-108(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The WVCCPA allows
a creditor to determine the total finance charge of the consolidated debt by applying
the sales finance charge rate on that portion of the obligation that represents the
consumer credit sale and the loan finance charge rate on that portion of the obliga-
tion attributable to the consumer loan. Id. Such a procedure is not necessary under
the National Consumer Act because the finance charge rate section governs all
creditors. NCA § 2.201, comment 3. The UCCC does not permit a creditor who is a
seller to consolidate a consumer loan and a debt from a consumer credit sale,
although a lender may do so. UCCC §§ 2.206,3.206, 1 CCH CONSUMER CaEDrr GUIDE
5066, 5186 (1975). The West Virginia Act attempts to moderate UCCC § 3.206
in two ways: first, by allowing both seller and lender to consolidate a consumer loan
with a consumer credit sale transaction; second, by proscribing the application by
the creditor of the higher finance rate, whether consumer sales or consumer loan,
to the full amount financed or principal of the consolidated obligation. Since only
the lender may consolidate under the UCCC in this sitation the principal on consol-
idation must be charged under the applicable lender rate. UCC § 3.206(2), 1 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5186 (1975).
The adoption and combination of different provisions from model acts by mere
rearrangement or integration presents significant difficulties under the WVCCPA
when some terms are not used in one model act or are defined differently. Although
the terms consumer credit transaction and creditor are used and defined in the
National Consumer Act, neither term is defined in the UCCC or the West Virginia
Act. Moreover, the UCCC does not use the term "consumer credit transaction" in
its sections on rebates, refinancing, consolidation, prepayment, or finance charge
rates. When a drafter attempts to limit or otherwise alter provisions from a model
act and uses terms out of their original context, the potential for interpretation
problems increases further.
Finally, the addition of a provision not contemplated by any of the model acts
complicates matters beyond reason. Subsection three of W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-
3-108 (Cum. Supp. 1974) is one example; subsection four of that provision is an-
other. Subsection four is an exception to the attribution rule of subsection two that
requires the portion of the amount consolidated in consolidation of a consumer loan
with a debt from a consumer credit sale that is attributable to the loan to be
charged according to the rate provisions for consumer loans and that provision
which is attributable to the sale to be charged according to consumer sale rates.
Subsection four provides that a creditor consolidating a consumer credit sale of real
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consumer credit sales and consumer loans.3 Particularly with re-
spect to supervised lenders, these sections make significant
changes from prior practice.2 For example, the order of the appli-
cation of payments on installments is the order in which they fall
due,3 except as provided in the delinquency subsections."' The
order of application of payments as to delinquent obligations is
first, to satisfy current installments, second, to satisfy delinquent
installments, and finally, to pay delinquency and other charges.
Another change in the prior practice is in the rate of delinquency
charges. The creditor of a precomputed debt has an option as to
the rate imposed: the creditor may impose five percent of the un-
paid amount of the delinquent installment, up to five dollars, with
one dollar as a minimum, or he may impose the deferral charge
that would be allowed to defer the installment for the delinquency
period.31 In contrast the creditor of a non-precomputed debt has
no option; he may not use the equivalent deferral charge as an
option for computing the delinquency charge. 2 The differing
treatment of precomputed and non-precomputed debts arises from
the nature of the two obligations. Unlike a non-precomputed debt,
a precomputed obligation is composed of the amount financed and
the sales finance charge, computed in advance on the theory that
all installments will be paid when due.m A failure to pay on time
deprives the creditor of the opportunity to earn additional income
on both the principal and finance charge for the period of delay.
For non-precomputed debts, the finance charge is not calculated
on the assumption that all installments will be paid when due,
Rather in fact, the non-precomputed finance charge is based on the
size of the unpaid balance and the period during which it is un-
paid. Consequently, the creditor still earns on the unpaid debt
estate subject to section 46A-3-102 with another consumer loan or other consumer
credit sale may not apportion the consolidated amount financed or principal for
finance charge determinations. What is the purpose of such creditor treatment?
32 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-112,-113 (Cum. Supp. 1974). For a discussion
of the application of the id. § 46A-3-112(4) delinquency charge provision on creditor
conversion of a precomputed debt to a non-precomputed obligation, see text accom-
panying notes 300-303 supra. This provision appears to be taken from UCCC §
3.203(4) and repealed W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4-7A-13(7) (1966).
Supervised lenders were governed by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-7A-13(4) (1966)
as to delinquency charges.
3 Id. § 46A-3-111(1).
- Id. §§ 46A-3-112(3),-113(3).
31 Id. § 46A-3-112(1)(a-b).
= Id. § 46A-3-113(1).
= Id. §§ 46A-3-101(2)(a),-104(2)(a); id. § 46A-4-107(3)(a).
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during the period of delay. His only loss resulting from nonpay-
ment is from lack of use of the payment. For this reason, precom-
puted obligations should be allowed a greater delinquency charge.
The difference in the ability to earn additional interest on late
payments appears to be the justification for granting only the cred-
itor of a precomputed debt the option of using the equivalent defer-
ral charge as the delinquency charge. Thus, by separate treatment
of precomputed and non-precomputed debts the WVCCPA recog-
nizes differences in the cost to the creditor of those different credit
forms. This valid distinction is not recognized in the National
Consumer Act or the UCCC.3 4
Several additional changes with respect to delinquency
charges have been made in sections 46A-3-112 and 46A-3-113 of the
Act. Both sections indicate that creditors may contract for delin-
quency charges and that a delinquency charge may be imposed on
any installment not paid in full."5 Under prior practice, a small
lender could unilaterally impose a delinquency charge on install-
ments only "if one half or more of any installment remains un-
paid. .. "I"
The WVCCPA provides that both a delinquency and deferral
charge may be incurred on a deferred installment of a precom-
puted debt;"' and only precomputed debts may have a deferral
charge imposed on them. 3 These provisions benefit both the credi-
tor and the consumer. In particular, the amount of deferral charge
permitted for and the number of installments that may be deferred
have increased for small loans, under the WVCCPA.13 It should be
334 NCA § 3.204; UCCC § 2.203, 3.203, 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDr GUIDE 5063,
5183 (1971). Although the UCCC grants the creditor the same options in determin-
ing delinquency charges granted by the WVCCPA, the UCCC delinquency provi-
sions apply only to precomputed debt. Id. § 2.203, comment 1, 5063. This is based
on a misunderstanding of the components of the creditor's opportunity cost result-
ing from a delinquent payment. There are two parts of such opportunity cost: loss
of finance charges for the delay period and loss of earnings from the inability to
reinvest the payment. Precomputed debt has both the above opportunity costs
while non-precomputed debt has only the second.
M W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-112(1), -113(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
M3' Id. § 47-7A-13(4) (1966).
3" Id. § 46A-3-112(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
= Id. § 46A-3-114(1).
'M Under prior practice only wholly unpaid installments could be deferred by
small lenders; and the rate of deferral was two cents per month per dollar of the
installment(s) deferred. Id. § 47-7A-13(5) (1966). Id. § 46A-3-114(1) (Cum. Supp.
1974) permits deferral of all or part of an unpaid installment and a deferral charge
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kept in mind, as already mentioned, that any unearned deferral
charge must be rebated on prepayment in full, refinancing, or
consolidation.3 0
Two remaining provisions of the WVCCPA pertaining to fi-
nancing need to be briefly discussed. Similar to the model con-
sumer credit acts, the West Virginia Act creates a general right to
prepayment in full, without penalty,3 4' except in consumer credit
sales of real estate and in "a non-precomputed consumer loan
secured by an interest in land and subject to the provisions on
rebate upon prepayment. .. 342 The exclusion above of non-
precomputed loans secured by real estate is meaningless, however,
because a non-precomputed consumer loan is not subject to the
provisions on rebate upon prepayment. Section 46A-3-111 is the
rebate section of the WVCCPA referred to in the exclusion and
only a precomputed debt is within its terms. 34 3
Finally, the WVCCPA specifically allows supervised financial
organizations that are assignees of a consumer credit sale to
collect, receive or enforce the sales finance charge provided in
said contract, and [provides that] any such charge so col-
lected, received or enforced by an assignee shall not be deemed
usurious or in violation of this chapter or any other provision of
this code if such sales finance charge does not exceed the limits
permitted to be charged by a seller under the provisions of this
chapter.34
By force of the above, a supervised financial organization will
find it more profitable in some consumer transactions, to take
assignments of consumer credit sale contracts rather than to make
loans. The clearest example where this would be the case is where
the seller's interest rate maximum is greater than the lender's rate
maximum. Thus, a lender can avoid the rate maximums through
the guise of an assignment of a consumer credit sale contract.
equal to the finance charge of the first deferral installment multiplied by the num-
ber of months of the deferral.
The problem of rebating is discussed in notes 298 and 302.
3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-110 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The National Consumer
Act allows prepayment in full or in part any unpaid balance without penalty. NCA
§ 2.209. The UCC allows only prepayment in full without a penalty. UCCC §§
2.209, 3.209, 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11 5069, 5189 (1971).
3" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-3-102 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
3 Id. § 46A-3-111(2).
34 Id. § 46A-3-104(4).
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5. The Supervised Lender
The WVCCPA repeals the former law regulating small loans
and specifies the licensing procedure by which creditors may be-
come supervised lenders."5 The administrative procedures for li-
censing will not be discussed in this article. Moreover, the
WVCCPA prescription of finance rate maximums applicable to
supervised lenders has already been discussed.3 14 Similarly, be-
cause the Act through incorporation by reference347 makes the pro-
visions on refinancing, consolidation, and prepayment of a con-
sumer credit sale or consumer loan equally applicable with respect
to a supervised loan, the reader should refer to the discussion of
these provisions above with respect to consumer credit sales and
consumer loans.," Similarly, although not incorporated by refer-
ence, the provisions discussed earlier in this article on delinquency,
deferral, additional charges, insurance, the right to prepay, and
advances to perform consumer covenants also govern supervised
lenders.39
With respect to interest rates applicable to supervised lenders
two provisions of the WVCCPA are significant. First, the
WVCCPA raises the upper range on which the maximum finance
charge may be applied by supervised lenders. Under former law,
the ranges were $0 to $200, $201 to $600, and $600 to $800.11 The
new ranges are identical, except the $601 to $800 range has been
expanded to $601 to $1200. 351 As a result, any loan by a supervised
lender, now above $1200, is limited to six percent per annum.3 2
Finally, the use of multiple loan agreements is specifically barred
under the WVCCPA, when used by a supervised lender with the
intent to obtain a higher loan finance charge than would otherwise
be permitted. 353
343 Id. § 46A-4-112. The repealed portions are id. §§ 47-7A-1 et seq. (1966).
ul See text accompanying notes 161-221 supra. The finance rates are set forth
in id. § 46A-4-107 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
", Id. § 46A-4-107(3)(b).
'8 See text accompanying note 252 supra.
311 A supervised loan is defined as "a consumer loan made by other than a
supervised financial organization . . ." Id. § 46A-1-102(45). A discussion of the
provisions on deferral, delinquency, additional charges, insurance, the right to pre-
pay, and advances to perform consumer covenants, is found in the text accompany-
ing notes 226 to 280 supra.
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-7A-13 (1966) (repealed 1974).
31 Id. § 46A-4-107(2)(a)-(c),-111 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Id. § 46A-4-111. Any loan above $1200 by a supervised lender is not a
supervised loan by definition. Id. § 46A-1-102(45).
m Id. § 46A-4-108. An example of a multiple loan agreement is: two $200 loans
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E. Selected Consumer and Consumer Credit Protection Provi-
sions
There is not enough space in this article to discuss at length
the seventy-four sections of the Act found outside the finance
charge and supervised lender sections previously discussed. Some
have been chosen for discussion here because they are more impor-
tant, some because they are of particular interest to the authors,
and some because more information was available as to relevant
legislative history. Many important sections and legal questions
will not be discussed and, no doubt, will be the subject of further
comment in future issues of this Review.
1. Confession of Judgement
The UCCC's treatment of confessions of judgement, com-
monly called cognovit judgements, are interesting. The UCCC bi-
furcates this legal practice: it statutorily prohibits cognovit judge-
ments in those situations where unfairness is common, but it does
not prohibit them in other situations. The West Virginia Act fol-
lows this procedure, and yet all cognovit judgements have been
invalid at common law in West Virginia for a long time.
A cognovit judgement is the legal device by which a debtor
consents in advance to the creditor's obtaining a judgement with-
out the debtor getting either notice or hearing."' Cognovit or con-
fession of judgement clauses can appear in all types of contracts,
but they most often appear in promissory notes, where they are
called cognovit notes. The purpose of the cognovit note is "to per-
mit the note holder to obtain judgement without a trial of possible
defenses which the signers of the notes might assert." 5
At first blush a clause giving away a party's right to notice and
hearing before judgement is rendered against him seems onerously
unfair and offensive to current ideas of fourteenth amendment due
process. Accordingly, many states have disallowed the practice
subject to the 36% supervised lender rate rather than one $400 loan with the first
$200 charged at the 36% rate and the second $200 charged at the 24% rate.
Commonly a cognovit note operates through a clause in the note through
which the signer authorizes the creditor's attorney, or any qualified attorney, to
appear before a court and confess judgment against the person signing it. Such a
practice was well established in common law, known at least as far back as Black-
stone's time. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 397.
m Hadden v. Rumsey Prod., Inc., 196 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1952).
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through court decision"' or by statute.37 The constitutional chal-
lenge to cognovit judgements concentrates upon reasonable notice
requirements and the opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court
examimed these questions in companion opinions decided on Feb-
ruary 24, 1972.3s
The first case, D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick,359 involved a
routine construction subcontract in which Frick agreed to do the
work and Overmyer agreed to make progress payments at specified
times. Overmyer became delinquent in its payments and Frick
refrained from further work. A postcontract agreement was
reached by which Overmyer made an immediate partial payment
and issued an installment note for the balance. Frick completed
the work and Overmyer accepted the work as satisfactory. There-
upon Overmyer balked at payment, and the parties again entered
negotiations. Overmyer, a large corporation which admitted to
making tens of thousands of contracts in many states, was repre-
sented by council. A second post-contract agreement was reached
wherein Frick reduced the monthly payment, reduced the interest
rate, extended the payment period, and released three mechanics
liens, all in exchange for a second mortgage and a confession-of-
judgement provision. The court, stressing Overmyer's equal bar-
gaining power, its sophistication, its understanding of the cognovit
clause, and the consideration received, held that Overmyer had
effectively given away its right to present a defense.3 16 Neverthe-
less, the court cautioned, "Our holding necessarily means that a
cognovit clause is not, per se, violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d
(1969).
11 Among others, ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16 (1958); id. tit. 62, § 248-49 (1958);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-629, 44-143 (1956); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 13A
(1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 130(b) (1957); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:16-9 (1952).
"I D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox 405
U.S. 191 (1972).
9' 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
13 The court, especially in the concurring opinion by Douglas, pointed out that
Ohio courts have broad powers to open confessed judgments so that if Overmyer
had a legitimate defense he could get a court to hear it. 405 U.S. at 189, 190. The
Ohio Supreme Court in Livingstone v. Rebman, 169 Ohio St. 109, 158 N.E.2d 366
(1959), had held that a court must suspend the judgment and send the issue to a
jury if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on the evidence support-
ing the debtor. Thus only a minimal obstacle impeded a real hearing of the debtor's
defense.
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ment due process" but "is not controlling precedent for other facts
of other cases."3 81
To some extent, the companion opinion of Swarb v. Lennox"'
involved such other facts of other cases. In Swarb seven persons
filed suit in the United States District Court on behalf of a class
consisting of all Pennsylvania residents who have signed docu-
ments containing cognovit provisions that could lead to a con-
fessed judgement in Philadelphia County. The defendants were
the county prothonotary, the sheriff, and the officials responsible
for recording and for executing such judgements. The complaint
alleged that the Pennsylvania rules and statutes supporting cog-
novit judgements were unconstitutional on their face by depriving
members of the class of procedural due process in the denial of
notice and hearing before judgement, that the signing of the cog-
novit contract was not an intelligent and voluntary waiver, and
that the plaintiffs only recourse was an action to strike or to reopen
the judgement that was costly and burdensome to low income
consumers.
The relief sought in Swarb was a declaration that the Pennsyl-
vania rules and statutes are unconstitutional and an injunction
restraining the defendants from recording and executing the cog-
novit judgements. A hearing was held before a three judge panel.
The parties stipulated that they were unaware of the cognovit
clause, would not have understood it if they had read it, were
unable to bargain for it, and that some of the plaintiffs could not
afford proceedings to strike or to reopen." 3 Also stipulated as evi-
dence was a sociological report entitled Consumers in Trouble, by
David Caplovitz, showing that ninety-six percent of confessed-
judgement debtors in Philadelphia had annual incomes of less
than ten thousand dollars, that only thirty percent had graduated
from high school, and that only fourteen percent knew that the
contracts they were signing contained cognovit clauses.
The three judge court found the evidence sufficient to support
a finding that those earning less than ten thousand dollars an-
nually as a class, did not voluntarily, intentionally, and intelli-
gently waive their constitutional rights to notice and a hearing.
11 405 U.S. at 187, 188.
2 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
1 The Philadelphia Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedule provides for at-
torney's fees of $150 for the filing of a petition to open. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F.
Supp. 1091, 1096 (1970).
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The court accordingly held that, as of November 1, 1970, the defen-
dants were permanently enjoined from entering cognovit judge-
ments against persons with annual incomes of less then $10,000,
unless it is shown that at the time of executing the document the
debtor "intentionally, understandingly, and voluntarily waived his
rights lost under the Pennsylvania law." '64
Justice Blackmum, speaking for the Court, commented on the
different results in the two cases. "[In Overmyer] we state that
the decision is not controlling precedent for other facts of other
cases and we refer to contracts of adhesion, to bargaining power
disparity, and to the absence of anything received in return for a
cognovit provision. When factors of this kind are present...
'other legal consequences may ensue'..."I"
Thus, the Supreme Court has drawn a line on cognovit notes.
They are permissable in cases where, like Overmyer, the debtor is
a business that knows about and understands the cognovit clause,
has real bargaining power, and receives consideration in return for
inclusion of the cognovit. They are not permissible in cases where,
like the class in Swarb, the debtors are individual consumers,3 86 not
likely to know that the contract contains a cognovit clause, proba-
bly would not understand the clause if they read it, do not have
the power to bargain over the terms of the agreement, and do not
receive consideration in exchange for the inclusion of the cognovit
term.3 1
7
3" 405 U.S. at 199.
m Id. at 201. The lower court determined the appropriate size of the class:
The record does not support a determination that this action may be
maintained as a class action on behalf of individual natural persons with
incomes of over $10,000 .... [O]nly 4% of the debtors in the Caplovitz
study earned more than $10,000. There has been no showing that these
plaintiffs are representative parties who fairly and adequately protect the
interest of persons signing confession of judgements notes who have in-
come over $10,000.
[But this is a class action] on behalf of those individual natural
persons signing confession of judgement clauses in leases and consumer
financing transactions who are residents of Pennsylvania having incomes
of less than $10,000 a year.
314 F. Supp. at 1098, 1099.
"I6 Albeit a consumer whose annual income is less than $10,000. Yet, this is not
to say that the court would not have found the same way for consumers with
incomes over $10,000. It was simply that the plaintiffs in the case were found not
to adequately represent the class. See note 365 supra.
"I Some credit consumers receive consideration for the cognovit clause in the
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The UCCC also proscribes cognovit judgements. The UCCC
provides that "a buyer or lessee may not authorize any person to
confess judgement on a claim arising out of a consumer credit sale
or a consumer lease." '388 This rule does not distinguish between
income groups; few laws do, or even could, with constitutional
validity. Moreover, it does not allow the creditor to evade the
prohibition by proving, as allowed in Overmyer, that the debtor
intentionally, understandingly, voluntarily, and for consideration
waived his rights. Evidently the drafters of the UCCC felt that in
the total number of consumer credit transactions so few would
truly satisfy the requirements for an effective waiver that problems
could be avoided at little cost by having an absolute prohibition
against cognovit judgements. Because these judgements are
viewed unfavorably even if freely agreed upon, such a limitation
upon the freedom of contract comes with little cost to society.
In West Virginia, confessions of judgement have been invalid
at common law and by statute, except for confessions entered after
a suit has been instituted by process.369 It appears that "[i]n the
sense that they are such poor credit risks that they would not get the credit sale or
loan if they would not agree to the cognovit. But many signers of cognovits are only
slightly better than poor credit risks, and even with cognovits prohibited, would get
the sale or loan at the same terms.
- UCCO § 2.415, 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5115 (1975). There are
advantages in predictability and ease of judicial administration in having an arbi-
trary rule. There is probably some doubt about whether there is any commonly
occuring type of consumer business (outside the twenty-ton yacht trade) which
would involve a significant number of buyers who would know about, understand,
and be able to bargain for a cognovit clause. There is no way to equalize bargaining
power generally between the consumer buyer and the merchant seller or lender.
Moreover, when interest charges are pressing the top of the legal interest rate it is
difficult for the seller to give consideration in exchange for the cognovit. And al-
though a seller might be able to prove the buyer saw the cognovit by having the
buyer initial it, proving that he understood the cognovit might be difficult. Under-
standing is a state of mind. The best evidence of comprehension is the testimony
of the buyer, the description of his actions, and the complexity of the cognovit
clause. The first is predictable. The second, if limited to an admission of the buyers
initialing, is not really persuasive in light of retail buying experiences of the average
juror. As for the third, the cognovit clause is not particularly meaningful to the
average buyer.
U' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-4-48 (1966). This is a written confession of liability
written after service of process, which is then admitted as evidence in the judicial
proceedings in which judgment is entered. There are no due process objections to
such a confession of judgment because the party confessing judgment has notice
and the opportunity to be heard. The value of this process is that it avoids needless
litigation.
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early Colonial history of Virginia, [cognovit notes] seem to have
had considerable recognition, but their use was abolished, and
prohibited by penal statutes, enacted in 1744, and they did not
again come into use until that statute was repealed by the Code
of 1849."110
The West Virginia Supreme Court halted attempts to revive
this practice in 1912, in the case of Farguhar & Co. v. Dehaven.3 7 '
In that case a judgement note authorized the creditor, its agents,
or any clerk or attorney of record to confess judgement against the
debtor without notice and without instituting a formal action. The
creditor argued that judgement notes were acceptable at common
law, and the 1849 legislation repealing the 1744 statute reinstated
the common law.
The court agreed that the repeal of the statute restored the
common law but held that the use of cognovit judgements before
1744 was merely a "condemned. . .practice [which had] of late
been introduced" '372 and had never been recognized as legitimate
at common law. The court, citing several other states' laws held
that to allow a defendant to bargain away the right to be heard in
court was contrary to public policy and that a confession of judge-
ment made prior to process was void on its face. This decision has
been affirmed in recent years, 7 3 and so the provision in the
WVCCPA that prohibits cognovit judgements does nothing to the
law of West Virginia other than cement the judicial attitude that
such clauses are inequitable and against the public policy of the
State."'
"I Farquhar & Co. v. Dehaven, 70 W. Va. 738, 740, 75 S.E. 65 (1912). An 1819
revision of this penal statute provided: "If any attorney . .. shall presume to
appear under any power of attorney made before action brought, for confessing...
judgement to pass by default. . . for any defendant. . . such Attorney shall...
forfeit and pay fifteen hundred dollars to such defendant, for his own use." Revised
Code of Virginia, ch. 76, § 12 (1819).
' 70 W. Va. 738, 75 S.E. 65 (1912).
37 Id. at 740, 741, 75 S.E. at 66 (1912).
'1 Perkins v. Hall, 123 W. Va. 707, 17 S.E.2d 795 (1941). But see Gavenda
Bros. v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960), where the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals felt bound by the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution of the United States to enforce a cognovit judgment
entered against the debtor in an Illinois court on an Illinois contract, even though
enforcement involved contravention of some public policy of West Virginia.
"I The WVCCPA provision ends by stating: "the provisions of this section
shall not be construed as in any way impliedly authorizing a confession of judgment
in any other type of transaction." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-117 (Cum. Supp.
1974).
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2. Home Solicitation Sales
Consistent with most recent consumer acts, the WVCCPA
provides for the traditional three-day "cooling off" period within
which to cancel a home solicitation sale. 7 ' The WVCCPA defines
a home solicitation sale as a consumer credit sale376 of over twenty-
five dollars in which the buyer receives a solicitation of the sale at
a place other than the seller's fixed place of business. " The Act
excludes from its definition of home solicitation sale sales pursuant
to pre-existing revolving charge accounts; sales resulting from prior
negotiations at the seller's place of business; sales of motor vehi-
cles, mobile homes, or farm equitment; and sales governed by the
Federal Truth-in-Lending recission provisions. The federal three-
day right to rescind is applicable to any transaction that might
result in a security interest in real property.7
The Act prescribes a specific form of written notice telling the
buyer of the three-day right to cancel, requires that the buyer sign
and date a written agreement in his own handwriting, and requires
that the date of the agreement be the date of such signing.37 Not
only can the buyer cancel the home solicitation sale by notifying
the seller [u]ntil the seller has fully complied with this section,""3
but the WVCCPA provides that "[n]o such agreement or offer to
purchase shall be effective until after it has been signed by the
37 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-132 (Cum. Supp. 1974); see also id. §§ 46A-2-
133 to -135.
"' The WVCCPA defines a consumer credit sale as a sale of goods, services, or
an interest in land made by a seller who regularly engages as a seller in like credit
transactions or by a seller to a natural person for personal, family, household, or
agricultural purpose, where the debt is payable in installments or a finance charge
is made and with respect to goods or services a lender credit card is not made, and
the amount financed does not exceed $25,000. Id. § 46A-1-102(19). A sale which
meets the above requirements but which is paid for in whole or in part by money
received in a consumer loan by an interlocking lender is also a home solicitation
sale. Id. But where the buyer has requested goods or services without delay because
of a bona fide emergency, there is no right of cancellation or right to notice. Id. §
46A-2-132,-133.
-" Id. § 46A 1-102(19).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970); FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 2269(a) (Rev. ed. 1974);
N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d
Cir. 1973); Garner & North Roofing and Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve System, 464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-133 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
" Id. Rescission rights likewise continue under the federal act until the timely
opportunity is afforded following proper notice. See Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp.
1099 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
[Vol. 77
86
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss3/3
CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION
buyer, and he has written the date of such signature in his own
handwriting."38 1 So if the buyer does not personally date the instru-
ment, he has no duty to even pursue the cancellation procedures
to prevent being bound to the contract.
This requirement that the buyer personally write in the date
of the current day on the contract is a significant improvement in
the area of recission rights. Under the Federal Act, the standard
procedure of the fraudulent home improvement contractor, for
example, is to provide the buyer at the time the contract is made
with a form instrument denoting only the cash price and indicating
that such is the total cost. Sometime later, or even after comple-
tion of the work by the seller, the seller will ask for additional
signatures on disclosure statements containing recission notices
that are back-dated to the date of the contract, thereby denying
to the consumer any meaningful right to rescind. 2
Statutory cooling-off periods are provided in the WVCCPA to
protect consumers from high pressure selling tactics exerted upon
them in their home where they did not seek the goods and where
they cannot escape by simply leaving. Because most people find
it hard, or think it rude to ask a person to leave their house, the
sales pitch continues and often the buyer will sign simply to get
the salesperson to leave. Possible evasion of the WVCCPA protec-
tion might be possible if the seller orally promises credit terms and
reduces only the price and the discription of the goods to writing.
Since the WVCCPA only applies to home purchases on credit, 3  a
seller might successfully use the parol evidence rule and the writ-
ten contract to avoid both the credit terms and the protection of
the Act. Although a better reading of the parol evidence rule would
allow evidence of the credit terms and the credit nature of the
transaction into evidence,384 consumers who default by not appear-
as W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-133 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
s Under the WVCCPA, such use of a back-dated right of rescission notice
would not remove the buyer's right to cancel because the notice does not "designate
as the date of the transaction the day on which the buyer signed W'. Id. If the buyer
also did not personally sign the current date, the agreement would not be effective,
and the buyer would not have to bother to cancel. Id.
3 See note 376 supra. Although an oral assurance of credit and a description
of the purported credit terms are made, the writing might not mention it, or might
provide that if credit is not approved, the balance is to be paid at the end of the
month.
If nothing is said in the writing as to terms of payment the evidence of the
oral credit terms should be admissable as a consistent additional term under the
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ing in court or who appear without counsel might be taken advan-
tage of. The Attorney General could prevent this by promulgating
a regulation requiring every home solicitation sale not made on
credit to include in the buyer's handwriting a statement to the
effect that "this sale does not involve the extension of credit but
is to be paid in full by the end of the month, etc.""'
3. Deficiency Judgements
The Act provides that if a seller or an interlocking lender
repossesses or accepts surrender of goods in which he has a security
interest to secure a debt arising from a consumer sale or a con-
sumer loan, and the balance owed at that time is less than one
thousand dollars, the buyer or borrower is not liable to the seller
or lender for any unpaid balance following the seller's or lender's
sale of the collateral u0 Conversely, if the seller or lender brings suit
for the unpaid balance of the loan or sale when the balance due is
less than one thousand dollars, the creditor may not repossess the
property or subject it to sale following the judgement." 7
This section of the WVCCPA attempts to deal with what has
been a major abuse in the area of consumer financing. The credit
sale of a large ticket item (often an automobile) generally involves
the taking of a security interest in the goods. Following the sale and
an actual or alleged default, the creditor will then take possession
of the collateral, sell the item, and sue for the difference between
the proceeds of the sale and the obligation (the deficiency), adding
the cost of repossession and sale. Often in actual practice, the
creditor sells the property to himself, or to another with whom he
has an unknown business relationship, for less than its actual
value, and even if the sale is technically at arms-length, it is often
sold at the same low price. Although the law mandates that the
sale be made in a commercially reasonable manner,m only the
debtor has an interest in checking to see if in fact it was, and
UCC, especially where a form contract drafted by the seller is used. See W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46A-2-202 (1966). If the writing prescribes the method of payment as
cash, the consumer would have to resort to the defense of fraud, unconscionability
or would be forced to bring an action for a reformation of the contract.
u The Attorney General has the power to adopt regulations to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter and to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46A-7-102 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Id. § 46A-2-119(2) to (4).
Id. § 46A-2-119(7).
Id. § 46-9-504 (1966).
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usually being without legal counsel, the debtor fails to do so. The
creditor will then bring an action for a now inflated deficiency and,
in all but a very few lawsuits, will obtain a default judgement on
the deficiency since the debtor, if unable to make payments, is also
unable to obtain counsel. The effect of such a practice is of great
benefit to the creditor. By collecting on an inflated deficiency, the
creditor is able to secure a greater profit by a default than he would
by full performance of the contract."5 ' Some judges have attempted
to police this practice by refusing to give default judgements in
deficiency situations, demanding instead that the creditor prove
that the sale was made in a commercially reasonable manner.
This new provision should limit the widespread use of the
practice, but it will not stop the practice. First, the WVCCPA
section does not apply to obligations in which the balance owed at
the time of repossession or surrender exceeds one thousand dollars.
Many states have a higher threshold below which a deficiency may
not be sought. 9 Furthermore, the pattern of grossly deflated sales
prices, inflated deficiencies, and default judgements will continue
in spite of the Act's provision to the contrary. It appears that some
months after the enactment of the WVCCPA, many creditors con-
tinue to bring lawsuits for deficiencies, even though the balance
owed before repossession was less than one thousand dollars. If the
creditor indicates in his pleading that the original debt was partly
satisfied through a sale of secured property, a judge-or Justice of
the Peace whose jurisdiction now extends to $1500-who knows of
the Act's protection might disallow the attempt to collect the defi-
ciency especially if the defendant is not represented by counsel or
fails to appear. But the judge might also treat the provision as an
affirmative defense and allow the deficiency, and probably will do
so if the defendant appears with counsel. If creditor uses a short
complaint,39" ' alleging the balance owed and attaching only the
original note or contract, the debtor or his attorney will have to
appear and assert the protection provided by the Act.
The sanctions under the WVCCPA for such continued abuse
"I See Shuchman, Profit on Default, An Archival Study of Automobile
Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20 (1969).
2. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.5 (Deering 1972) (no deficiencies permitted); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-3812(e)(3) (1973) (no deficiency if cash price is less than $2000);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 143 (1975) (no deficiency if cash price is less than $2000);
ORE. Rav. STAT. § 83.830 (1974) (no deficiency if unpaid balance is less than $1250.)
"I A complaint similar to short forms 3 and 4 in LUGAR & SiLVERSTEiN, W. VA.
RULES 546-47 (1960) should be used.
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are not really adequate, except against a creditor who repeatedly
and willfully violates the provision. A consumer has no cause of
action for a penalty because the conduct is not an unfair trade
practice392 or a violation of those sections that give the consumer a
cause of action to recover a civil penalty.93 If the consumer com-
plains to the Attorney General,394 the Attorney General can investi-
gate39 and issue a cease and desist order prohibiting future viola-
tions, 9 ' or seek an injunction against future violations. 7 If the
creditor has engaged in a course of repeated and willful violations
within the last four years, the attorney general can seek a penalty
of up to five thousand dollars.9 8
A remedy should be given to the injured consumer, who is the
person most likely to discover the violations and have an interest
in prosecuting. To do this, and to stop the part-time violator, or
to avoid the problem of proving repeated violations, the WVCCPA
should be amended to add unlawful suits for deficiency judge-
ments or repossessions to those violations that give a consumer a
cause of action to recover damages and a civil penalty of from one
hundred to one thousand dollars. 9 ' An alternate would be to add
to the WVCCPA a provision requiring the plaintiff to plead part
satisfaction by repossession in an action to collect on a consumer
debt, imposing a penalty for not doing so and requiring a judge to
deny the cause of action if the claim falls within the Act.
Because the prohibition of deficiency judgements applies only
when the "amount owed" upon repossession is one thousand dol-
lars or less, the question might arise as to whether the one thou-
sand dollars refers to only the unpaid principal or to the sum of
the unpaid principle and the remaining finance charges. For a
seller who repossesses goods that gave rise to the debt, the use of
the phrase "the balance owed for the goods repossessed""4 ' most
clearly refers to the money represented by the goods, that is the
balance of the cash price. For an interlocking lender who repos-
sesses goods securing the debt, the use of the phrase "the balance
112 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-106,-102(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
3 Id. § 46A-5-101(1).
-4 Id. § 46A-7-101.
313 Id. § 46A-7-104.
-0 Id. § 46A-7-106.
7 Id. § 46A-7-108.
3,8 Id. § 46A-7-111(2).
-1 Id. § 46A-5-101(1).
' Id. § 46A-2-119(2).
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owed on the net proceeds of the loan paid to... the borrower""4 '
also most clearly means the capital of the loan and excludes the
finance charges.
This interpretation is confirmed by a written presentation
made to the Conference Committee by one of its members during
the committee's deliberations on the Act:
It has been suggested that we should return the language
in subsection (2) of "cash price of $1500", instead of the lan-
guage which has been placed there, which consists of a "a bal-
ance owed of $1000."111 The way the section reads now, if a
buyer has a balance owing on the cash price of the goods of
$1000 or less at the time the seller or assignee repossesses the
goods, then the buyer is not liable to the seller for a deficiency
judgement after the sale of the collateral. The language in the
UCCC provided that said buyer was not liable for a deficiency
judgement after repossession if the original cash price of the
goods exceeded $1500. I suggest that the language which is in
the section now relating to the balance owing on the cash price
of the goods, reaches the abuse in a better fashion than the
original language."3
But for a seller who repossess goods that did not give rise to
the debt, the use of the phrase "balance owed on such debt"40 4
seems to refer to the entire debt, including finance charges, less
any amount which would have been allowed as rebate had full
prepayment been made at the time of repossession.
The limitation on deficiency judgements is made applicable
to attempts to collect on obligations made prior to the effective
date of the WVCCPA: the chapter applies to "all consumer credit
transactions made before this chapter becomes operative insofar as
401 Id. § 46A-2-119 (4).
402 The provision first proposed in the legislative committee was the UCCC
version which applies to repossessions when the original cash price of the goods was
$1500. UCCC § 5.103,1 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GumE 5313 (1975). The committee
balked at the apparent scope of the $1500 coverage and readily accepted the $1000
figure as a compromise. But the $1000 substitute applies to the balance due upon
the repossession and, therefore, applies to purchases above $1500. Since many
defaults occur when the goods are deteriorating and the incentive to pay for new
purchases has gone, the balance owed on expensive purchases has often been re-
duced to $1000 when the default occurs. The $1000 balance due measure probably
gives more protection than the $1500 original price measure.
403 Address by Del. William Field to the Conference Committee on the
WVCCPA, W. Va. H.D., Reg. Sess. (1974). (emphasis added)
40 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-119(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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this chapter limits the remedies of creditors.""4 5 A creditor might
claim that such retroactivity is unconstitutional because in taking
away a remedy the WVCCPA is taking away property without due
process of law,' and impairing the obligation of contracts.",
In a case applying a similar statute, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that the denial of deficiency judgement was not uncon-
stitutional because a creditor has no property right to any particu-
lar form of remedy."' As for the impairment of contract rights, it
is well established that states by legislative act can change the
remedies available to parties of private contracts without impair-
ing the obligation of such contracts in violation of the contract
clause." 9 "The legislature may modify, limit or alter the remedy
for enforcement of a contract without impairing its obligation, but
in so doing, it may not deny all remedy or so circumscribe the
existing remedy with conditions and restrictions as seriously to
impair the value of the right."'' 0 Limitations on deficiency judge-
ments leave as many remedies available to the creditor as do limi-
tations on garnishment, limitations on assignment of earnings, and
discharges in bankruptcy.
4. Assignment of Earnings and Garnishment
The provision in the WVCCPA restricting wage assignments"'
corrects a wide-spread exploitative practice in West Virginia. Prior
to the enactment of this section, a store closely affiliated with a
specific employer, generally called the "company store" whether
4- Id. § 46A-8-101(3).
'c See W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 10; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See W. VA. CONST. arts. Im, IV; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
'a, Sanco Enterprises Inc. v. Christian, 495 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1972). See also
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933).
11 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (1819); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v.
Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437 (1903); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 (1922); City of El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). "Scrip laws" in West Virginia, which prohibited
the payment of wages in scrip redeemable only at the company store, or which
construed the payment in scrip to be a promise to pay the sum specified therein in
lawful money, have been held not to impair contract rights and to be a proper
exercise of the police power under both the state and federal constitutions. See
State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S.E. 1000 (1892); Atkins v. Grey
Eagle Coal Co., 76 W. Va. 27, 84 S.E. 906 (1915); Holliday v. Elkhorn-Piney Coal
Mining Co., 102 W. Va. 147, 134 S.E. 736 (1926).
"10 Richmond Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S.
124, 128 (1937).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-116 (Cum. Supp. 1974)
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or not owned by the employer, often had access to one hundred
percent of the employee's wages. The store would extend the em-
ployee more credit than he could repay from his surplus salary and
then require the employee to assign all of his wages to the store.
Without money, or the promise of earnings, the employee could not
secure credit elsewhere, and his only recourse was to return to the
company store for necessities of life, often at inflated prices. To
secure cash for other necessities such as rent or utilities, the wage-
earner was often forced to buy large-ticket items and sell them to
a friend at a fraction of their value, thereby further snowballing the
exploitative practice.
The statute dealing with wage assignments prior to the new
law was either unenforced, or was interpreted to the detriment of
the wage-earner. Generally, the West Virginia statutory law limits
wage assignments to twenty-five percent of an individual's earn-
ings,412 and prescribes a form for such wage assignments.',' How-
ever, the statute goes on to create an exception: "Provided further,
that nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting the
right of employer and employee to agree between themselves as to
deductions to be made from the payroll of employees."4 4 Many
employers construe this to mean that no limitation is placed upon
wage assignments so long as the employer and employee initially
agree to the wage assignments. Yet the term "deductions" would
seem to refer to a limited category of wage subtractions. For exam-
ple, union dues, charitable contributions, and payroll savings
plans are types of withholdings connoted by the word "deduc-
tions." Such an interpretation is consistent with the use of the
term in the wage assignment statutes of other states."' Moreover,
42 No assignment of an order for future wages shall be valid for a
period exceeding one year from the date of such assignment or order.
Such assignment or order shall be acknowledged by the party making the
same before a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowl-
edgements, and such order or assignment shall specify thereon the total
amount due and collectible by virtue of the same and three-fourths of the
periodical earnings or wages of the assignor shall at all times be exempt
from such assignment or order and no assignment or order shall be valid
which does not so state upon its face: Provided further, that no such order
or assignment shall be valid unless the written acceptance of the em-
ployer of the assignor to the making thereof is enclosed thereon.
Id. § 21-5-3 (1970 Replacement Volume).
413 Id.
414 Id.
"I See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-361(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975); MAss. STAT.
ANN. ch. 154, § 8 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.06 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
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it is consistent with the rule of statutory construction which pro-
vides that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to accom-
plish the purposes of the statute."' And finally, a 1975 amendment
to the general provisions on wages gives a similar definition of
deductions."7
The WVCCPA limits the assignment of earnings for the pur-
pose of paying debts arising from consumer loans or from any sale
of goods or services,"1 8 to twenty-five percent of those earnings re-
maining after legally required deductions are withheld.4 11 It also
makes any assignment of earnings or any agreed upon deduction
revocable by the employee at will. 4' Included in assignments of
earnings, as used in the twenty-five percent limitation, are all
types of wage transfers, including deductions, transfers, sales of
earnings, and deductions, except deductions for union dues, pen-
sion plans, payroll savings plans, charities, stock purchase plans,
and medical insurance."' All assignments and deductions seem to
be included in the employees right to revoke.
Under pre-existing code provisions, all wage assignments, ex-
cept those defined as deductions under the new definition422 are
NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-213 (1968 Replacement Volume); N.Y. PEsS. PROP. LAW §
46(1) (McKinneys 1971); R.I. STATS. ANN. § 28-15-9 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 241.09 (West 1974 Cum. Stat.).
4I See Hasson v. Chester, 67 W. Va. 278, 67 S.E. 731 (1910); Pfalzgraf v.
County Court, 73 W. Va. 723, 81 S.E. 397 (1914). It is easily seen that to interpret
the statute to mean that if the employer and the employee agree to have wages
deducted and given to the creditor, a creditor can have access to the total amount
of the employee's wages and thereby negate the effect of the statute. But see the
use of the word deduction in W. VA. COD ANN. § 21-5-3 (1973 Replacement Vol-
ume).
" The 1975 legislature provided a set of definitions for W. VA. CODE ANN. §
21-5-1 to -8 (1973 Replacement Volume). The definition for the term "deductions"
which is of course, now applicable to section three provides: "The term "deduc-
tions" includes amounts required by law to be withheld, and amounts authorized
for union or club dues, pension plans, payroll savings plans, credit unions, charities
and hospitalization and medical insurance." Enr. S.B. 482, W. VA. CODE ANN. §
21-5-1 (1975).
"I The Act refers to "payment of. . . debts arising from one or more consumer
credit sales or one or more consumer loans, or one or more sales as defined in section
one hundred two, article six of this chapter." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-116(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1974). Id. § 46A-6-102(c) includes as a sale "any goods for cash or
credit or any services or offer for services for cash or credit."
410 Id. § 46A-2-116.
121 Id. § 46A-2-116(3).
421 Id. § 46A-2-116(2)(b).
1,2 Enr. S.B. 482, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-1 (1975). See note 417 supra.
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invalid unless: the assignment states the total amount due, the
assignment is notarized, and the employer endorses his acceptance
on the agreement.41 Whether an assignment which fails to conform
to these requirements makes the employer liable for a penalty
under the Act is doubtful. First, the penalty section begins: "if a
creditor has violated the provisions of this chapter" 424 The chapter
referred to, chapter 46A, only limits the amount of earnings that
may be assigned, it does not prescribe the form necessary to effec-
tuate such an assignment. That is done in chapter 21. Second, the
penalty section subjects only a "creditor" to the penalty,4 5 and the
duty to use the prescribed form probably falls upon the employer,
who often is not the creditor.
Three provisions of the WVCCPA relate to wage garnishment,
or "suggestee execution" as it has been known in this state. The
Act insulates eighty percent of a consumer's wages or an amount
equal to thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage, whichever
is greater, from all garnishment brought to collect on a consumer
debt.426 Thus, the WVCCPA gives only minimal additional protec-
tion to the wage-earner because West Virginia law has long pro-
vided a twenty percent maximum to creditors.41 Whereas the ex-
isting statute limited suggestee execution to twenty percent of the
total wages, the WVCCPA limits execution to twenty percent of
"disposable earnings," which is something less. The provision ex-
cluding a minimum dollar amount from garnishment is identical
to the provision in the FCCPA.4n The WVCCPA contains a novel
concept in permitting the wage-earner to petition a court to have
a wage execution set aside temporarily or permanently because the
wage execution causes "undue hardship.""4 9 This concept owes its
origin to the recommendations of the National Commission on
4" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-3 (1973 Replacement Volume).
424 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-101(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
42 The employer withholds the wages and either keeps them for himself for a
debt due him or sends them to a third party creditor. The penalties subjected fall
upon the employer. Id. § 46A-5-101.
,25 Id. § 46A-2-130. The present minimum hourly wage is $2.10. Fair Labor
Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1974).
'4 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-5A-3 (1966). It should be emphasized that the
existing statute limits garnishment to twenty percent for the enforcement of any
judgment, while the WVCCPA limits garnishment to the stricter twenty percent
of take home wages, but this applies only for the enforcement of judgments arising
from a consumer credit sale or a consumer loan.
'u 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(2) (1970).
'n W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-130(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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Consumer Finance. 3 The apparently open-ended standard should
allow a court considerable flexibility in reducing or disallowing a
garnishment.
Other wage-related provisions of the WVCCPA have only min-
imal effect. The provision disallowing garnishment before judge-
ment"' has little or no effect because existing law allowed garnish-
ment only to judgement creditors. 32 The only possible previous
exception was that under certain circumstances, wages could be
the subject of an attachment proceedings;433 such proceedings have
recently been ruled unconstitutional. 3 ' The WVCCPA should
settle any further question by prohibiting garnishment through the
attachment statute for consumer debts.'
Similar to the federal act, the WVCCPA prohibits discharge
because of garnishment or attempted garnishment.' The State
act differs in that it applies only to garnishments brought to satisfy
a judgement arising from a consumer credit sale or loan; the fed-
eral act applies to all garnishments. 37 A further difference is that
the WVCCPA prohibits discharge for any garnishment, while the
federal act only prohibits discharge "for garnishment for any one
indebtedness."'38 The WVCCPA also provides the consumer a
" Consumer Credit in the United States, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON CONS -R FINANCE 33 (1972). The WVCCPA provision was taken from the Field-
Palumbo Bill, S.B. 338, H.B. 1060 (1973), drafted following the recommendations
of this report.
4'1 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-118 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
432 Id. §§ 38-5A-2, -3 (1966); id. §§ 38-5B-1, -2.
M Id. 99 38-7-1 to -46. The West Virginia attachment statute allows a claimant
who is suing or who is about to sue on a claim or a debt, to attach a defendant's
property when there are grounds (id. § 38-7-2) to believe that the defendant might
dispose of his property in order to defraud the possibly successful claimant. Id. §
38-7-7 includes personal property among that property attachable; and id. § 38-7-
15 provides for garnishment.
411 Union Barge Line Corp. v. Marble Cliff Quaries Co., 374 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.
W. Va. 1974); Sniadich v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
m The Act states that the creditor "may not attach unpaid earnings of the
debtor by garnishment or like proceedings" prior to entry of judgment. W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46A-2-118 (Cum. Supp. 1974). That attachment is a "like proceeding" is
made clear by the use of the word "garnishment" as the title of section 15 of the
attachment statute. Id. § 38-7-1 to -46 (1966).
4u Id. § 46A-2-131 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
w 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1971).
m Id. See Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490 (D. Cal. 1971). This
probably means that there must be at least two non-consumer related garnishments
before a resulting discharge can be legal. If there is one non-consumer related
garnishment, a resulting discharge will violate the federal act. If a consumer related
[Vol. 77
96
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss3/3
CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION
cause of action to recover up to six weeks in resulting lost wages
and reinstatement in the job." 9
Although it did not make it a part of the WVCCPA, the 1974
Legislature gave significant additional protection to wages by in-
creasing from two hundred to one thousand dollars the amount of
personal property a debtor can exempt from levy."' If a debtor
wants to protect his wages more than his other personal property,
he can do so by listing the wages presently due him on a schedule
that lists all of his personal property, note the wages and other
personal property up to a combined total of one thousand dollars
as that property he wants to exempt from levy, and deliver the
schedule to the court officer (constable for a J.P. Court, circuit
clerk for a circuit court) whose duty it is to levy on the existing
judgment. Since the list only exempts that property actually
owned by the debtor at the time the list is filed, the debtor must
file a new list each pay period in order to exempt the newly earned
wages.
The Act provides for the exemption of some personal property
from execution brought to collect f6r consumer debts, but it does
not extend its protection to wages due the debtor.441
5. Disclaimers and Privity
The provisions that invalidate disclaimers of warranties and
abolish privity as a requirement to recover on warranties will prob-
ably affect existing litigation practice more than anything else in
the Act." 2 The important part of the section concerning disclaim-
ers states:
garnishment were to be added to a non-consumer related garnishment a resulting
discharge would not violate the federal act because there would be two garnish-
ments. Nevertheless, because the consumer related garnishment was needed to
avoid the federal prohibition, any discharge would be a result of that consumer
related garnishment, and this would violate the WVCCPA.
,3' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-101(6) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
"0 Id. § § 38-8-1,-3. This amendment to the Code's exemptions from levy imple-
ments the 1973 constitutional amendment which increased the homestead exemp-
tion from $1000 to $5000 and the personal property exemption from $200 to $1000.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48. The increase only applies to debts incurred after the
ratification of the amendment. Id.
The exemption applies only to the head of the household so a husband and a
wife are probably limited to a combined exemption of $1000. See McGrew v. Stew-
art, 113 W. Va. 45, 166 S.E. 847 (1932).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-136 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
42 For a good discussion of the traditional problems in West Virginia concern-
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with respect to goods which are the subject of or are intended
to become the subject of a consumer transaction, no merchant
shall: (1) Exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit any
warranty, express or implied, including the warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose . . . .Any
such exclusion, modification or attempted limitation shall be
void.4 3
The important part of the section concerning privity reads: "[n]o
action by a consumer for breach of warranty or for negligence with
respect to goods subject to a consumer transaction shall fail be-
cause of a lack of privity between the consumer and the party
against whom the claim is made."" Both the section on disclaim-
ers and the section on privity apply to cash as well as credit sales."'
It is therefore clear that a retail seller cannot disclaim express
or implied warranties created under the Uniform Commercial
Code44 in a sale of consumer goods, and any attempt to do so is
void. Nevertheless since the Act says that "no merchant shall dis-
claim," the question arises as to who is a "merchant" within the
meaning of this statute.
In a typical situation, a manufacturer will manufacture the
consumer goods and sell them to a wholesale distributor; the
wholesale distributor will sell them to a retail seller; the retail
seller will finally sell them to a consumer; the consumer in some
cases will sell them in a used condition to someone else. The retail
seller is clearly a merchant, and the consumer who later sells the
goods at a garage sale is clearly not a merchant. But are the manu-
facturer and the distributor merchants under this section? The Act
does not define "merchant."
The National Consumer Act defines "merchant" as one who
regularly deals in property in a manner that leads to a consumer
ing disclaimers and privity, see Note, Products Liability-West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act-Definitional Inadequacies 77 W. VA. L. REv. 328 (1975).
This note was written before the Act was amended to define "consumer" and
"consumer transaction" and before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
decided the privity question in Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va.
1975).
"3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-107 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
4" Id. § 108.
"0 All of article six of the WVCCPA applies to both cash and credit transac-
tions. Id. § 46A-1-103 & §§ 46A-6-102(b), (c).
'" The Act defines warranties as those warranties contained in sections -313,-
314, and -315 of chapter 46, article two of the UCC. Id. § 46A-6-102(f).
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transaction and specifically includes a manufacturer within the
definition.447 Since the NCA served as one of the models for the
Act, this definition is meaningful. More persuasive is the definition
of "merchant" found in the UCC, which states that a merchant is
"a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill, peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction." 4" This clearly
includes a manufacturer and at least one case has so held. 49 This
definition is important not only because both the WVCCPA and
the UCC deal with sales of goods but because the disclaimer sec-
tion of the Act is specifically tied to the warranty provisions of the
UCC.111 Furthermore the abolition of the requirement of privity by
the Act makes it clear that the Legislature intended that consum-
ers have a remedy against the manufacturer and the distributor of
the goods purchased. This remedy would become ineffective if the
manufacturer and the distributor could disclaim liability. But
there are a group of cases in other jurisdictions which hold that a
manufacturer is not a merchant.45 ' Although these holdings are
concerned with taxes levied upon "merchants" and not with the
presence or absence of warranties, the Legislature should amend
the statute and define merchant to include manufacturers. Under
the UCC, the NCA, and case law, the term "merchant" includes
one who buys and resells goods, so a distributor is clearly a mer-
chant under the Act.
Once it is determined that the disclaimer provision applies to
manufacturers there is no problem in determining which buyers in
the chain of purchasers enjoy the benefit of the prohibition of
disclaimers. The Act simply states that an attempted disclaimer
by a merchant is void. Therefore a disclaimer by a manufacturer
as to goods that are intended to become the subject of a consumer
"4 NCA § 1.301(23).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-104(1) (1966).
"' Safeway Stores v. L. D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D. Mo.
1971).
" The Act prohibits exclusion of warranties in article 6, section 107, and
defines warranties in article 6, section 102 (f) as those "warranties described and
defined in sections three hundred thirteen, three hundred fourteen and three
hundred fifteen, (of the UCC) . . ."
"I Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. City of Broken Bow, 184 Okl. 362, 87 P.2d 319
(1939); Fischback Brewing Co. v. St. Louis, 231 Mo. App. 793, 95 S.W.2d 335
(1936); United Biscuit Co. v. Stokes, 174 Tenn. 111, 124 S.W.2d 230 (1939); Com-
monwealth v. Meyer, 180 Va. 466, 23 S.E.2d 353 (1942). But see Mercanti v. Pers-
son, 160 Conn. 468, 280 A.2d 137 (1971).
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transaction is not effective against a claim by the wholesale dis-
tributor, the retail seller, the consumer purchaser, or a third party
user who is otherwise allowed to recover.
A recent amendment to the WVCCPA indicates that the abo-
lition of the privity requirement applies only to vertical privity and
not to horizontal privity. The Act now defines "consumer" as a
"natural person to whom a sale is made in a consumer transac-
tion."452 Thus if a person purchases a defective consumer product
from a retail seller to be used by herself, her family, or her friends,
she can recover from the manufacturer even though she was not
in contractual privity with the manufacturer. Members of the pur-
chaser's family and guests in her home have been allowed by the
Uniform Commercial Code to recover from the retail seller even
though they were not in contractual privity with that seller.'53 But
it appears that the WVCCPA does not provide these same family
members or guests with a cause of action against the manufac-
turer. The Act states "no action by a consumer for breach of war-
ranty .. .shall fail because of lack of privity."'14 Since the Act
defines consumer as one "to whom a sale is made," it takes away
privity as a bar to a suit brought by one "to whom a sale is made,"
that is the purchaser, but it does not abolish privity as a bar to a
suit by one who is not the purchaser. 5
Nor can it be argued that the Uniform Commercial Code ex-
tends warranties of the manufacturer to the family and guests of
the buyer. The UCC states that "a seller's warranty . . . extends
'12 Enr. H.B. 1421, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-102(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
'U W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318 (1966). It must be emphasized that although
this code section itself extends warranties of the seller only to the family and house
guests of the buyer, it is silent on the extension of these warranties by courts to
further classifications of users, including persons not guests of the purchaser. See
id. § 46-2-318, Comment 3. It should also be noted that this code section applies
only to actions for personal injury and not for economic loss standing alone. The
WVCCPA's privity section applies to economic injury as well as personal injury.
Id. § 46A-6-108.
Many members of a family are arguably the purchaser even if they do not
themselves personally make the purchase. When a husband buys a toaster, he is
probably buying it as the agent for both himself and his wife, at the direction and
for the benefit of them both. It makes no difference who happened to be driving
near the hardward store that day. So even if the wife personally picks up the toaster
at the seller's store, if the husband gets burned by its defective wiring, he should
be considered one of the people "to whom [the]... sale is made," and not be
barred by lack of privity from suing the manufacturers. This is not so clear when
the son of the mother and father is suing because he probably did not share in the
decision to purchase, and he had no share in the money used for the purchase.
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to ... the family or household of his buyer. . ."I" The consumer
is not "his" buyer. The retailer (or other distributer) is his buyer.
Any further analysis is probably unnecessary in light of the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals's recent decision in
Dawson v. Canteen Corp.45 7 The defendant in Dawson baked a
sandwich bun, sold the bun to a retail seller, the seller used the
bun in a vending machine from which the plaintiff purchased it.
Contaminants in the bun caused the buyer acute food poisoning.
The defendant baking company raised lack of contractual privity
as a defense. In striking down this defense, the court said
"[a]ccordingly the requirement of privity of contract in actions
grounded in breach of express or implied warranty is abolished in
West Virginia. . .,4
Although Dawson involved a question of vertical privity, it
appears that the court intended to strike down both vertical and
horizontal privity as requirements in warranty actions. In its dis-
cussion of the privity question, the court stated that the privity
requirement began to erode in West Virginia when the Uniform
Commercial Code eliminated the requirement of horizontal privity
and that it was further eroded by the WVCCPA's elimination of
vertical privity in consumer transactions. After this discussion of
both vertical and horizontal privity, the court stated in conclusion:
"It is sufficient merely to hold that lack of privity alone is no longer
a defense to a warranty action in West Virginia." 459 A conservative
reading of this case suggests that the court intends to allow those
persons enumerated by the UCC, as family or guests in the home
of the buyer, to recover from manufacturers for damage caused by
defective consumer or non-consumer products, even though any
kind of contractual privity may be lacking.46
6. Limitations on the Lenders Defenses
If a buyer buys goods from a seller and the goods turn out to
'u W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318 (1966) (emphasis added).
'7 212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975).
45 212 S.E.2d at 82-83.
'5' 212 S.E.2d at 84.
4e0 Taken literally the court's broad ruling would mean that anyone, no matter
how far removed from the buyer or the user of the defective product, could recover
from the manufacturer for damage caused by the defectively manufactured prod-
uct. This would include, among others, recovery by employees of the buyer, and
recovery by innocent bystanders injured by a defectively manufactured automo-
biles. Most jurisdictions have not extended warranty protection this far.
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be defective, the buyer is under no duty to pay the full contract
price for the goods."' If the buyer has not yet paid for the goods,
she is in an advantageous position. Commonly, however, a buyer
of goods on credit finds herself under a legal duty to pay for the
goods, even though the goods are clearly defective, and even
though she has not yet paid for them. This comes about in several
ways. The buyer might arrange a loan from a third party lender
and use the money obtained from the loan to buy the goods from
the seller. Since the lender is theoretically outside the sales con-
tract, the lender's rights under the loan contract are not affected
by the failure of the seller to perform on the sales contract. In this
manner the seller is able to sell his goods to one who does not have
the cash available, and yet receive the money immediately. The
lender is able to make a loan for a charge and yet not be liable for
defects in the goods. Because of this legal phenomenon, a party in
the business of selling goods on credit will commonly split his
business structure into two separate legal entitles, one entity sell-
ing the goods and the other lending the money to the buyer for the
purchase. Thus, due to the sophistication of the seller, and his use
of what is really a legal technicality, the buyer loses a defense she
would normally have.462
The same result can occur where the seller himself purports
to extend the credit to the buyer by the use of a waiver-of-defense
clause in the sales contract or the holder-in-due-course doctrine in
46! W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-2-601,-602,-711 (1966).
46, The best justification for this practice is that it leaves the buyer in the same
situation she would have been in had she paid cash. Another person (the seller)
would have his $300, and the buyer would have only a cause of action against the
seller for $300. The leverage remains with the seller. Usually a buyer will seek to
purchase on credit, not to gain the protection of leverage on the chance that the
seller will default, but because the buyer does not have the money or finds it more
convenient to take the goods on credit. The buyer is looking for credit, not protec-
tion. If the charge she pays for this credit is the going interest rate for loans of this
size, then she is paying only for the credit. If she also wants the protection, then
she should have to pay an additional amount for it.
But conversely, especially when the seller himself purports to extend credit,
even a credit buyer motivated chiefly by a need for credit will often think she does
not have to pay if the goods turn out to be defective. So while she would inspect
the goods or services exhaustively before she turned the $350 in cash over to the
seller, she might sign a credit instrument without such exhaustive inspection, put-
ting it off until later under the misapprehension that she will not have to pay for
them if they then prove to be defective. In this way her reasonable expectations are
defeated by the esoteric operation of legal principles.
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the credit instrument.4613 In the former, the sales contract contains
a clause whereby the buyer agrees to waive any claims or defenses
she might have on the contract against the assignee who buys the
contract. In the latter, the buyer signs a negotiable note. When the
note is sold (negotiated) to a third party who takes for value, in
good faith, and without notice of any defenses the buyer might
have, the third party has a right to collect on the note regardless
of any defenses the buyer may eventually in fact have against the
seller.404
Countless sales are made using these techniques, especially
involving more expensive consumer purchases where the seller is
not large enough to truly finance the transaction. Under the
WVCCPA, lenders who participate in or are connected with con-
sumer credit sales," 5 assignees of seller's rights in a consumer
credit sales contract,"' and holders of non-demand467 negotiable
instruments taken in a consumer credit sale4 have no immunity
from claims and defenses that the borrower or buyer may assert
against the seller.
In West Virginia prior to the passage of the Act, anyone who
could qualify as a holder in due course under the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code,46 or under the Uniform Negotiable
"I When the seller does the initial financing and then sells the "debt" to the
third party, it is this third party who is actually extending the credit to the buyer
to finance the purchase. This third party is commonly the same bank who could
have made the cash loan directly to the buyer in the previous example. Yet the bank
benefits more when it buys the debt from the seller because the seller, as the initial
extender of credit, can change the rates allowed for credit sales, which are usually
higher than those allowed for cash loans. See 1 CCH CONSUoIR CREDrr GumE,
Charts T 510, 570 (1971). The UCCC and the WVCCPA allow the same rates for
both consumer credit sales and consumer cash loans. UCCC §§ 2.401, 3.508, 1 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5101, 5248 (1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-3-101 et
seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-305(1966).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-103 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See also NCA § 2.407.
'"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-101 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See also UCCC § 2.404,
1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5104 (1971); NCA § 2.406.
"7 A check is not a credit instrument; it is a form of immediate payment. For
this reason, the WVCCPA applies only to negotiable instruments "other than a
currently dated check." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-101 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
"I Id. See also UCCC § 2.403, 1 CCH CONSUNR CREDIT GumE 5103 (1971);
NCA § 2.405. It should be emphasized that for the first year of the Act, these
defenses against interlocking lenders, assignees, and holders in due course can be
avoided by a complicated notice system set out in subsections of W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 46A-2-101 to -103 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
"I "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (a) for value;
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Instruments Act, 7 ' or under the common law of negotiable instru-
ments 47' took negotiable instruments free from most claims and
defenses that the original maker of the note might have asserted
against the original payee. 12 While the new law applies only to
consumer credit sales or consumer loans, abolition of the defenses
of a holder in due course of consumer paper represents a substan-
tial change from prior law and will undoubtedly change the busi-
ness practices of those dealing in consumer paper.
The change made in the law by these sections of the Act has
a basis in the case law of most states, and therefore operates to
bring West Virginia more in step with the consumer law of other
states.'7 Courts have increasingly refused to apply the holder-in-
due-course concept against consumer makers of notes in consumer
sales or consumer loans when strict application of the rule would
result in an inequitable or unconscionable holding. The courts
have usually allowed the maker of the paper to assert defenses by
refusing to recognize the assignee as a holder in due course, either
because the assignee had notice or knowledge that the maker held
a claim against the payee or other lack of good faith.
Many of the cases where the holder of a note given in a con-
sumer sale was held not to be a holder in due course involved the
and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been disho-
nored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person." W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46-3-302 (1966).
"I A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions: (1) that the instrument is complete and regular upon its face;
(2) that he became the holder of it before it was overdue and without notice that it
had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; (3) that he took it in good
faith and for value; (4) that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice
of infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
W. VA. CODE ch. 98, art. 52, (Barnes 1923).
"' See Interstate Fin. Co. v. Schroder, 74 W. Va. 67, 81 S.E. 552 (1914).
472 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-305 (1966); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bibbee,
147 W. Va. 786, 131 S.E.2d 745 (1963); Interstate Fin. Co. v. Schroder, 74 W. Va.
67, 81 S.E. 552 (1914).
.3 See the cases collected in 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955) and 40-48 A.L.R. LATER CASE
SERVICE 392 (1969). Note, Holder in Due Course Defense in Consumer Sales, 73 W.
VA. L. REV. 240 (1971). See also, Benson & Squillante, Holder in Due Course
Doctrine in Consumer Credit Transactions, 26 HAST. L.J. 427 (1974); Note,
Consumer Defenses and Financers as Holders in Due Course, 4 CONN. L. REV. 83
(1971); Note, Negotiable Instruments: A Consumer Challenge to Holder in Due
Course Status of Financing Instututions, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 626 (1971); Hart-
man & Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77 CoM.
L.J. 116 (1972).
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use of conditional sales contracts entered into at the time of the
making of the note. Some courts found that the negotiability of
such notes was destroyed by their connection with the contract. 74
Other courts have held that while such notes retained their negoti-
ability, the holder either had knowledge of unfulfilled conditions
of the contract,"7 or otherwise did not meet the requirements of
good faith, and thus did not enjoy the protection given to a holder
in due course.47
The states which held that a note's negotiability could be
destroyed by its connection, sometimes physical, with the condi-
tional sales contract often referred to the "single contract"
theory.77 Under the single contract theory, courts allowed the
maker of a note to assert defenses against the holder (who usually
also held the conditional sales contract) by reasoning that the
holder, by his holding of the actual contract, had notice that a
condition needed to be met before the note was good (thereby
defeating a finding of an unconditional promise to pay);478 or, by
reasoning that while the maker could not assert a defense against
the holder of the note, he could assert a defense against the holder
as a holder of the contract, as a counter-claim in the holder's suit
against the maker.479
Many of the elements that led the courts to find that an as-
signee of consumer paper was not a holder in due course have
become those elements which make a lender an interlocking lender
under the WVCCPA. Elements such as the preparation of credit
forms by the lender to the seller,"' the guarantee of the loan by
seller,"8 ' and the existence of an extensive course of dealing be-
tween lender and seller,4"2 have all been cited by courts as reasons
,", See, e.g. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 126 Misc. 375, 213 N.Y.S. 536,
aff'd 219 App. Div. 771, 220 N.Y.S. 893, aff'd without opinion 247 N.Y. 538, 161
N.E. 173 (1926).
'T' Cooke v. Real Estate Trust Co., 180 Md. 133, 22 A.2d 554 (1941).
478 Commercial Credit v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
" See, e.g., Federal Credit Bureau v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div.
379, 264 N.Y.S. 723 (1933).
478 Cooke v. Real Estate Trust Co., 180 Md. 133, 22 A.2d 554 (1941); First &
Lumberman's Nat'l Bank v. Bucholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945).
"I The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals expressly refused to adopt the
single contract theory in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bibbee, 147 W. Va. 786,
792, 131 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1963).
" Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
,' Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
472 Unico v. Owen 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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for refusing to find that an otherwise qualified holder in due course
did not take free from claims of the buyer against the seller.
Clearly the object of the courts in these cases has been to do
justice to unsophisticated consumers who would otherwise fall prey
to "the jungle of finely printed, creditor oriented provisions. ' 483
The modem use of credit by consumers has spread faster than the
understanding that one who signs a negotiable instrument relin-
quishes his defenses against a holder in due course.
In the famous case of Unico v. Owen,484 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey found a maker not liable on a note given to a door-to-
door salesman in return for a promise to deliver 140 record albums
and a free stereo. After paying over three hundred dollars of the
$840 due, the Owens had received only the stereo and twelve al-
bums, which were delivered immediately after the contract was
signed. When a year elapsed during which the Owens paid faith-
fully without receiving any more records, they stopped paying and
were sued by Unico, the corporation that now held the note. Uni-
versal, the seller of the records, had become insolvent by that time.
The facts showed that Unico was formed expressly for the
purpose of financing Universal, that Unico bought all of Univer-
sal's customer's notes, that Unico determined the credit worthi-
ness of Universal's customers, and that it otherwise exercised gen-
eral control over Universal's extention of credit. The court held
that the close relationship between Unico and Universal prevented
Unico from taking notes in the required good faith of a true holder
in due course.
Close connections between a lender and a seller, and the
knowledge by the lender of the questionable business practices of
the seller have also served as reasons to deny holder-in-due-course
status in cases involving the sale of come-on schemes,48 sales of
used cars more suited for flavoring iced tea than for transporta-
tion,"' and sales of broken down equipment to small businesses.48
The cases referred to above arose before the enactment of
consumer credit codes. The undefined, uncoordinated state of the
4' Id. at 111, 232 A.2d at 410.
,5 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App.2d 1, 45 Ohio Ops.2d 2, 240
N.E.2d 886 (1968).
488 Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
" Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
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case law that had begun to chip away at holder-in-due-course sta-
tus in consumer credit cases provided the impetus for the abolition
by statute of holder-in-due-course status in consumer sales.
Forty states now have some statutory modification of the doc-
trine of holder in due course in consumer credit sales."'5 These
statutes vary in the type of transaction covered, the requirement
of interconnection between lender and seller, the time limit, if any,
during which the buyer may assert such defenses,489 and the re-
quirements, if any, that a consumer note state on its face that it
was taken in a consumer transaction.49
There are a number of things that should be noted about the
WVCCPA provisions. If a seller wilfully and repeatedly takes nego-
tiable instruments in consumer transactions in violation of the
prohibition against taking such instruments, he is liable for a five
thousand dollar civil penalty.49 ' If a business makes a practice of
buying such prohibited instruments, the business should be sub-
ject to the same penalty for assisting in the violation of the Act.49
Im ALA. CODE §§ 5-14-319 to -320 (1958); ALAsKA STAT. § 45-10-010 (1962); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-145 (1972); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1804.2 (West 1970); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 73-2-403 (Supp. 1971); CONN. LAWS 1972, P.A. No. 137; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 43-4302 et seq. (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3807 et seq. (Supp. V.,
1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 96-908 (Supp. 1971); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 476-18 et seq.
(1968); IDAHO CODE § 48-609 (Supp. 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 517 et seq.;
id. § 262D (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 3-211, 3-307, 3-404 to -405 (1971); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 16A-3-307 et seq. (1969); LA. REV. STAT. § 9-3532 et seq. (1950); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 762-3-307,-403 et seq. (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §
147, id. art. 58A, § 24, id. art. 83, § 216 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255, § 12, id.
ch. 255D, § 25A (1932); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 445-865 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
325-79, 325-741 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382A; 3-305(a) (1955); N.J. REv.
STAT. § 17-16C-1 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-16-5 (1953); N.Y. PERS. PROP. ch.
41, art. 10, § 403 (McKinney 1962); N.Y. GEN. Bus. ch. 20, art. 15, § 253 (McKinney
1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. 25A-25 (1971); N.D. LAWS 1973, SB 2109, effective July 1,
1973; Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.031 et seq. (Anderson 1967); ORE. REv. STAT. §
626.2, 744.83.820 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1402 (1936); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 147 (1956); S.C. LAWS 1974, HB 2356, approved Aug. 13, 1974, effective Jan. 1,
1975; S.D. LAws, 1973, HB 583, App. 3-27-73, eff. 7-1-73; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
2455 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE § 63-14-020 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-101
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422-406 et seq. (1969); Indiana,
Oklahoma, and Wyoming have adopted § 2-403, 2-404 of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code.
" Some states require the consumer to assert his claims within a limited
period ranging from five days (Illinois) to twelve months (Wisconsin).
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-403 (Supp. 1971).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-111(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
492 Id.
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There is a question as to whether a buyer can initiate a lawsuit
against a holder, an assignee, or an interlocking lender, or whether
the protection given her under the WVCCPA can be used only as
a defense. The first bill passed by the 1973 Legislature493 contained
no limitation. But the final versions of each section contains limi-
tations:
A claim or defense which a buyer or lessee may assert against a
. . . [holder in due course assignee, interlocking lender] . . .
may be asserted only as a matter of defense to or set off against
a claim by the holder."'
The section above suggests that the protection is available to
the buyer only if the creditor brings the lawsuit. But further provi-
sions of the sections above indicate otherwise:
Provided, that if a buyer or lessee shall have a claim or defense
which could be asserted . . . as a matter of defense to or setoff
against a claim by the [holder, assignee, or interlocking
lender] were [they] to assert such a claim against the buyer
or lessee, then such buyer or lessee shall have the right to insti-
tute and maintain an action. . . [to cancel]. . . the indebted-
ness. . . or [to release any lien securing payment thereofi A'5
These exceptions seem to allow those types of actions that a
consumer would wish to bring in any case. If the limitation has any
effect, it limits the amount that a consumer can recover against
the holder, assignee, or interlocking lender, to that amount still
owed such creditor. This sets a limit for claims against a holder
where that section does not otherwise provide a limit."' But if it
does operate to limit the amount of a consumer's claim, it conflicts
with those limits found elsewhere in the sections dealing with as-
signees and interlocking lenders. 97 If indeed the sections do con-
flict, the inconsistency should be settled by legislative amend-
ment. Liability to the consumer for resulting damage to person or
property is specifically excluded by all three sections. 9'
"I Enr. S.B. 2070, Reg. Sess (1973).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§46A-2-101(7),-102(7), -103(6) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
" Id. The sections also allow buyers or lessors to sue at any time for fraud,
lack of consideration, or penalties for violation of the WVCCPA. Id.
498 Id. § 46A-2-101.
117 A claim by a consumer brought against the assignee is limited to the amount
owing at the time of such assignment. Id. § 46A-2-102(5). A claim by a consumer
brought against an interlocking lender is limited to the amount of the loan used
for the sale. Id. § 46A-2-103(3).
"9' Id. §§ 46A-2-101(8), -102(8), -103(8).
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The Legislature clearly intended that the developing common
law defenses against holders and assignees remain available to
consumers who do not find protection under the WVCCPA.499 This
is made clear by a written statement presented to the conference
committee by one of its members during the final deliberations of
the bill."'
The provision that subjects the lender to liability in interlock-
ing loan-sale transactions" 1 was derived from the Massachusetts
provision. 2 First, the provision enumerates six circumstances
under which an interlocking loan-sale transaction is deemed to
exist."3 Second, by the inclusion of the language "without limiting
the generality of the foregoing," ' the statute leaves to court con-
struction and jury decision a case-by-case determination of what
other facts will constitute a lender "connection" with the transac-
tion, so as to subject him to the defenses of the borrower-buyer.
The case law in this area should supply some guidelines." 5 Also,
the broad rule-making authority given to the Attorney General
authorizes him to delineate additional indicia of financer involve-
ment in a sales transaction. 6 The fact that the general language
was intended to permit a case-by-case determination is evident
"' Id. §§ 46A-2-101(3), -102(3).
" There is a substantial body of case law from the various states as
to what indicates a close business relationship between a buyer and an
assignee or holder of negotiable paper. This subsection makes it very clear
that these two sections of the Code should not be construed to limit the
buyer's access to this common law to show notice or lack of good faith or
the like of an assignee or holder of negotiable instrument because of the
statutory sections we are writing into law. The buyer should nevertheless
have the access to his common law approach of showing a close business
relationship between the assignee or holder and the seller, so as to defeat
his claim of bona-fide purchase. This is, of course, in addition to the
rights provided the buyer by virtue of this section. It should be empha-
sized that by enacting the two sections as a whole, we are not attempting
to take away any rights that the buyer might have under the evolving case
law of this and the other jurisdictions.
Written statement of Del. William Field to Conference Committee on WVCCPA
concerning S.B. 240, Reg. Sess. (1974).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-103 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
.. MAss. CODE ANN. ch. 255, § 12F.
0- W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-103(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
L04 Id.
5 E.g., Note, Consumer Protection-The Holder-In-Due-Course Defense in
Consumer Sales, 71 W. VA. L. REv. 240, 254-257 (1971).
W' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-102(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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from the statement, presented to the committee, in opposition to
the attempt to delete the" language:
The language contained here, "without limiting the generality
of the foregoing", is very necessary in that the circumstances
enumerated in (i) through (vii), are not the only circumstances
indicating that a lender is connected with sales transactions. In
fact, no complete catalog of circumstances could be made inas-
much as they vary with each type of transaction. A few are now
spelled out in West Virginia case law, and many others have
been indicated by other states' case law, and there are many
more yet to be articulated anywhere. Therefore, the language
here, "without limiting the generality of the foregoing", indi-
cates that the clause in the general prohibition "if such lender
participates in or is connected with" is left to the general case-
by-case legal interpretation, as it should be.
Further, it is clear from the language of the rule-making author-
ity given the administrator, pursuant to Section 46A-7-102(e),
that the administrator can further define circumstances which
he considers to be circumstances which indicate that "such
lender participates in or is connected with the sales transac-
tion". I believe that the generality language should be retained
to make it readily apparent that the enumerated circumstances
are not the only ones which render the lender subject to defenses
and claims of the buyer against the seller when there is some
business relationship between the two. Varying circumstances
of business relationships can therefore be included within the
general provision of "participating in or being connected with"
a transaction either in a particular case or by the administra-
tors' listing of circumstances. Otherwise, the bill, if it becomes
law, may well become a sham." '
Concern and opposition to this section subjecting interlocking
lenders to defenses that the buyer has against the seller is probably
unfounded. A lender can avoid the operation of the section by not
arranging with the seller for a referral fee, by avoiding relationships
with the seller, by not receiving guarantees of the loan from the
seller, by not directly supplying the seller with documents of loans
or vice versa, by not conditioning loans on purchases from the
seller, and by not issuing non-lender credit cards.0 8 The facts that
will constitute an interlocking relationship over which the lender
' Written statement of Del. William Field presented to the Conference Com-
mittee on S.B. 240, Reg. Sess. (1974).
- W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-103 (1)(a) (i) to (v), (vii) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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has no control will be so hard and expensive for consumers to prove
in the usual case, that it is really no cause for concern." 9
7. The Rule Making Authority of the Attorney General
Among the most important features of the WVCCPA are the
two sections conferring rule-making authority upon the Attorney
General.- ' One provision authorizes the Attorney General to make
rules "interpreting and defining unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices," as defined in section 102
of article six, and as used in article six."' The second gives to the
Attorney General power to adopt "regulations in accordance with
the . . .[West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act] . . .as
are necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes of this chapter
[the entire Act] and to prevent circumvention or evasion
thereof."512
The WVCCPA makes unfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce unlawful, whether the methods, acts, or practices in-
volve cash or credit transactions 3 and imposes penalties for such
violations."1 The Act defines as unfair methods and acts, fourteen
common practices, including among others passing off goods or
services as those of another, representing that goods are new if they
are used, disparaging the goods of another by false or misleading
representations of fact, and engaging in any conduct that similarly
Id. § 46A-2-103(1)(a)(vi).
5,0 The Attorney General has set up a division of consumer protection within
the Attorney General's office and has appointed a director to run it. The director
is presently engaged in drafting rules and regulations needed to administer the
IWVCCPA.
5,1 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-103 (Cum. Supp. 1974). This is potentially the
most important of the powers given to the Attorney General under the WVCCPA.
But this section also authorizes him to make rules interpreting the terms
"advertisement," "consumer," "consumer transaction," "merchantable," "sale,"
"trade or commerce," and "warranty" as these terms are used in article six. Id. The
terms "consumer" and "consumer transaction" were added to this section by En-
rolled H.B. 1421 (Reg. Sess. 1974).
... W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-102(1)(e).
513 Id. § 46A-6-104.
5I One penalty gives to any consumer who suffers an ascertainable loss as a
result of an unfair act or practice a cause of action for actual damages or two
hundred dollars, whichever is greater. Id. § 46A-6-106. Another authorizes the
Attorney General to bring a civil action against the violator for a penalty of up to
$5000 for repeated wilful violations of the Act. Id. § 46A-7-111(2).
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creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.'" The
WVCCPA gives the Attorney General the authority to promulgate
regulations interpreting and defining what other acts and practices
will constitute such illegal unfair acts and prActices.
The effectiveness of this whole scheme will turn on how much
authority the Act really gives to the Attorney General. That this
authority is very broad is clear from the provision's origin, its
language, and its legislative history. Article six is modeled after the
Federal Trade Commission Act," 6 and states in its introductory
section that its purpose "is to complement the body of federal law
governing unfair competition and unfair, deceptive, and fradulent
acts or practices." ' 7 The Federal Act declares unfair practices to
be unlawful and entrusts to the Federal Trade Commission the
power to define what specific practices constitute such unfair prac-
tices. Changing views under the federal law will be complemented
by changing views under the WVCCPA as required by the author-
ity granting section of the Act:
Such rules and regulations shall conform as nearly as practica-
ble with the rules, regulations and decisions of the federal trade
commission and the federal courts in interpreting the "Federal
Trade Commission Act," as from time to time amended." '
To accomplish this, the rule-making power of the Attorney General
must be broad.
That the power of the Attorney General is broad is also made
clear by the language of section 102(e), which defines unfair meth-
ods and practices: illegal conduct "includes, but is not limited to"
the specified acts and practices.
The legislative history of the article underscores the intent to
vest in the administrator the broad power to define additional
unfair practices. Immediately prior to the passage of the Act, the
bill had been passed by both houses and was in conference com-
mittee. At that time Delegate Field, as a member of the commit-
tee, suggested the addition of the language "and defining" to the
description of rule-making authority, in order to clarify the power
of the administrator to delineate additional unfair practices:
"I Id. § 46A-6-102(e).
516 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970).
", W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-101 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
, Id. § 46A-6-103.
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I would suggest adding the language "and defining" to Section
103 for the reason that I feel it is not abundantly clear that the
Attorney General has the power to, without this word, actually
define practices which he finds to be an unfair method of com-
petition and an unfair or deceptive act or practice. A reading
of Section 102 of the same Article indicates that he does have
this power; subsection (e) states 'unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices' means and includes,
but is not limited to, any one or more of the following." The
language "but is not limited to" would indicate that the Attor-
ney General's Office would have the power to set up its own
categories of unfair methods of competition and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices within the meaning of article 6; however,
by adding the word "defined" to the Attorney General's rule-
making power, it is then abundantly clear, together with the
inclusionary language of "but is not limited to" from the defini-
tion that the Attorney General has the power to define unfair
methods of competition and unfair methods of deceptive acts
or practices which do not fall into any one specific category as
enumerated in (1) thru (14) of subsection (e) of Section 102.51,
The statement further suggested that this rule-making power
would insure that the administrator would not have to go back to
the Legislature every time a deceptive seller derives a new fraudu-
lent technique.52
The second authority provided the Attorney General is the
general rule-making authority for the overall supervision of the
WVCCPA. The Act authorizes the Attorney General to:
Adopt, amend and repeal such reasonable rules and regula-
tions. . . as are necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes
of this chapter and to prevent circumvention or evasion
thereof. . ..21
The language of the provision has its origin in the Federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, which gives to the Federal Reserve
Board the power to promulgate rules and regulations as are neces-
sary and proper to effectuate the purposes of that chapter and to
prevent circumvention and evasion thereof.2 2
"I Written statement of Del. William Field, presented to the Conference Com-
mittee on the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act. Reg. Sess. (1974).
52 Id.
521 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-102(1)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
5 The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of
[the Act]. These regulations may contain such classifications, differen-
tiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and
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It is clear from the language employed, and the interpretation
of the identical language in the Federal Act by the United States
Supreme Court, that the rule-making authority is a broad one. The
United States Supreme Court has indicated that the language
empowers the agency to write regulations going beyond the express
language of the Act. The situation that gave rise to Supreme Court
construction of this rule-making language in Mourning v. Family
Publication Service, Inc.s clarifies the extremely broad nature of
the language authorizing rules "to effectuate purposes" of the Act
and "to prevent circumvention and evasion thereof". The Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act provides that its coverage extends
to all transactions in which "a finance charge is or may be im-
posed."su The federal agency promulgated rules extending that
coverage to transactions in which "either a finance charge is or
may be imposed or which pursuant to an agreement, is or may be
payable in more than four installments." ' The Supreme Court
held that even though the regulation went beyond the specific
language of the Act, Congress in using the broad rule-making lan-
guage, had given to the agency the power to make the act effective
and to prevent its evasion, and that the regulation accomplished
such a purpose."'
The actual language used in the WVCCPA was initially incor-
porated into the bill in the deliberations in the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1973 Regular Session.5 There were attempts to re-
move the broad language in the 1974 Regular Session, and a writ-
ten statement submitted by a delegate in support of the broad
language spells out clearly its derivation and purpose."' Thus,
exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board
are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of [the Act], to pre-
vent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance there-
with.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1971).
5- 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
524 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1971).
52 FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 226 2(k) (Rev. ed. 1974).
5n Mourning v. Family Publications, 411 U.S. 356, 365-71 (1973).
51 S.B. 1070, Reg. Sess. (1973) Originating in the Committee for the Judiciary
of the State Senate.
12 The language of this provision is specifically taken from the Fed-
eral Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604. The provision in this bill
[46A-7-102(e)] permits the Attorney General to adopt reasonable rules
and regulations that are "necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes
of the Act and prevent circumvention or evasion thereof". This is impor-
tant rule-making authority. As always with any piece of consumer legisla-
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from this legislative history, the language used, and the origin of
the language, it is clear that the rule-making power given to the
Attorney General in the WVCCPA is very broad indeed.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The WVCCPA strikes a balance somewhere between the inter-
ests of creditors and the interests and protection of debtors. That
is not to say the Act on a whole is "just" or is "right." There may
well be no "just" or "right." After all, most-of the problems con-
tion, consumer credit being the intricate and complicated field that it is,
certain creditors and devious sellers find ways and technicalities to avoid
a specific provision designed to prohibit a certain practice or area of
practices.
The Federal Truth-in-Lending Act specifically provided language
that would permit the rule-making authority to write regulations which
went beyond the specific language of the Act in an effort to prevent
circumvention or evasion of an Act. For example, the Federal Truth-in-
Lending Act provided that the disclosure mandate related to a transac-
tion in which a finance charge was imposed. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(F). The
Federal Reserve Board, the rule making authority, pursuant to the Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1604, wrote a regulation known as the "Four Installment
Rule" which said that any transaction in which there was a finance
charge or in which was payable in more than four installments was sub-
ject to the provisions of the Act. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k). This provision was
clearly beyond the specific language of the Act, but was necessary be-
cause creditors were burying the finance charge in the cash price to avoid
coverage of the Act. The United States Supreme Court specifically up-
held this rule making authority provision in the case of Mourning v.
Family Publications Service, Inc., 93 S.Ct. 1652 (1973). The Supreme
Court found that Congress had specifically intended to prevent certain
devious persons and others to avoid the purposes of the Act by the use of
technicalities which would bring them outside of the coverage of the Act.
Likewise with our Act here, I am certain that some sellers or creditors
will find ways to avoid coverage of specific provisions of the Act. For
example, a seller or a lender might structure his selling or lending to fall
outside the coverage of the provision, rendering an assignee or lender
subject to defenses. Further legislative action should not be required
when the purpose could be accomplished by a broad regulatory authority.
The broad regulatory language which permits the regulatory agency
to write regulations prohibiting circumvention of the intent of the provi-
sions is important. This, I suggest, is the language that we should retain
in the draft of the Act that we have here. The language has been upheld
as a proper rule-making authority by the United States Supreme Court,
and thereby we have a body of case law to follow in the construction of
the rule-making authority.
Written statement of Del. William Field to Conference Committee, on the West
Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act, Reg. Sess. (1974).
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fronted by the Act are social and political and pose social and
political questions. The answers given by the Act are social and
political answers. This does not mean the WVCCPA is not an
important step forward for West Virginia. In some situations it
clearly is, and in others it might be. Citizens who need cash for
consumer goods can more easily find a lender now that interest
rates on loans are higher. Consumers who were once barred from
suing by disclaimers they never saw or never understood can now
recover. Privity, a doctrine which was never in the interests of
citizens who consumed goods manufactured in other states, is now
abolished. The coal miner who for forty years saw every penny of
his earnings taken by the company store is freed at least from this
form of economic slavery.
It will take several years of experience with other provisions
of the WVCCPA to show how effective it is in regulating finance
charges and lending practices, and how much it will protect the
consumer and redress the traditional imbalance between consumer
purchasers and merchant sellers. But some general statements
about the WVCCPA can be made. Some of the provisions in the
Act do not seem particularly important because the abuses they
reach are not common in West Virginia. Referral sales are one
example.5 2 Other sections are directed at common consumer prob-
lems, but they may not go far enough to solve the abuses. Balloon
payments are still allowed with notice, and there is no right to
refinance the balloon payment if the initial obligation is more than
$1500.130 Many automobile purchases will therefore fall outside the
protection of this section. Garnishment is still allowed on up to
twenty percent of disposable earnings,53' and an employer can still
fire an employee for two or more non-consumer related garnish-
ments.5312 Some assignment of earnings is still allowed '33 and defi-
ciency judgements in larger purchases are still available.5" Some
household goods, necessary for civilized living, can still be reached
to satisfy a judgment."' Importantly, although penalties are pro-
vided for some violations, they are not provided for others, and
even those penalties which are provided might not be high enough
5 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-110 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
'o Id. § 46A-2-105.
', Id. § 46A-2-130.
52 Id. § 46A-2-131.
Id. § 46A-2-116.
Id. § 46A-2-119.
Id. § 46A-2-136.
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to encourage consumers to pursue the violation and then also pay
for the consumer's attorney.
53 6
To make the rate ceilings and regulations effective, the Act
should be amended. It should adopt, for computation purposes,
the finance charge regulations of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, the National Consumer Act, or the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act; or in the alternative, the WVCCPA should be
amended to require lenders to disclose the true interest rates,
which would make their computations conform to the Federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act Truth-in-Lending provisions for in-
consistent provisions.
There are a number of problems that the Act does not attempt
to reach. The President's Commission on Consumer Finance rec-
ommended that creditors be allowed to provide for reasonable at-
torney's fees up to fifteen percent of the outstanding debt for col-
lecting upon the debtor's default and also recommended that the
creditor be required to pay the debtor's attorney's fees if the credi-
tor's lawsuit fails.07 The Act says nothing about horizontal privity,
so it is still left to the courts to determine who, besides the buyer
or members of her family or household, are protected by warranties
of the seller.5 u
Moreover, the WVCCPA says nothing about "sewer serv-
ice," 5 or problems with the parol evidence rule in consumer
sales,"' although it is not clear whether these are problems com-
mon to West Virginia consumer transactions.
Id. § 46A-5-101; id. § 46A-6-106; id. § 46A-7-111.
M7 NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIr IN THE UNITED
STATES XV. (1972) [hereinafter CONSUMER CREDrr REPORT].
's W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
' See the recommendations concerning the problem of failure to serve sum-
mons found in CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, note 537 supra, at 41.
"I Most consumer transactions involve face to face oral negotiations between
the buyer and seller in which descriptions, promises and conditions of the agree-
ment are made. In many instances this is followed by the seller producing a form
contract at the last minute and having the buyer sign it, which the buyer does and
usually without reading the contract. The buyer's signature implies that he agrees
with the terms contained in the writing, when often that is not necessarily the case.
The parol evidence rule operates to keep out any evidence of agreements or prom-
ises made outside the writing which conflict with the terms of the writing. Even if
the proferred evidence does not conflict with the writing but merely supplements
it, many courts will find that the writing was meant to contain all the terms agreed
upon (that it is an integrated contract), and will not allow the introduction of the
proferred evidence. This is done in spite of the liberal rule found in the clear
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A large problem left untouched by the Act is that of default
judgments. Consumers commonly fail to get legal counsel when
they are sued, many because they cannot afford it, and some be-
cause they do not comprehend the importance of the suit. Many
of the latter fail to appear in court. If the law does not provide some
way to represent the interest of those who fail to appear, or who
appear without counsel, the substantive protections supplied by
the WVCCPA largely disappear. Default judgments cannot be
abolished; otherwise a party could avoid his legal obligations sim-
ply by staying away from the court. But they can be regulated. One
way to regulate default judgments would be to enact a statute
allowing any party to re-open simply by motion, any judgment
against her based upon a consumer transaction. This would help
those consumers who awaken to the seriousness of the threat
against their interests when the judgment creditor is attempting
to levy upon their property or wages.
There are more effective ways of protecting consumers who fail
to appear to defend themselves. All plaintiffs should be required
in any lawsuit arising from a consumer transaction, to aver in their
pleadings the basis of the debt, the amount and manner of the
payment already made, the alleged reasons for the defendants fail-
ure to pay, if known, and any defenses claimed by the defendant
that have been communicated to the plaintiff. This requirement
should be accompanied by heavy sanctions for non-disclosure
placed upon both the plaintiff and his attorney, and by a duty
placed upon the court to raise sua sponte all defenses that the
consumer could raise on the facts as presented in the pleadings.
This would have to be done by statute, and the sanctions, espe-
cially those placed upon the attorneys, would have to be enforced.
But adoption of the requirements above might solve many of the
abuses caused by default judgments entered against poor, unso-
phisticated, unaided defendants.
language of the Uniform Commercial Code's parol evidence rule. See W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46-2-202 (1966). The result is that consumers are left without contract
promises that they thought they had, and are bound to contract conditions they
did not know about. One solution would be to determine those contract terms which
are often contairied or excluded by seller's form contracts to the detriment of the
buyer and require that these terms be independently initialed by the buyer before
they can effectively bind him. The WVCCPA prohibition of disclaimers eliminates
the most damaging use of the parol evidence rule to injure consumers. Id. § 46A.6-
107 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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Finally, the chief weakness in the WVCCPA is that it is too
complicated for the average consumer to understand even if she
does read it. In fact, it is unlikely that the average attorney will
spend the dozen hours necessary to gain a good understanding of
the Act. It might be that the Act could not be made more simple
without discarding the exceptions and compromises needed for its
enactment. But regardless of the reasons, the end product is not a
simple, clearly understandable statement of consumer rights and
protections. It is rather a complicated, interrelated, lengthy piece
of legislation, which contains within its excess verbiage a number
of solid provisions protecting consumers. This article has at-
tempted to gather in a more orderly fashion a clear restatement of
those provisions. We must hope that the director of the division of
consumer protection will take steps to use the mass media to com-
municate these protections to the consumers for whose benefit the
Act was drafted.-"
-4 One of the duties of the director of the division of consumer protection is to
conduct programs to educate the public about consumer problems. See id. § 46A-
7-103(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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APPENDIX
This table provides cross references to provisions in the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act which are
similar to the corresponding sections of the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act. It provides a reference to the
UCCC and the NCA through such publication as the Consumer
Credit Guide of CCH, the NCA Official Text (with comments) and
Selected Commercial Statutes (1973). This enables the researcher
to examine the drafter's comments which follow each code section
showing the purpose and reasoning in drafting that particular pro-
vision. Many of these publications, especially CCH, provide list-
ings of recent cases in other jurisdictions relating them to corre-
sponding UCCC sections, that may have dealt with a similar prob-
lem or question. Also a growing number of law review articles are
being written on particular provisions of the UCCC and NCA.
Reference to these materials enables the researcher to better inter-
pret the West Virginia Act and allows some predictability as to
how the courts will interpret this same act.
W.Va. Description UCCC NCA
46A-1-101 Short Title 1.101 1.101
1-102 Definitions 1.301 1.303
1.303
1-103 Effect on powers or organizations. 1.108 1.107
1-104 Application 1.201 1.201
1-105 Exclusions 1.202 1.202
1-106 Transactions subject to Act by Agreement 2.601 -
of parties 3.601
1-107 Waiver 1.107 1.106
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION
46A-2-101 Holders of neg. instruments subject to 2.403
claims & defenses
2-102 Assignee subject to claims & defenses 2.404 2.406
2-103 Lender subject to claims & defenses - -
2-104 Notice to cosigners - -
2-105 Balloon payments 2.405 2.402
3.402
2-106 Notice of right to cure default: acceleration - 2.203
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2-107
2-108
2-109
2-110
2-111
2-112
2-113
2-114
2-115
2-116
2-117
2-118
2-119
2-120
2-121
2-122
2-123
2-124
2-125
2-126
2-127
2-128
2-129
2-130
2-131
2-132
2-133
2-134
2-135
Security in sales or leases
Cross-collateral
Debt secured by cross-collateral
Referral sales or leases
Discloser in consumer leases
Restriction on liability in consumer lease
Notice of assignment
Receipts; statements of account;
evidence of payment
Limitation on default charges
Assignment of earnings
Confession of Judgment prohibited
Pre-judgment garnishment
Restrictions on deficiency judgments
Extortionate extentions of credit
Unconscionability
Definitions
Practice of law by debt collectors
Threats or coercion
Oppression and abuse
Unreasonable Publication
Fraudulent, deceptive or misleading
representations
Unfair or unconscionable means
Postal Violations
Limitation on garnishment
No discharge or reprisal because of
garnishment
Home solicitation; right to cancel;
notice
Form of agreement;
Statement of buyer's rights
Restoration of down payment
Buyer's duty, no compensation for
certain services
2.407
2.408(1)
2.409
2.411
2.311
2.406
2.412
2.414
3.405
2.414
3.403
2.415
3.407
5.104 5.105
5.103 5.211
5.107 5.108
5.108 5.107
- 7.103
- 7.201
- 7.202
- 7.203
- 7.204
- 7.205
- 7.206
- 7.207
5.105 5.106
5.106 -
2.502 2.502
2.505
2.503 2.503
2.505
2.504 2.504
2.505 -
2.416
2.416
2.415
2.411
2.408
2.412
2.403
2.404
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2-136 Personal property exemptions - -
2-137 Service of process on nonresidents -
2-138 Buyer's right to cancel certain subscriptions --
& other obligations
FINANCE CHARGES AND
RELATED PROVISIONS
46A-3-101 Sales[max.] finance charge 2.201 2.201
3-102 Sales[max.] finance charge - -
- real estate.
3-103 Sales[max.] finance charge 2.207 2.201
-revolving charge acc'ts
3-104 Loan finance charge by supervised 3.508 -
finan. organ.
3-105 Interest rates on loans - -
guaranteed by U.S.
3-106 Loan finance charge for revolving 3.508 -
loan acc'ts
3-107 Finance charge on refinancing 2.205 2.206
3.205"
3-108 Finance charge on consolidation 2.206 2.207
3.206
3-109 Additional charges 2.202 2.202
3.202
3-110 Right to repay 2.209 2.209
3.209
3-111 Application of payments on account . . . 2.210 -
3.210
3-112 Delinquency charges on precomputed 2.203 2.204
sales or loans 3.203
3-113 Delinquency charges on non-precomputed - -
sales or loans
3-114 Deferral charges 2.204 2.205
3.204
3-115 Advances to perform covenants of consumer 2.208 2.208
3.208
3-116 Change in terms of revolving charge 2.416 2.414
of loan acc'ts 3.408
SUPERVISED LENDERS
46A-4-101 Authority to make supervised loans 3.502 -
4-102 License 3.503 -
122
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss3/3
CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION
4-103
4-104
4-105
4-106
4-107
4-108
4-109
4-110
4-111
4-112
4-113
46A-5-101
5-102 Assertion of rights
6-103 Willful violations
GENERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
-6-101 Statutory construction
6-102 Definitions
6-103 Rules & regulations
6-104 Unlawful Practices
6-105 Exempted transactions
6-106 Actions by consumers
6-107 Disclaimer of warranties & remedies
abolished
6-108 Breach of warranty; privity abolished
ADMINISTRATION
-7-101 Division of consumer protection created
7-102 Power of Atty. Gen.
7-103 Division of administrative powers
7-104 Investigatory powers
7-105 Application of Admin. Procedures Act
3.504
3.505
3.506
3.507
3.508
3.509
3.510
Revocation of license
Records & reports
Examinations & investigations
Application of Admin. Procedures Act
Loan finance charge
Multiple agreements
Restrictions on Interest in land
as security
Conduct of business other than
making loans
Max. interest of loan over $1,200
Small loan companies
Continuation of licensing
CIVIL LIABILITY AND CRIMINAL
PENALTIES
Effect of violations on rights
of parties
3.512 -
9.102
5.202 5.302
5.303
5.304
5.305
5.301 5.401
- 1.303
- 3.202
- 3.201
- 3.302
- 3.304
6.104
6.106
6.107
6.104
6.106
6.107
2.413
2.416
46A
46A
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Admin. enforcement orders; jud. review 6.108 6.108
Assurance of discontinuance 6.109 -
7-106
7-107
7-108
7-109
7-110
7-111
7-112
7-113
7-114
7-115
7-116
OPERATIVE DATE AND PROVISIONS
FOR TRANSITION
Enforceability of prior transactions
Severability
6.110 6.110(1)
6.111 6.110(1)
Injunctions
Injunctions against unconscionable
agreements & fraud
Temporary relief
Civil action by Atty. Gen.
Jury trial
Consumer remedies not affected
Venue
Notification
Consumer affairs advisory council
6.112 6.110(2)
6.113 6.111
6.114 -
6.115 6.113
6.116 6.112
6.202 6.201
6.202
6.301 6.301
6.302 6.302
9.101 9.10146A-8-101
8-102
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